Kluth v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin
| Decision Date | 18 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-1924,92-1924 |
| Citation | 505 N.W.2d 442,178 Wis.2d 808 |
| Parties | Cari E. McLean KLUTH and Farmers Insurance Exchange, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. GENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY OF WISCONSIN, Dick Crooks Electric Co., Ltd., and Richard J. Crooks, Defendants-Appellants, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Dolores R. Gramins, Defendants. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
Before ANDERSON, P.J., and BROWN and SNYDER, JJ.
This appeal from a nonfinal order dismissing defense motions for separate trials requires us to decide the scope of the permissive joinder statute, sec. 803.04, Stats., involving two different car accidents. 1 The complaint stated that Cari E. McLean Kluth sustained soft tissue injuries in a car accident with Richard J. Crooks which were later aggravated by a second accident with Dolores R. Gramins. The narrow question is whether Kluth's actions against the two defendants arise out of "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" under the meaning of sec. 803.04. 2 We conclude that Kluth's joining of the two accidents in the complaint was permissible under sec. 803.04 because she alleges commonality of an injury and aggravation of that injury by the tortfeasors. Whether that commonality survives until trial must await the taking of discovery and gathering of evidence. We affirm the trial court's order with that caution.
The relevant allegations are as follows. Kluth was injured on July 25, 1989 in a car accident with Crooks, who was driving a company van at the time. Kluth's injuries required ongoing medical treatment for soft tissue injuries. She was still being treated for her original injuries when she was in a second accident, this time with Gramins on January 15, 1991.
Kluth brought suit jointly and severally against both defendants and their insurers. Her complaint alleges:
That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of CROOKS, KLUTH sustained severe personal injuries, which may be permanent in nature, necessitating medical care and attention, a loss of earnings and earning capacity, pain, suffering, disability and other damages.
....
That the collision caused by the negligence of GRAMINS aggravated the injuries which KLUTH had sustained on July 25, 1989, for which she was still under active treatment and medical care; further, that she was caused to suffer a further loss of earning capacity, and additional pain, suffering, disability and other damages.
After they answered the complaint and before anyone had commenced discovery, Gramins, Crooks and their insurers filed motions for separate suits. At the motion hearing, the court asked counsel for each of the defendants, "[L]ogistically what practical problems do you foresee in having this issue tried before the same jury?" Counsel for Crooks responded:
Well, Your Honor, we feel there are going to be problems as far as the jury keeping in their mind that these are two separate accidents and being able to distribute out damages and injuries per these two separate accidents....
... It's our understanding that these are two separate and distinct occurrences. We have got some general allegations with regards to injuries arising out of the first accident, and we have some general allegations regarding an aggravation of some unknown or general injuries arising out of the first accident....
It's my understanding that in order to bring these type of occurrences together, series of occurrences or transactions, as the statute requires would at least require under the cases ... some specific pleadings as to what particular injuries she had as to what particular injuries were aggravated. I think there would be a problem for the jury ... hearing about two different, separate accidents and having to divvy up between these two separate defendants as to what injuries occurred and as to what injuries were aggravated....
Counsel for Gramins added that the law prior to the adoption of the new rules of civil procedure has not been overruled. She argued that the court was still bound by decisions taking a narrow view of joinder, which required that a lay person must view a group of facts as a single unit or occurrence in order for joinder to be proper. Finally, she argued that this case does not meet the statutory requirements for joinder.
The court denied the defendants' motions. It noted that concern for judicial economy carries much more weight now than it did when the cases cited by the defendants were decided. It also noted that joinder rules have become more liberal since the new rules of civil procedure were adopted. The court did not agree with the defendants that jury confusion would be a problem. It stated:
Now, the defendants argue much regarding the subject of jury confusion. I have found in my experience on the bench ... that irrespective of the complications which are placed before the jury if accurately instructed and if properly presented confusion can be much allayed concerning separate incidents that may be placed before a jury....
