Klos v. Zahorik

• Decision Date: 26 January 1901
• Citation: 84 N.W. 1046,113 Iowa 161
• Parties: P. KLOS, Appellant, v. A. M. ZAHORIK
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

84 N.W. 1046

113 Iowa 161

P. KLOS, Appellant, v. A. M. ZAHORIK

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

January 26, 1901

Appeal from Linn District Court.--HON. W. N. TREICHLER, Judge.

THIS is an action brought to recover damages for an alleged libel. Verdict for defendant, and judgment thereon plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

C Nichols and Remley, Ney & Remley for appellant.

C. W Keppler and Bingham & Mekota for appellee.

OPINION

MCCLAIN, J.

The facts of the case, so far as necessary to the understanding of the questions of law raised on this appeal, are, without controversy, as follows: A newspaper published in the Bohemian language at Chicago, in its regular issue, early in May, 1898, contained an article, over defendant's name commenting on the reported action of plaintiff, a Catholic priest, in soliciting contributions from his congregation, at regular service, in aid of the Spaniards, and the indignation of some of his parishioners in regard thereto, and extended comment condemnatory of his supposed action, and of any person who should sympathize with him in such actions or act in a similar manner. It is not questioned in this case that the article is libelous in its nature, and the only issues tried were as to whether the defendant was chargeable with the article, or any part thereof, and whether there were any matters of mitigation in his behalf. From the evidence appearing of record it must be conceded that the article, as published, was not wholly written by defendant. It was shown to have been more or less rewritten and changed by the editor of the paper, and the principal question to the jury was as to the extent to which, if at all, the article as it appeared was based upon the matter communicated to the editor by defendant. Appellant's objections to instructions given and to the refusal to give instructions asked involve the legal rules of liability with reference to comment on the action of clergymen, and also those relating to the contribution to or participation in the publication of a libel.

A clergyman is a public man, in such sense that public comment in a proper manner upon his sayings and doings in his public capacity is justified. In Kelly v Tinling, L. R. Q. B. 699, Chief Justice Cockburn says: "I cannot think that a dispute between a clergyman and his churchwarden as to what he allows to be done in his church during divine service, and the use to which he puts part of it, namely, the vestry room, which were the matters involved in the correspondence between them [and published by defendant in his newspaper], is not a subject of public interest. The maintenance of decency and propriety in conducting public worship and of the sanctity of the sacred edifice and all connected with it, is surely a matter of the greatest public concern. The very use of the term 'public worship' shows this." And it was held that defendant's publication of the matter complained of was privileged. And in Kelly v. Sherlock, L. R. 1 Q. B. 686, which was an action for having published in a newspaper a series of libels on plaintiff as the incumbent of a church, the judge, in summing up the case to the jury, said (page 689): "A clergyman with his flock, an admiral with his fleet, a general with his army, and a judge with his jury--we are all of us the subjects for public discussion. So, also, it is a matter of public interest--the dispute between the plaintiff and his organist, and the way in which the church is used. They are all public matters, and may be publicly discussed." And see Webb's, Pollock Torts, 320; Odgers, Libel & Slander, 34. On this theory that their functions are public, the proceedings of a church or congregation are privileged. Farnsworth v. Storrs, 5 Cush. 412. And see Landis v. Campbell, 79 Mo. 433. The true grounds of justification in a case of the comment upon or criticism of the conduct of public men with reference to public affairs are succinctly stated by a leading text writer as follows: "Every one has a right to comment on matters of public interest and general concern, provided he does so fairly and with an honest purpose. Such comments are not libelous, however severe in their terms, unless they are written intemperately and maliciously. Every citizen has full freedom of speech on such subjects, but he must not abuse it. * * * The right to comment upon the public acts of public men is the right of every citizen, and is not the peculiar privilege of the press. * * * Every one of the public is entitled to pass an opinion on everything which in any way invites public attention." Odgers, Libel & Slander, 34-36. The action of plaintiff, therefore, in the discharge of his duties and office as a priest, in the conduct of the public functions of his calling, was a proper subject of comment on the part of defendant; and so long as such comment was kept within proper limits the defendant would not be liable in damages for anything he should say, and this would be regardless of the question whether plaintiff had done any act or said any word which he ought not to have done or said. The defendant would have no right to make false statements with regard to what plaintiff did or said, nor would he have a right to extend by publication false statements made by others. But freedom of criticism would secure him in the right to comment upon what was done or said, or even upon what was supposed to have been done or said, so long as no false statements were published. The tenor of the article which it appears from the evidence defendant did send to the Chicago paper was that, if certain accounts which had appeared in the newspapers with reference to the acts of plaintiff in soliciting contributions from his congregation for the Spaniards were true, then plaintiff had acted in an improper manner, and should be condemned by the public, etc. We do not think this to have been a false statement of fact, but, rather, a criticism of supposed acts which criticsm would not be libelous, even though the facts were improperly stated in the newspaper accounts which defendant had seen, and, if properly stated, would not have furnished any ground for the adverse criticism which was made. Can it be supposed for a moment that if a citizen sees in newspaper accounts of the proceedings of this court that the justices have, on the bench, been guilty of intoxication or indecent behavior, he would be guilty of libel if he should write to a newspaper his condemnation of such supposed conduct, not stating the facts as of his own knowledge, but as derived from newspaper reports? Any such rule as this would certainly be an unjust and improper limitation upon the right to comment upon and criticise acts of those in public life. It is to be borne in mind, however, that this action is not based on the communication which was written by defendant to the Chicago paper, but upon the publication made in that paper; and it therefore became necessary to submit to the jury the...