Kline v. Shapley
| Decision Date | 31 March 1919 |
| Parties | KLINE et al. v. SHAPLEY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Middlesex County.
Application for guardianship of an insane person by George M. Kline and others, being a majority of the Massachusetts Commission on Mental Diseases, against Sarah C. Shapley. From a decree of the probate court, dismissing the application, applicants appealed. A motion of respondent to dismiss the appeal was denied by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court and the case reported for the determination of the full court. Decision of the single justice affirmed, and case ordered to stand for hearing.
Arthur Thad Smith, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.
James A. Keown, of Lynn, for appellee.
This case is before us upon a report of a single justice of this court who denied a motion to dismiss the appeal. The appellants who are described as a Majority of the Massachusetts commission on mental diseases, filed in the probate court a petition for the appointment of a guardian of the respondent who is alleged to be insane and confined in the Medfield State Hospital. The judge of probate found that the respondent was not an insane person and entered a decree dismissing the petition. The petitioners by their attorney as ‘Special Assistant Attorney General’ claimed an appeal from the decree, and the respondent filed the motion to dismiss the appeal which is before us.
It is provided by St. 1909, c. 504, § 99, that ‘if the relatives or friends of an insane person, or the mayor and aldermen of a city or the selectmen of a town in which he is an inhabitant or resident, or the State Board of Insanity, apply to the probate court to have a guardian appointed for him,’ the court, after causing the statutory notices to be given, may appoint a guardian of his person and estate.
The state board of insanity was abolished by St. 1916, c. 285, § 1, and all the rights, powers and duties of the board were transferred to the commission on mental diseases as the successor of the board.
While no right of appeal from a decree of the probate court is expressly given by the statute above referred to, it is the contention of the petitioners that they are entitled to maintain the appeal, first, because they are parties to the proceeding; and secondly, because they are persons aggrieved by the decree. R. L. c. 162, § 9.
It is provided by R. L. c. 162, § 8, that this court shall be the supreme court of probate and shall have appellate jurisdiction of all matters which are determinable by the probate court ‘except as otherwise provided.’ To entitle either a person or a party to appeal, the appealing party must be aggrieved by the decree. A person who is aggrieved by a decree of the probate court is by section 9 expressly authorized to appeal whether he is a party to the proceedings or not, it being the purpose of the statute to include, as was said in Farrar v. Parker, 3 Allen, 556, ‘a wider range of persons than those entitled to an appeal in the other courts.’
The question is, are the petitioners ‘persons aggrieved’ by the decree within the meaning of the statute? In filing the petition and in the proceedings subsequently taken by them they acted solely in their capacity as public officers. They are representatives of the commonwealth. They are charged with the performance of important and responsible duties concerning the treatment and welfare of a large class of unfortunate persons, and are bound to safeguard the interests of the commonwealth and the community at large.
It is manifest that under R. L. c. 87, § 8, and by other sections of that chapter the petitioners are clothed with large executive, supervisory and discretionary powers.
In Lawless v. Reagan, 128 Mass. 592, it was said by Mr. Justice Colt that--
‘In order to give a right of appeal from the judgment of the [probate] court, it must appear that the party appealing has some pecuniary interest, or some personal right, which is immediately or remotely affected or concluded by the decree appealed from.’
In that case it was held that the stepmother of minor children whose parents were both dead and whose grandmother had been appointed their guardian by the probate court was not a person aggrieved by the decree within the meaning of Gen. Sts. c. 117, § 8 (now R. L. c. 162, § 9), so as to entitle her to an appeal therefrom. The reason for the rule as stated in the opinion being that-- the rule as stated in the opinion being that-- proceedings of the probate court if...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Green v. Board of Appeals of Provincetown
...in variance and special permit appeals, those interests are private, and in enforcement appeals, public. Compare Kline v. Shapley, 232 Mass. 500, 502-504, 122 N.E. 641 (1919). This view is implicit in our holding in Morganelli v. Building Inspector of Canton, 7 Mass.App.Ct. at 482-488, 388 ......
-
Trs. of Andover Theological Seminary v. Visitors of Theological Inst.
...authority and obligation there contained. The visitors have a public or official duty resting on them in this particular Kline v Shapley, 232 Mass. 500, 122 N. E. 641;Monroe v. Cooper, 235 Mass. 33, 34, 126 N. E. 286;Ayer v. Commissioners on Height of Buildings, 242 Mass. 30, 33, 136 N. E. ......
-
In re Mayberry
...460, 139 N.E. 170;Grievance Committee v. Broder, 112 Conn. 269, 273,152 A. 292;In re Dolphin, 240 N.Y. 89, 147 N.E. 538;Kline v. Shapley, 232 Mass. 500, 503, 122 N.E. 641. But we need not rest this decision upon technical niceties of practice, for even if the order of October 5, 1933, had b......
-
In re Mayberry
... ... 460, 139 N.E. 170; Grievance Committee v. Broder, ... 112 Conn. 269, 273,152 A. 292; In re Dolphin, 240 ... N.Y. 89, 147 N.E. 538; Kline v. Shapley, 232 Mass ... 500, 503, 122 N.E. 641 ... But we ... need not rest this decision upon technical niceties of ... ...