Kline v. City of Columbia

• Decision Date: 07 June 1967
• Docket Number: No. 18663,18663
• Citation: 155 S.E.2d 597,249 S.C. 532
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Ella KLINE and Lena Kline, Respondents, v. The CITY OF COLUMBIA and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, of whom theCity of Columbia is, Appellant. KLINE SUPPLY COMPANY, Respondent, v. The CITY OF COLUMBIA and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, of whom theCity of Columbia is, Appellant.

Page 597

155 S.E.2d 597

249 S.C. 532

Ella KLINE and Lena Kline, Respondents, v. The CITY OF COLUMBIA and South Carolina Electric & Gas

Company, of whom theCity of Columbia is, Appellant.

KLINE SUPPLY COMPANY, Respondent, v. The CITY OF COLUMBIA and South Carolina Electric & Gas

Company, of whom theCity of Columbia is, Appellant.

No. 18663.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 7, 1967.

John W. Sholenberger, Edward A. Harter, Jr., Columbia, for appellant.

Robinson, McFadden & Moore, Columbia, for respondents.

BUSSEY, Justice:

This is an appeal from orders of the Richland County Court, in each of the above entitled actions, overruling a demurrer and a motion to strike by the appellant City of Columbia.

The two actions are identical, except that the individual respondents Kline are the owners of a building on Huger Street in the City of Columbia, and they seek to recover for damages to such building, while respondent Kline Supply Company, a partnership, seeks to recover for damages as owner of the contents of the building. The cases are joined in this appeal because identical questions are involved, and for convenience we shall refer to them in the singular. The damages for which the respondents seek to recover resulted from an explosion and fire on November 19, 1962, allegedly caused by leaking gas coming in contact with a suspended gas heater. The recovery sought against the City is predicated both on Section 47--70 of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolina and Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution.

The complaint charged the City of Columbia as follows:

'(a) In negligently pulling loose a gas line running from Huger Street to the plaintiffs' building while excavating the street in order to change the location of a fire hydrant due to the widening of Huger Street in that area;

'(b) In failing to notify its co-defendant South Carolina Electric & Gas Company to shut off the gas after its agents or servants knew or should have known that their equipment had pulled loose a gas line and gas was escaping; and

'(c) In failing promptly to notify its co-defendant after the forman of the City's crew had himself been advised of what the crew had done and that he should call the power company.'

The defendant, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, which will be referred to simply as the Power Company, is alleged to have been negligent in certain particulars in failing to cut off the gas after the line was ruptured. The complaint also alleged that the damages sustained amounted to a taking of the property as the result of the acts of the City, its agents and servants, for which the respondents were entitled to just compensation at the hands of the court.

The City moved to strike from the complaint allegations (b) and (c) above, and the paragraph alleging a 'taking'. The City also demurred to the complaint on several grounds, which may be briefly summarized as follows: 1. The complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under either Section 47--70 of the Code, or Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution. 2. That several causes of action had been improperly united.

The City's motion to strike and its demurrer were both overruled, the lower court holding that the complaint stated a cause of action under both the statute and the Constitutional provision.

The appellant's argument that the complaint does not state any cause of action against it is predicated entirely on the recent decision of this court in Collins v. City of Greenville, 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704, wherein it was held that the complaint did not allege a cause of action under either the statute or the constitutional provision here relied on. While there are some similarities, we think the Collins case is distinguishable and not here controlling. There the act giving rise to the damages complained of was the clogging of a sewer pipe and the alleged negligent act of a city employee in attempting to unclog such, damage having been sustained when sewerage backed up in plaintiff's premises.

For the purpose of demurrer the complaint must be liberally construed, and all the facts and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom are deemed as true. Chilton v. City of Columbia, 247 S.C. 407, 147 S.E.2d 642. We first consider whether the complaint alleges a cause of action under the constitutional provision. It appears that in the instant case the City was involved in the affirmative, aggressive and positive act of improving and widening a public street for public use. It was engaged in the exercise of a power ordinarily, though not necessarily, exercised under the power of eminent domain. In the Collins case the city was not engaged in any such aggressive and positive act.

It has long been recognized in this jurisdiction that the casting of water on adjoining premises by some act of the governmental authority in the course of making improvements to a public way constitutes a taking of property in violation of Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution. Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dept., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842; Milhous v. State Highway Dept., 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852, 128 A.L.R. 1186; Faust v. Richland County, 117 S.C. 251, 109 S.E. 151. No logical reason is suggested why the invasion of one's property with a highly inflammable substance, such as gas, should be considered any less a taking of property than an invasion by water.

In the case of Derrick v. City of Columbia, 122 S.C. 29, 114 S.E. 857, the plaintiff was permitted to recover damages for injuries to his premises by dangerous fumes created by the improper maintenance of a slaughter house by the city. In the case of Kneece v. City of Columbia, 128 S.C. 375, 123 S.E. 100, recovery was permitted for damages caused by disagreeable odors originating from an incinerator installed by the city. In the case of Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871, the court pointed to the two cases, last above cited, as illustrative of the following principle,

'The constitutional prohibition against taking private property for public use without just compensation must have been intended to protect all the essential elements of ownership which make property valuable, including, of course, the right of user, and the right of enjoyment. Accordingly, it has been held that the erection and maintenance of a public work or enterprise under lawful authority in such a way as to destroy the beneficial use of adjacent land or property may constitute a taking, although there is no physical invasion of the property itself.'

This court has previously adopted and adhered to the broadest possible view of 'what is a taking' and has construed the least actual 'damage' to be a 'taking'. Webb v. Greenwood County, 229 S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d 688.

Here respondents allege that they have sustained substantial damage to their property as a result of an aggressive, affirmative, positive act by the City done in the course of widening and improving a public street for public use, and under the authorities hereinabove cited we think the complaint sufficiently alleged a taking of respondents' property for public use in contravention of the Constitution.

The foregoing conclusion would ordinarily render it unnecessary to consider whether the complaint also alleges a cause of action under the statute. In the instant case, however, we reach such question...