Kludt v. Majestic Star Casino, LLC

• Citation: 200 F.Supp.2d 973
• Decision Date: 28 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2:00-CV-319-TS.,2:00-CV-319-TS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
• Parties: Terrance KLUDT, Plaintiff, v. MAJESTIC STAR CASINO, LLC, Defendant.

200 F.Supp.2d 973

Terrance KLUDT, Plaintiff, v. MAJESTIC STAR CASINO, LLC, Defendant.

No. 2:00-CV-319-TS.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

December 28, 2001.

Dennis M. O'Bryan, Neil A. Davis, Baun, Cohen & Kuebler, Birmingham, MI, for Plaintiff.

Scott R. Bilse, Abrahamson, Reed & Adley, Hammond, IN, Tammy S. Sestak, Steven B. Belgrade, John A. O'Donnell, Patrick J. Cullinan, James Kent Minnette, Belgrade & O'Donnell, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPRINGMANN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 31], filed by the Defendant, Majestic Star Casino, LLC, on August 31, 2001. For the following reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 12, 2000, the Plaintiff, Terrance Kludt, filed a Complaint in this Court, alleging that the Defendant breached its duty under general maritime law to exercise due care on the Plaintiff's behalf and that as a result of this breach the Plaintiff was injured.¹ The Complaint premises this Court's jurisdiction upon diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332.² The Complaint specifically alleges that "[o]n or about March 27, 1999, Plaintiff patronized Defendant's casino, THE MAJESTIC STAR, where he gambled for a number of hours subject to Defendant's illicit practice aforesaid, when while attempting to depart he plummeted from the top to the bottom of an escalator, all because of Defendant's failure to exercise due care on his behalf and thereby monitor the consumption of alcohol." Complaint at 2. The Plaintiff has made a demand for trial by jury and seeks both compensatory and punitive damages. On July 27, 2000, the Defendant filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses.

On August 31, 2001, the Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support, and Exhibits. On October 2, 2001, the Plaintiff filed his Response and Exhibits. On October 22, 2001, the Defendant filed its Reply.

Both parties have consented to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ. Pro. 56(c). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate—in fact, is mandated—where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing a court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party may discharge its "initial responsibility" by simply "`showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. When the non-moving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. at 323, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n. 3 (7th Cir.1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party may, if it chooses, support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials and thereby shift to the non-moving party the burden of showing that an issue of material fact exists. Kaszuk v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Intern. Pension Fund, 791 F.2d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 1986); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 617 (7th Cir.1982); Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 561 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir.1977).

Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. F.R.C.P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir.1994). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) establishes: "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party must do more than raise some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts; the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Juarez, 957 F.2d at 322.

In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of that party. NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir.1995); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.1994); Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1440 (7th Cir.1992). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Doe, 42 F.3d at 443.

MATERIAL FACTS

The Defendant operates the Majestic Star Casino Riverboat. Alcoholic beverage is served from 8:00 a.m. to 3:30 a.m., except on Sundays. Last call is at 3:30 a.m. One bar is located on the first floor, two bars are located on the second floor, and one on the third floor. Dollar and nickel slot machines are found on three floors. The fourth floor of the boat is a deck.

Typically, one or two bartenders work behind a bar, depending on the volume of passengers on the floor. On a weekend, the Defendant will put two bartenders behind the bars on the first and second floors. For bartenders, there are two shifts, 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to close. During a shift, bartenders are given a thirty minute break and a fifteen minute break. During a bartender's breaks, another bartender called a "breaker" replaces the breaking bartender. Approximately six bartenders, including the breaker, will be on the boat during any given shift. The Defendant also assigns from four to seven beverage servers on each of the first, second, and third floors.

The Defendant provides employees with a handbook entitled Controlling Alcohol Risks Effectively (CARE), which contains information regarding guest alcohol use, effects, identification criteria, intervention, and risk prevention. Food and beverage employees are administered a test that is included in the CARE handbook.

On Friday, March 26, 1999, the Plaintiff, Terrance Kludt, and his wife boarded the boat some time between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. While they were on the boat, the Plaintiff and his wife played slot machines on at least two floors, ate a light meal, and visited most of the floors on the boat. During their time on the boat, the Plaintiff's wife was with the Plaintiff for some periods of time but away from him during other periods. The Plaintiff also made several visits to the cashiers and obtained cash from an automatic teller machine (ATM). They remained on the boat until approximately 4:00 a.m. on March 27, 1999. As they were leaving the boat, the Plaintiff fell on an escalator and was injured.

The Plaintiff and his wife have testified that while he was on the boat, the Plaintiff consumed a substantial amount of beer that he purchased from various bars and beverage servers on the boat³ and that he became intoxicated. The Plaintiff, who has a history of alcohol use and abuse, testified that he purchased most of the beer at the bars on the boat and that he himself walked to and from the bars, placed the orders, and purchased the drinks. The Plaintiff cannot identify any of the bartenders or servers, cannot remember whether the bartenders were male or female, and cannot remember any conversations with any of them. The record contains no evidence that any employee of the Defendant observed visible signs of intoxication or otherwise knew that the Plaintiff was intoxicated, as the Plaintiff alleges. The record does not contain evidence of any blood work or test that would indicate the Plaintiff's blood alcohol level at the time of his spill.

DISCUSSION

In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law, that the Court should apply the Indiana Dram Shop Act rather than any substantive federal maritime law, that the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Indiana Dram Shop Act, and that the...