Knadler v. Adams

• Decision Date: 22 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. 5809,5809
• Citation: 661 P.2d 1052
• Parties: Fred B. KNADLER and Elaine M. Knadler, Appellants (Defendants), v. Donald F. ADAMS and Roberta Ann Adams, Appellees (Plaintiffs).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1052

661 P.2d 1052

Fred B. KNADLER and Elaine M. Knadler, Appellants (Defendants), v. Donald F. ADAMS and Roberta Ann Adams, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

No. 5809.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 22, 1983.

George L. Zimmers, of Zimmers, Nelson & Castor, Laramie, for appellants.

Philip Nicholas, of Corthell, King, McFadden, Nicholas, Prehoda & Olson, Laramie, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief Justice.

Appellants-defendants appeal from a summary judgment enforcing a covenant in the deeds under which both parties hold title to adjoining lots in Cochran Addition to the City of Laramie. The covenant provides that "only one residence shall be erected on each lot." Appellees-plaintiffs instituted an injunction action to prevent appellants from expanding their residence into a multiple-family dwelling. ¹ Appellants allege error in the granting of the summary judgment because they contend the covenant language to be ambiguous, wherefore an issue of material fact exists as to its meaning. A motion for summary judgment should not be granted if there is a genuine issue of a material fact. Timmons v. Reed, Wyo., 569 P.2d 112 (1977); and Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984 (1980).

We affirm.

A review of a summary judgment must be made from the viewpoint favorable to the party opposing it and with examination of the material upon which it is based from the same standpoint as did the district judge. DeHerrera v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1342 (1979); Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976); Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147 (1981); and Fegler v. Brodie, Wyo., 574 P.2d 751 (1978).

If the intention of the grantor does not readily appear in a deed, a question of fact is presented and circumstances surrounding the language used may be resorted to in order to ascertain such intention. Gregory v. Sanders, Wyo., 635 P.2d 795 (1981), and In Re Rennie's Estate, 430 F.2d 1388 (10th Cir.1970). But, if the intent of the parties can be gathered from plain and unambiguous language in the deed considered as a whole, such should be done as a matter of law without reference to extrinsic evidence. Dawson v. Meike, Wyo., 508 P.2d 15 (1973); Gregory v. Sanders, supra. The issue of whether or not an ambiguity exists in an instrument is one of law. Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 (1980).

Although the language here in question is plain and unambiguous: "Only one residence shall be erected on each lot," appellant contends for ambiguity in two respects. (1) The language could mean either a dwelling occupied by a single family or a single structure which could be occupied by more than one living unit, and (2) the restriction was modified in a number of respects by the original grantors in deeds to others in the Cochran Addition, thus reflecting uncertain meaning for it.

FIRST CONTENTION

" * * * [T]he meaning of the phrase 'one residence,' as used in the plaintiff's contract is a building constructed for the purpose of serving as a dwelling place of one family, and that a building constructed for the purpose of serving as the dwelling place of four distinct families, living separate and apart from one another, is outside of its meaning." Dillon v. Gaker, 57 Ohio App. 90, 12 N.E.2d 150, 151 (1937).

"It seems clear to us from a simple reading of the original restriction above quoted that 'only one residence' means exactly what it says and that it cannot be stretched to mean four residences. The noun 'residence' itself is singular, and the definitions in Webster's New International Dictionary all indicate that a residence is a dwelling place or abode of a single person or family unit. This is likewise the commonly understood meaning. * * * " Macy v. Wormald, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1959).

We agree that the words "only one residence" have reference to one living unit. The purpose of such restriction is to control the general density of population in an area, thereby making it a more desirable living environment. This purpose would not be accomplished if the language were interpreted to permit one structure without reference to the occupants because the structures could be many storied and house hundreds of people. Accord: see Coffman v. James, Fla., 177 So.2d 25 (1965); Callahan v. Weiland, 291 Ala. 183, 279 So.2d 451, 65 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1973); Shapiro v. Levin, 223 Pa.Super. 535, 302 A.2d 417 (1973); Killian v. Goodman, 229 Mich. 393, 201 N.W. 454 (1924); Bailey v. Jackson-Campbell Co., 191 N.C. 61, 131 S.E. 567 (1926); Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951); and Cunningham v. Hall, La.App., 148 So.2d 808 (1963).

SECOND CONTENTION

The foregoing refutes appellants' second basis for finding ambiguity in the restrictive language, i.e. that modification of the restriction in other deeds evidenced ambiguity in such language. As already noted, if there is no ambiguity in the language itself, extrinsic evidence should not be considered.

Should the language, nonetheless, be considered ambiguous and resort be had to...