Klingaman v. Miller

• Decision Date: 27 December 1990
• Citation: 564 N.Y.S.2d 526,168 A.D.2d 856
• Parties: In the Matter of David KLINGAMAN, et al., Respondents, v. William MILLER, et al., Constituting the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Troy, Appellants, and John McGraw, et al., Intervenors-Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 526

564 N.Y.S.2d 526

168 A.D.2d 856

In the Matter of David KLINGAMAN, et al., Respondents, v. William MILLER, et al., Constituting the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Troy, Appellants and John McGraw, et al., Intervenors-Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Dec. 27, 1990.

John D. Chestara (Edward R. Marinstein, of counsel), Troy, for appellants.

Thomas V. Kenney, Jr., Troy, for respondents.

Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg & Griffin, P.C. (Jeffrey R. Armstrong, of counsel), Troy, for intervenors-appellants.

Before KANE, J.P., and CASEY, LEVINE, MERCURE and HARVEY, JJ.

CASEY, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDermott, J.), entered September 12, 1989 in Rensselaer County, which granted petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Troy granting intervenors' request for an area variance.

In February 1988, intervenor John McGraw applied for a work permit for the construction of an addition to the detached garage of his home, located in a residential zone in the City of Troy, Rensselaer County. McGraw and his wife intended to use the addition as a graphics art studio, which McGraw claimed was a permitted use under the home occupation definition in the City's zoning ordinance. The application was denied by the Director of Code Enforcement on the ground that an area variance was required because the 760 square-foot proposed addition exceeded the 300 square-foot maximum for home occupation contained in the ordinance. McGraw applied to the City's Zoning Board of Appeals (hereafter the Board) for an area variance and, after a hearing at which several neighbors objected to the intrusion of a business into a residential neighborhood, the Board granted McGraw's application.

Petitioners, two residents of the McGraw neighborhood, commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul the determination, contending that the Board erred in concluding that the proposed use was a home occupation and in concluding that McGraw was entitled to an area variance. Supreme Court held that a graphic arts studio constitutes a home occupation, but that the proposed "expansion to a detached garage for a home occupation is not in conformance with the [City's] Ordinance". The Board's determination was annulled, resulting in this appeal by the Board. The McGraws have intervened by permission of this court. We reverse.

The City's zoning ordinance defines home occupation as "[a]n occupation or profession which * * * [i]s customarily carried on in a dwelling unit, or in an attached building provided no commodity is sold upon the premises". Although the definition contains other requirements, Supreme Court's decision was apparently based exclusively upon the quoted provision. After a review of the zoning ordinance, we conclude that the question of whether an occupation or profession which otherwise meets the definition of a home occupation can be carried on in an addition to a detached garage requires an interpretation of the zoning ordinance, and the question cannot be answered solely by reference to the quoted provision. Rather, reference must be made to all relevant provisions in the zoning ordinance, including the definitions of accessory use, accessory building, floor area and private garage, and the list of uses specified by the ordinance as permitted in the particular district.

The Board is expressly authorized to hear and decide requests for interpretations of the zoning ordinance, and in the ordinary course of events, the Board would interpret the...