Knapp v. Cardwell
| Decision Date | 18 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 78-385 PHX CAM.,CIV 78-385 PHX CAM. |
| Citation | 513 F. Supp. 4 |
| Parties | John Henry KNAPP et al., Petitioners, v. Harold J. CARDWELL, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
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William J. Schafer, III, Chief Counsel, Crim. Div., Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent.
John Foreman, Phoenix, Ariz., for petitioners Paul William Jordan and John Henry Knapp.
John P. Frank, Phoenix, Ariz., for amicus curiae.
Frank C. Nielsen, Kingman, Ariz., for James Alan Arnett.
David A. Chamberlain, Prescott, Ariz., for Ronald Paul Bishop.
Thomas E. Higgins, Jr., Tucson, Ariz., for Mitchell Thomas Blazak.
Charles L. Weninger, Tucson, Ariz., for Richard B. Britson.
Joe Erlichman, Phoenix, Ariz., for Robert Paul Brookover.
Chris E. Wotruba, Phoenix, Ariz., for Paris Hoyt Carriger.
Brice Buehler, Phoenix, Ariz., for Jose Jesus Ceja.
James Kerley, Bisbee, Ariz., for James Dean Clark.
Jordan Green, John E. Savoy, Murray Miller, Phoenix, Ariz., for Max Anderson Dunlap.
J. Douglas McVay, Phoenix, Ariz., for Larry Eugene Evans.
Robert C. Brown, Casa Grande, Ariz., for Randy Greenawalt.
David S. Hoffman, Tucson, Ariz., for Douglas Edward Gretzler.
Thomas V. Rawles, Phoenix, Ariz., for Wilmer G. Holsinger, Mark Allen Koch and Ronald Lee Madsen.
Frederick S. Klein, Tucson, Ariz., for Jimmie Wayne Jeffers.
Donald E. Wolfram, Phoenix, Ariz., for Manuel Thomas Lujan.
John Rood, Phoenix, Ariz., for Loris Lee McVay.
James H. Kemper, Phoenix, Ariz., for Luis Mata, Stevenson L. McDaniel and James Albert Robison.
Robert L. Storrs, Phoenix, Ariz., for Ruben Melendez.
Edwin F. Cathcart, Tempe, Ariz., for Joe Morales.
Allen G. Minker, Tucson, Ariz., for Willie Lee Richmond.
Stephen M. R. Rempe, Phoenix, Ariz., for Joe Clarence Smith.
Terry J. Adams, Phoenix, Ariz., for Sylvester Smith, Jr.
Robert B. Norgren, Tucson, Ariz., for Willie Luther Steelman.
Boyd T. Johnson, Coolidge, Ariz., for Raymond Tison.
Phillip W. Glenn, Casa Grande, Ariz., for Ricky Tison.
Thomas G. Martin, Tucson, Ariz., for Frank James Valencia.
Michael F. Beers, Casa Grande, Ariz., for Robert Wayne Vickers.
Michael J. Meehan, Tucson, Ariz., for Spencer Watson.
On May 13, 1978, petitioner John Henry Knapp, an inmate on Arizona's death row, brought before this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, seeking to enjoin his execution by respondent. After court proceedings in this, and other related cases, Knapp's action has reached its present posture. A brief historical review will be helpful to an understanding of the issues presented to the Court.
In 1973, the Arizona legislature adopted A.R.S. §§ 13-4531 and 454,2 both of which have since been repealed. Section 13-453 stated that upon conviction of murder in the first degree, a defendant could be sentenced to either death or to life imprisonment without parole for twenty-five years. Section 13-454 set forth the procedure by which the death penalty could be imposed. It provided that once the state proved the existence of one or more of the "aggravating circumstances" contained in subsection E of the statute, the burden of proof switched to the defendant to establish "mitigating circumstances." If the defendant were unable to do so, death was mandatory. Subsection F of Section 13-454 listed four mitigating circumstances that could be considered by the court.
On December 20, 1976, in State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1977), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the mitigating circumstances enumerated in A.R.S. § 13-454(F) were intended to be exclusive and that sentencing courts were powerless to consider other factors such as defendant's age, his prior record, or the extent of his cooperation with the authorities. The court's restrictive interpretation of subsection F was reaffirmed in State v. Bishop, 118 Ariz. 263, 576 P.2d 122 (1978).
On April 21, 1978, two death-row inmates petitioned this Court for writs of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging the unconstitutionality of A.R.S. § 13-454 as interpreted in State v. Richmond, supra, and State v. Bishop, supra. Richmond v. Cardwell, 450 F.Supp. 519 (D.Ariz. 1978). The Court concluded that the failure of Section 13-454 to permit consideration of all relevant mitigating circumstances violated petitioners' rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and enjoined the state from putting petitioners to death. Id. at 526.
