Jones v. Lynn

Citation498 P.3d 1174
Decision Date22 November 2021
Docket NumberDocket No. 46735
Parties Brandi JONES, natural parent of R.N. and Dasha Drahos (a/k/a Dasha Hunter), biological sister of R.N., Decedent, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Tracey LYNN, Defendant-Respondent, and Cameren Nosworthy, Brody Thomas Lundblad, and Christopher Nosworthy, Dale Atkisson, Does I-X, Defendants.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d'Alene, attorneys for Appellants. Monica Brennan argued.

Law Offices of Mark Dietzler, Liberty Lake, attorneys for Respondents. Daniel Stowe argued.

BEVAN, Chief Justice.

This appeal concerns the applicability of the Idaho Dram Shop Act to a federal maritime wrongful death case. R.N.’s mother, Brandi Jones, and sister, Dasha Drahos1 (referred to hereafter as "Appellants" or "Plaintiffs"), filed a complaint against the Respondent, Tracy Lynn, alleging she recklessly and tortiously caused R.N.’s death (R.N. was sixteen years old at the time) by providing him with alcohol before he drowned in Lake Coeur d'Alene. Lynn filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the district court to dismiss the case because the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements under Idaho's Dram Shop Act. The district court agreed and granted Lynn's motion for summary judgment after concluding there was no uniform body of federal maritime dram shop law that would preempt Idaho's Dram Shop Act. Thus, the Plaintiffs had to comply with the Dram Shop Act's notice requirements. The Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute the facts relevant to this appeal. On July 21, 2015, R.N. went boating on Lake Coeur d'Alene with his friends C.N. and B.L. All three boys were sixteen years old at the time. The boat was owned by C.N.’s father. C.N., B.L., and R.N. obtained about 12 beers from an unknown source and consumed them while boating. Later, the boys stopped at Shooters, a restaurant and bar near the south end of the lake. Lynn allegedly provided C.N., B.L., and R.N. with an alcoholic drink2 known as a "Shooter sinker" (also known as a "derailer" and "d tailer"). The boys left the restaurant and drank the derailer on the lake. At some point during the trip, R.N. jumped or fell off the boat into the water and drowned.

On May 2, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint against C.N. and B.L., as well as two adults who furnished alcohol to the boys, Lynn and her husband Dale Atkisson.3 Relevant to this appeal are the Plaintiffs’ claims against Lynn for "negligence, negligence per se, recklessness, and tortious conduct," and a claim for "wrongful death."4 R.N.’s father, Andrew Nault, filed a similar complaint that was later consolidated.5 On July 12, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, adding a cause of action for spoliation of evidence against C.N. and B.L. The claims against Lynn remained the same at that time. On November 7, 2017, Lynn answered the first amended complaint, asserting the affirmative defense that "Plaintiffs’ claims were barred because of, but not necessarily limited to, their failure to comply with pre-suit notice requirements of I.C. § 23-808."

On November 30, 2017, Lynn filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that she did not receive proper notice of the Plaintiffs’ intent to sue as required by Idaho's Dram Shop Act. The Plaintiffs opposed Lynn's motion, arguing that the Idaho Dram Shop Act does not apply to cases governed by federal maritime law.

While Lynn's motion for summary judgment was pending, on June 5, 2018, Jones moved to amend the complaint to add a claim of spoliation against Atkisson and Lynn. There is no ruling on this motion in the record.

On August 9, 2018, the district court entered a memorandum decision and order granting Lynn's motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded that Idaho's Dram Shop Act applies to these facts, which shields from liability "any person who sold or otherwise furnished" alcohol to the intoxicated person who did not receive notice by certified mail "within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim or cause of action arose by certified mail." I.C. § 23-808 (2), (5). Because the Plaintiffs did not provide timely notice, the district court granted Lynn's motion.

On August 15, 2018, the district court dismissed all claims against Lynn with prejudice. The district court did not execute a Rule 54(b) certificate at that time. The Plaintiffs moved to reconsider, arguing that the elements of maritime tort law apply to their claims and the element of proximate cause cannot be narrowed by the application of Idaho's Dram Shop statute. Lynn opposed the motion to reconsider. On December 20, 2018, the district court denied the motion after concluding that the Plaintiffs had resubmitted the same line of cases that the district court had previously rejected.

On January 30, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. On March, 5, 2019, the district court issued its final judgment regarding all defendants. On March 21, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed an amended notice of appeal.

