Klein v. Atp Flight Sch., LLP
| Decision Date | 03 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No 14-CV-1522 (JFB) (GRB),14-CV-1522 (JFB) (GRB) |
| Parties | MARIE KLEIN, Plaintiff, v. ATP FLIGHT SCHOOL, LLP, ADAM ROSENBERG, JIM KOZIARSKI, AND KELVIN KING, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Marie Klein ("Klein" or "plaintiff") commenced this action against ATP Flight School, LLC ("ATP"),1 Adam Rosenberg ("Rosenberg"), Jim Koziarski ("Koziarski"), and Kelvin King ("King") on March 7, 2014, alleging harassment, discrimination, and retaliation on the basis of her sex. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendant Rosenberg subjected plaintiff to severe sexual harassment, and that the other defendants did nothing to stop him even after plaintiff brought the issue to their attention. Plaintiff brings claims of discrimination and retaliation against ATP under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88; discrimination claims against all defendants under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws; aiding and abetting claims against all individual defendants under the New York State Human Rights Law; and claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Rosenberg.
Presently before the Court is a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss this action filed by ATP, Koziarski, and King(collectively, the "ATP defendants"). In the alternative, the ATP defendants request that this Court stay plaintiff's claims against them in favor of arbitration. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court stays plaintiff's claims against the ATP defendants in favor of arbitration; however, the Court cannot compel arbitration in Georgia, as the parties' arbitration agreement provides.
The following facts are taken from the complaint. These are not findings of fact by the Court. Instead, the Court recites these allegations in order to provide context for the instant motion.
Plaintiff enrolled in ATP's career pilot program in March 2013, and she began attending flight school at MacArthur Airport in Suffolk County, New York, the next month. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 24.) While a student at ATP, plaintiff alleges that she was subject to sexual harassment by Rosenberg, who administered Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") exams known as "check-rides" and instructed ATP students in the classroom and flight simulator. (See generally id. ¶¶ 26-58.) In general, plaintiff claims that Rosenberg made unwelcome sexual advances toward her and, on two occasions, masturbated in front of her. (See generally id.)
According to plaintiff, she and her flight instructor reported Rosenberg's actions to King, ATP's Regional General Manager for the Northeast, in September 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 61-68.) Despite plaintiff's reports of sexual harassment by Rosenberg, ATP allegedly took no action to stop the sexual harassment, and the sexual harassment continued. (Id. ¶ 70.) Plaintiff further alleges that her husband called Koziarski, ATP's Vice President of Operations, on October 8, 2013, and Koziarski told him that plaintiff was being expelled from the program. (Id. ¶ 74.) The next day, ATP expelled plaintiff from the career pilot program. (Id. ¶¶ 75-76.)
When plaintiff enrolled at ATP on March 13, 2013, she signed a "Flight School Agreement, Waiver of Liability, Release, and Agreement to Arbitrate" (the "Agreement"). The Agreement contained the following arbitration clause:
Trainee acknowledges that this Agreement and ATP's provision of flight training services constitute transactions involving interstate commerce and agrees that this Agreement and related disputes are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. Trainee agrees that any claim, dispute, or controversy (whether in contract, tort, or otherwise) arising from or relating to this Flight School Agreement and Waiver of Liability or the relationships which result from this contract, including the validity or enforceability of this arbitration clause or any part thereof or the entire contract, shall be resolved by binding arbitration under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association and the Federal Arbitration Act in Atlanta, Georgia. The Arbitration panel will consist of three members, all of whom must be pilots, and the chairman must be a lawyer. Each party will select one arbitrator and the selected arbitrators will choose the chairman. The parties exclusively select the application of Georgia substantive law without resort toGeorgia's conflicts of law rules to resolve legal issues that may arise in the course of such arbitration or any litigation between the parties. In the event a party brings a lawsuit in violation of this agreement, the violating party shall be responsible for all expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in enforcing this arbitration agreement. In the event of any litigation arising from or related to this agreement or any other agreements or dealings between the parties, the parties select as the sole and exclusive venue for any such litigation the state and federal courts in Atlanta, Georgia.
(Id.) Plaintiff signed her initials next to the arbitration clause and signed the agreement. (Id.)
Plaintiff signed another agreement, entitled the "Flight Training and Refund Policy" (the "Policy"), on April 17, 2013. (Kalocsay Decl. Ex. B, Policy.) The Policy also contained an arbitration clause, which reads as follows:
Trainee agrees that, upon the sole and exclusive election of ATP, any claim, dispute, or controversy (whether in contract, tort, or otherwise) arising from or relating to Trainee's enrollment in any ATP flight training program or any dealings or agreements between ATP and Trainee, including the validity or enforceability of this arbitration clause or any part thereof or any other matter, shall be resolved by binding arbitration under the Rules of the American Arbitration Association in Jacksonville, Florida. The Arbitration panel will consist of three members, all of whom must be pilots, and the chairman must be a lawyer. Each party will select one arbitrator and the selected arbitrators will choose the chairman. The parties exclusively select the application of Georgia substantive law without resort to Georgia's conflicts of law rules to resolve legal issues that may arise in the course of such arbitration or any litigation between the parties. Should any such controversy arising from or related to this agreement or any other agreements or dealings between the parties be litigated rather than arbitrated, the parties select as the sole and exclusive venue for any such litigation the state and federal courts in Jacksonville, Florida.
(Id.) Plaintiff signed her initials next to the arbitration clause and signed the Policy. (Id.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on March 7, 2014. The ATP defendants moved to compel arbitration and dismiss this action on May 2, 2014. Plaintiff filed her opposition to the motion on May 30, 2014, and the ATP defendants filed their reply on June 13, 2014. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on June 24, 2014. The Court has fully considered the submissions of the parties.
Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., the Court evaluates a motion to compel arbitration under a standard similar to the standard for a summary judgment motion made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.2 SeeBensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54 n.9 (3d Cir. 1980)); see also Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 380 F. App'x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order); Jillian Mech. Corp. v. United Serv. Workers Union Local 355, 882 F. Supp. 2d 358, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Guida v. Home Sav. of Am., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d 611, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). "If there is an issue of fact as to the making of the agreement for arbitration, then a trial is necessary." Bensadoun, 316 F.3d at 175 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).
The standard for summary judgment is well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2013). The moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Jillian Mech. Corp. , 882 F. Supp. 2d at 364 (). The court "'is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments.'" Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996)); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) ().
Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party " " Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). As the Supreme Court stated in Anderson, "[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be...
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