On May 2, 1978, the Arizona Supreme Court directed the execution of John Henry Knapp. Knapp immediately instituted the present action, alleging that the Court's reasoning Richmond v. Cardwell, supra, was applicable to all inmates on Arizona's death row. On May 12, 1978, this Court entered an order permitting Knapp's suit to proceed as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and enjoined respondent from imposing the death penalty on any State prisoners.
On July 3, 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), and Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 98 S.Ct. 2977, 57 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1978), in which it struck down Ohio's death penalty statute for the same reasons given by this Court in Richmond v. Cardwell, supra.3
On July 20, 1978, the Arizona Supreme Court handed down State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), in which the court addressed the effect of Lockett on its position that Section 13-454 limited the mitigating circumstances that could be considered by a sentencing court with respect to defendants convicted of first-degree murder. Although the Arizona court found this restriction unconstitutional, it held that had the state legislature been aware of the problem, it would have permitted consideration of all relevant mitigating circumstances. Thus, the court ruled that the constitutional portion of A.R.S. § 13-454 was "severable" from that which was unconstitutional, and remanded defendant's case for resentencing under the newly-construed statute.
On May 1, 1979, the Arizona legislature adopted the present version of A.R.S. § 13-7034 which, in essence, codified the changes made in State v. Watson, supra. As a result of the Watson decision, and the enactment of Section 13-703, Arizona's death row now consists of the following groups of inmates: those sentenced or resentenced pursuant to Watson; those sentenced pursuant to Section 13-703; and those sentenced prior to Watson whose resentencing is now pending. This opinion is concerned only with the effect of the Watson decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty in Arizona. The validity of Section 13-703, or the sentences of those sentenced pursuant to it, is not at issue in this case.
On January 9, 1980, respondent moved to dissolve this Court's injunction of May 10, 1978, on the basis that the above inmates had been (or will be) sentenced under a procedure that permits consideration of all mitigating circumstances.5 Petitioners, through counsel, filed numerous responses, some of which raised a variety of legal issues.6 Oral argument was held on February 25, 1980, after which the Court took the matter under advisement. Since oral argument, two petitioners have filed supplemental memoranda, and respondent has replied thereto.
At the heart of respondent's motion is the validity of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in State v. Watson, supra. There is no question that Watson professes to remedy that which was the basis of this Court's original injunction. The issue is whether the means chosen by the Arizona Supreme Court are subject to constitutional objections.
Several petitioners argue that the Watson Court deleted subsection F from Section 13-454, thereby severing the statute's list of the mitigating circumstances a court must consider in its decision whether to impose death. From this proposition, it is urged that all statutory reference to subsection F is meaningless and that Section 13-454 is rendered void for vagueness. Alternatively, it is argued that without subsection F, sentencing courts are no longer permitted to consider any mitigating circumstances—a clear violation of the eighth amendment. This Court's analysis of Watson makes it unnecessary to address the merits of either of these contentions.
While Watson was not overly explicit as to the means by which it constitutionalized Section 13-454, a close reading of the case makes it apparent that the Arizona court altered the statute through reinterpretation rather than by deleting specific statutory language. This conclusion is supported by two findings. First, the restriction on mitigating circumstances that was "severed" in Watson cannot be found in the express language of Section 13-454. Rather, it was the product of the court's prior interpretations in State v. Richmond, supra, and State v. Bishop, supra. Second, at no point in the Watson decision did the court invalidate or strike specific language of Section 13-454. It removed only that portion of the statute which restricted mitigating circumstances.
Section 13-454 contains no language which demands the restrictive view of State v. Richmond and State v. Bishop that "subsection D authorizes the trial court to take into account only those mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsection F." State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. at 204, 560 P.2d at 50. Subsection F gives no express indication of whether its list was intended to be illustrative or exclusive. It merely states "mitigating circumstances shall be the following ...."7 While subsection D requires the sentencing court to "take into account the ... mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsection F," it stops short of limiting the court to those circumstances. Instead, subsection D states that the sentencing judge "shall impose a sentence of death if the court...
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...class of death row inmates challenging the constitutionality of the Arizona death sentencing procedures in federal court, Knapp v. Cardwell, 513 F.Supp. 4 (D.Ariz.1980). The decision upholding the constitutionality of the statute was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2......
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...the Eighth Amendment by unduly restricting the sentencing court's ability to consider mitigating evidence); See also Knapp v. Cardwell, 513 F.Supp. 4 (D.Ariz. 1980), aff'd. 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 473, 74 L.Ed.2d 621 (1982) (finding constitutiona......
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State v. Mata
...(footnote omitted). After a class action challenge to the Arizona death penalty statute failed in the federal courts, Knapp v. Cardwell, 513 F.Supp. 4 (D.Ariz.1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 473, 74 L.Ed.2d 621 (1982), this court set an executi......
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Richmond v. Ricketts
...sever the invalid portion of the statute. The authority of the state supreme court to interpret its own laws was upheld, Knapp v. Cardwell, 513 F.Supp. 4 (D.Ariz.1980) and that decision was affirmed on appeal, Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1055, 103 ......