Further, the Court is satisfied that there would be less confusion and less reason for or less opportunity for an injustice if the same jury were to hear the facts in this case as opposed to separate juries....
As to what I find to be the minimal inconvenience to the parties or burden on the parties to have to endure separate proofs relating to one claim or the other, I am not satisfied that those override the need for our system to permit a stream-lining and [an] expeditious way of disposing of cases as can be.
Finally, the court observed that there was "some commonality" between the two accidents because of the similarity of the injuries and the permanency claims. The court stated that "because of those common factors there is enough factual identity here to permit the cases to be tried together." The court concluded that the federal trend was to try the cases together to serve judicial economy and denied the defendants' motions for separate suits.
To resolve this case, we must interpret sec. 803.04, Stats. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo without deference to the trial court. State ex rel. Roberta A.S. v. Waukesha County Human Servs. Dep't, 171 Wis.2d 266, 272, 491 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Ct.App.1992).
We begin with the well-settled proposition that our purpose in interpreting a statute is to determine its legislative intent. Campenni v. Walrath, 172 Wis.2d 563, 567, 493 N.W.2d 266, 268 (Ct.App.1992). Only if a statute is ambiguous may we engage in construction by looking at its history, context, subject matter and scope. Id. A statute is ambiguous if its language is capable of being understood in two or more different ways. Id.
Joinder of defendants is permitted if they are sued jointly, severally, or in the alternative, for liability "arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences." Section 803.04(1), Stats. In addition, a question of law or fact common to all defendants must arise in the action. Id. Because causation of and liability for Kluth's injuries are common questions of law and fact common to all defendants, we need only decide whether this case involves the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.
We conclude that the phrase "same ... series of transactions or occurrences" is ambiguous. Each party offers a reasonable interpretation of the phrase. On one hand, Kluth suggests that the phrase should be interpreted broadly to include situations in which "a successive tortfeasor aggravates injuries caused by the original tortfeasor." She claims that this interpretation is consistent with both Wisconsin precedent and the federal trends in interpreting FED.R.CIV.P. 20(a), after which sec. 803.04(1), Stats., was patterned. She asserts that "Wisconsin should look to the purposes and applications of [FED.R.CIV.P.] 20(a) when interpreting and applying its own recently adopted liberal joinder statute." 3
On the other hand, Crooks argues that we should interpret the joinder statute as it was interpreted prior to Wisconsin's 1976 adoption of the new rules of civil procedure. In particular, Crooks cites Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis.2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965), and Fitzwilliams v. O'Shaughnessy, 40 Wis.2d 123, 161 N.W.2d 242 (1968), for the proposition that "a cause of action must be viewed as a grouping of facts falling into a single unit or occurrence as a lay person would view them." Crooks also refers us to Butzow v. Wausau Memorial Hosp., 51 Wis.2d 281, 285, 187 N.W.2d 349, 351 (1971), arguing that our supreme court has ruled that "a subsequent tortfeasor's aggravation of a pre-existing injury caused by the negligence of a prior tortfeasor does not qualify as a single occurrence or single cause of action." Finally, Crooks argues that Robinson v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 137 Wis.2d 1, 402 N.W.2d 711 (1987), decided after the adoption of the new rules of civil procedure, reaffirms the Caygill rule that joinder is appropriate only when a lay person would view facts as falling into a single unit or occurrence.
We agree with Kluth that Wisconsin's permissive joinder statute should be interpreted broadly to encompass situations in which an injury caused by a negligent tortfeasor is aggravated in a later incident involving a second tortfeasor. Section 803.04(1), Stats., was taken from FED.R.CIV.P. 20(a). See Clausen & Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure Chapters 801 803, 59 MARQ.L.REV. 1, 92 (1976) (hereinafter New Rules ). When interpreting a state statute that is patterned after a federal statute, we may look to cases interpreting the federal statute for guidance. Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis.2d 161, 174, 255 N.W.2d 917, 925 (1977).
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