Kline Iron & Steel Co. v. Superior Trucking Co., Inc., 19740

• Decision Date: 11 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 19740,19740
• Citation: 261 S.C. 542,201 S.E.2d 388
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: KLINE IRON AND STEEL COMPANY, Respondent, v. SUPERIOR TRUCKING COMPANY, INC., Appellant.

Page 388

201 S.E.2d 388

261 S.C. 542

KLINE IRON AND STEEL COMPANY, Respondent, v. SUPERIOR TRUCKING COMPANY, INC., Appellant.

No. 19740.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 11, 1973.

J. Lewis Cromer and James P. Craig, Columbia, for appellant.

Frank A. Graham, Jr., Columbia, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice:

Plaintiff, Kline Iron and Steel Company, recovered judgment against defendant, Superior Trucking Company, Inc., a common carrier, for damages allegedly sustained as a result of the failure of defendant to timely deliver a shipment of steel in accordance with the contract of conveyance between the parties. Defendant has appealed, presenting two basic questions for decision, to wit:

(1) Was there any evidence to show that defendant failed to deliver the goods as agreed; and (2) did the trial judge properly submit the issue of damages to the jury?

Plaintiff entered into an agreement with defendant on August 24, 1970, for the transportation of a truckload of fabricated steel from Cayce, South Carolina, to Shoreview, Minnesota, for the sum of $915.00. The shipment was consigned to Hamilton Erection Company which was engaged in the erection of a television tower for plaintiff at Shoreview. Plaintiff's traffic manager, who arranged the shipment, testified that the need for the steel in the construction at Shoreview was urgent and necessitated delivery there by August 26, 1970. He further testified that he informed defendant's agents of the necessity for delivery by August 26th, which resulted in the agreement for the delivery of the steel to the consignee at Shoreview by that date.

The shipper's agreement, signed by the parties, contained the notation '8--26--70 Del. or ASAP. All agree that 'Del.' meant 'delivery' and 'ASAP' meant 'as soon as possible,' so that, without abbreviations, the notation was '8--26--70 delivery or as soon as possible.' Whether or not defendant breached the agreement depends upon the construction to be placed on this notation as to time of delivery of the shipment.

The traffic manager testified that defendant's employees assured him that, if the shipment was loaded on August 24th, which was done, it would arrive in Shoreview in time for delivery to the consignee on the afternoon of August 25th. Since he was assured that it could be delivered on the 25th, the notation 'as soon as possible' was added, indicating the agreement to deliver earlier than the deadline date of August 26th, if possible. Plaintiff's traffic manager was emphatic that 'as soon as possible' meant as soon as possible Prior to the deadline date of August 26th and was not intended, as argued by defendant, to mean that delivery could be made by August 26th or as soon as possible Thereafter.

Defendant did not deliver the shipment at Shoreview until the afternoon of September 1, 1970. It now takes the position that September 1st was as soon after August 26th as it could make delivery and that it has therefore complied with the contract of conveyance.

Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that defendant agreed under the written contract to deliver the shipment not later than August 26, 1970, and that defendant negligently failed to deliver by that date. The sole defense of the defendant was, in effect, a general denial. The basic issue of liability, therefore, turned upon whether defendant had agreed to deliver the goods by August 26th. If it did so agree, it was liable for any damages resulting from the failure to deliver by that date. If it did not so agree, it was not liable. This was the narrow issue under which the case was submitted to the jury by the trial judge, to which there was no exception.

Admittedly, the agreement between the parties called for delivery by August 26th, 'or as soon as possible.' The phrase 'or as soon as possible' was susceptible of more than one interpretation, that is, whether 'as soon as possible' prior to August 26th or after that date. Its meaning depended upon the intention of the parties, and under the conflicting testimony on the issue, was properly submitted to the jury for determination. The contention that there was no evidence to show that defendant failed to deliver the goods as agreed is without merit.

Defendant next contends that plaintiff failed to prove any recoverable damages.

When the shipment was not delivered by August 26th, the testimony shows that construction of the television tower was delayed until the steel arrived. The employees of the consignee had to be paid during the time that they were idle because of the delay and the consignee required plaintiff to pay the amount of these wages. This is referred to as stand by time. The stand by time was paid by plaintiff, and plaintiff's liability to the consignee for such payment because of the delay in delivery or the amount thereof is not in dispute.

Appellant takes the position that the payment of wages to laborers because of the delay constituted special damages; that it had no notice of any circumstances from which it could reasonably be expected that such damages would occur from a delay in delivery of the steel; and that, in the absence of such notice, it would not be liable for any charges for stand by time of the consignee's employees.

The damages recoverable for a breach of contract are those which follow as a natural consequence of the breach, or which may reasonably be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, Section 56; Hiers v....