On December 3, 2019, nearly nine months after the district court entered final judgment, and almost a year after the court declined to reconsider Lynn's dismissal from the case, the Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. The Plaintiffs argued that while researching their brief for the appeal before this Court, they discovered a case that said, in dicta, that the notice provision of Idaho Code section 23-808(5) does not apply to the service of alcohol to minors. (Citing Slade v. Smith's Management Corp. , 119 Idaho 482, 490, 808 P.2d 401, 409 (1991) ). The district court concluded that the motion was untimely under either rule, leaving the only possible avenue for relief to be under Rule 60(b)(6), which requires "unique and compelling circumstances" to relieve a party from a final judgment. The district court found the Plaintiffs’ arguments derived from Slade were not "unique and compelling circumstances" because the case was decided 29 years earlier. Even so, the district court went on to reject the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claim, ultimately denying the motion to amend the judgment.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the Appellants comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules?

2. Did the district court err in holding that federal maritime law applied?

3. Did the district court err in holding that Idaho's Dram Shop Act applied rather than federal maritime general negligence law?

4. Did the district court err in holding that Idaho's Dram Shop Act precluded the Appellants’ claims?

5. Should Lynn be precluded from raising the Idaho Dram Shop Act as a defense when she lied to police, spoliated evidence, and had unclean hands?

6. Does the time limitation in Idaho Code section 23-808(5) apply when the alcohol was furnished to minors?

7. Is Idaho Code section 23-808 unconstitutional?

8. Is either party entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court employs the same standard as the district court when reviewing rulings on summary judgment motions. Owen v. Smith , 168 Idaho 633, 485 P.3d 129, 136–37 (2021) (citing Trumble v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho , 166 Idaho 132, 140–41, 456 P.3d 201, 209–10 (2019) ). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). A moving party must support its assertion by citing particular materials in the record or by showing the "materials cited do not establish the ... presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact[s]." I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(B). Summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented." Owen , 168 Idaho at ––––, 485 P.3d at 136–37 (quoting Trumble , 166 Idaho at 141, 456 P.3d at 210 ). Even so, a "mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment." Id .

"[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment." Tricore Invs., LLC v. Est. of Warren through Warren , 168 Idaho 596, 485 P.3d 92, 106 (2021) (quoting Drakos v. Sandow , 167 Idaho 159, 162, 468 P.3d 289, 292 (2020) ).

IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Appellants complied with the Idaho Appellate Rules.

Lynn first asks this Court to impose sanctions based on her allegation that the Appellants failed to file a timely brief. This Court may levy sanctions when a party violates the time limits prescribed by the Idaho Appellate Rules. I.A.R. 21. The Appellants’ opening brief was originally due on April 30, 2020, and not filed until May 1, 2020. However, on April 21, 2020, this Court issued an emergency order due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which specified:

In the event a deadline has been set by court order or rule and the last day for filing any document, holding any hearing, or doing any other thing or matter in any court falls on or between March 26, 2020 and April 30, 2020 when courts are reducing operations, the time for filing or doing any other thing in any court shall be extended until May 1, 2020.

The Appellants plainly complied with the extension granted by this emergency order.

Second, Lynn argues the Appellants violated the augmented record rules. This Court denied the Appellants’ initial motion to augment the record on May 5, 2020. Appellants remedied the issue and filed an amended motion to augment the record, which this Court granted on June 4, 2020. On July 21, 2020, the Appellants filed an amended opening brief to reflect citations to the augmented record. Because the Appellants complied with the...

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3 cases
  • Bracken v. City of Ketchum
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • September 15, 2023
    ...employs the same standard as the district court when reviewing rulings on summary judgment motions. Jones v. Lynn, 169 Idaho 545, 551, 498 P.3d 1174, 1180 (2021) (citing Owen v. Smith, 168 Idaho 633, 640-41, 485 P.3d 129, 136-37 (2021)). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that ......
  • Aizpitarte v. Minear
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • May 3, 2022
    ... ... This testimony is insufficient to rebut the facts established by the Aizpitartes from 2005. See Jones v. Lynn , 169 Idaho 545, 551, 498 P.3d 1174, 1180 (2021) (quoting Trumble , 166 Idaho at 141, 456 P.3d at 210 ) (a "mere scintilla of evidence or ... ...
  • State v. Doe (In re Doe)
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • May 25, 2023
    ...a party 6 must raise both the issue and the party's position on the issue before the trial court. Jones v. Lynn, 169 Idaho 545, 552, 498 P.3d 1174, 1181 (2021). This Court need not address the applicability of an exception to the mootness doctrine if the issue was not preserved. Accordingly......

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