Woratzeck v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 04 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. CIV-84-1783-PHX-CAM.,CIV-84-1783-PHX-CAM.
• Citation: 863 F. Supp. 1079
• Parties: William Lyle WORATZECK, Petitioner, v. Samuel LEWIS, Director, Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

863 F. Supp. 1079

William Lyle WORATZECK, Petitioner, v. Samuel LEWIS, Director, Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents.

No. CIV-84-1783-PHX-CAM.

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

August 4, 1994.

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David J. Burman, Kevin J. Hamilton, Perkins & Coie, Seattle, WA, for petitioner.

Crane McClennen, Office of the Atty. Gen. for the State of Arizona, Crim. Appeals Section, Phoenix, AZ, for respondents.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MUECKE, District Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, William Lyle Woratzeck filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court on September 24, 1984. On May 20, 1985, this Court granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment, denied Petitioner's cross motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition. On June 28, 1985, this Court denied Petitioner's motion to "alter and amend findings of fact and/or to modify and/or vacate judgment." On July 12, 1985, Petitioner filed his notice of appeal and on July 16, 1985, this Court issued a certificate of probable cause.

On September 1, 1987, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court's denial of relief. Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.1987). On June 13, 1988, the United States Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit "for further consideration in light of Maynard v. Cartwright," 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 486 U.S. 1051, 108 S.Ct. 2815, 100 L.Ed.2d 916 (1988). On November 7, 1988, the Ninth Circuit vacated this Court's judgment and remanded the matter for "consideration in light of Maynard" and also advised this Court to consider the Ninth Circuit opinion in Adamson v. Ricketts, when issued. Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 1559 (9th Cir. 1988).

The Ninth Circuit issued its en banc opinion in Adamson on December 22, 1988. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988). On January 12, 1989, the Court ordered the parties to brief the procedural and substantive effects of the Adamson decision on Petitioner's case. On January 20, 1989, Respondents requested the Court to stay proceedings in this matter pending finality of the Adamson decision. On February 13, 1989, this Court granted Respondents' motion for a stay in proceedings pending determination of the State's petition for certiorari.

On October 8, 1991, in light of Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511, reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050, 111 S.Ct. 14, 111 L.Ed.2d 828 (1990), Respondents asked the Court to vacate its previous order and lift the stay on proceedings in this matter. On December 11, 1991, the Court granted Respondents' motion. In addition, the Court asked the parties to submit briefs regarding the effect of Walton and its companion case, Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606, reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050, 111 S.Ct. 14, 111 L.Ed.2d 829 (1990), on these proceedings. The Court also ordered the parties to address whether there were any changes in the law that would mandate relief and whether Petitioner should be allowed to re-argue his claims and/or raise any new claims.

On February 26, 1993, after submission of the requested briefing, Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the "especially heinous, cruel and depraved" aggravating factor was not sufficiently narrowed at the time of Petitioner's sentencing and that in light of Richmond v. Lewis, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992), Petitioner was entitled to have the state courts perform a new sentencing calculus.

On October 1, 1993, the Court issued an order file doc. no. 82 reviewing the procedural posture of this case and the matters then pending before it. Upon review the Court concluded that it had no need to revisit the majority of issues raised, decided on-the-merits and subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. The Court, therefore, modified and reinstated its prior judgment file doc. no. 24 of May 20, 1985. See (Order of 10/1/93, at pg. 11).¹ In addition, the Court noted that it would; 1) defer ruling upon Petitioner's motion for summary judgment because the identical issue raised in the motion was then pending before the Ninth Circuit in Mata v. Ricketts, No. 87-1731; 2) that it would defer ruling upon five other claims potentially effected by that decision;² and 3) allow Petitioner the opportunity to file a motion to amend the petition to enable the Court to evaluate the circumstances and determine whether Petitioner should be granted leave to amend his petition to add new and potentially unexhausted claims.

On November 16, 1993, Petitioner filed a motion requesting the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing, or in the alternative, to grant him leave to amend his petition to add new allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel file doc. no. 88. On May 13, 1994, the Ninth Circuit panel denied Mata all relief in an unpublished order.³ As the issue is no longer pending, the Court will now address Petitioner's motion for summary judgment and his remaining claims.

DISCUSSION

Currently pending before the Court are five claims which were raised in Petitioner's petition filed on September 24, 1984:

Claim 20: Petitioner did not commit gratuitous violence upon the victim and application of the (F)(6) factor is inappropriate.

Claim 28: The (F)(6) "especially heinous, cruel, and depraved" aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague.

Claim 29: The (F)(5) "pecuniary gain" aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague and violates principles of double jeopardy in cases of felony murder.

Claim 34: The evidence does not support application of the pecuniary gain factor nor did the trial court find that the factor existed beyond a reasonable doubt.

Claim 35: The evidence does not support application of the especially heinous, cruel, and depraved factor nor did the trial court find that the factor existed beyond a reasonable doubt.

The original remand order and Petitioner's current motion for summary judgment concern primarily Claim 28 as it is identified in the petition. Although the Court reinstated its judgment with respect to a majority of Petitioner's claims, it deferred ruling upon the other four claims noted above primarily because the issues raised in those claims related to, and could have been affected by the Court's resolution of Claim 28.⁴ Also pending before the Court are Petitioner's motions for an evidentiary hearing or in the alternative leave to amend the petition.

I. PENDING CLAIMS AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

A. Claim 28: Constitutionality Of (F)(6) Aggravating Factor

Petitioner received the death penalty based, in part, upon the trial court's finding that the murder was committed in an "especially heinous, cruel and depraved" manner pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6).⁵ In Claim 28 and in his motion for summary judgment Petitioner contends that this factor is facially vague and was not constitutionally narrowed at the time of his sentencing in 1980.⁶ Consequently, Petitioner contends that his death sentence was obtained through a standardless procedure and he is, therefore, entitled to be resentenced pursuant to what he asserts is the current and adequate narrowing construction provided in State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1 (1983).

In opposition, Respondents assert that Petitioner was not sentenced in a standardless fashion. Respondents contend that Gretzler only summarized existing Arizona case law and did not establish a narrowing construction. Further, Respondents argue that because Gretzler merely summarized existing law, it may not serve as a basis to invalidate all death sentences rendered prior to the date it was issued.

1. APPLICABLE LAW:

In 1972, the United States Supreme Court invalidated several capital sentencing statutes and held that all such statutes must adequately guide the sentencer's discretion. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2735, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). In 1976, after employing similar reasoning, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional North Carolina and Louisiana statutes containing mandatory death sentence provisions, while upholding Georgia, Florida, and Texas death penalty statutes that sufficiently channeled or guided the sentencer's discretion. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (finding statute unconstitutional because it mandated death as penalty for the commission of certain offenses); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976) (same); compare, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (finding that statute sufficiently guided jury's discretion by permitting sentence of death if specified aggravating factors were established); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (finding that statute sufficiently guided discretion where death sentence permitted only after a weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (same).

The 1976 decisions delineated the fundamental Eighth Amendment requirements which death penalty statutes must satisfy in order to pass constitutional muster. The required elements are that a statute must narrow the class of death eligible defendants and also guide the sentencer's discretion to ensure an individualized determination regarding the propriety of the death sentence. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909; See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742-43, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (noting that aggravating factors must narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and reasonably justify imposition of a more severe sentence compared to others found guilty of murder).

Continuing to develop the principle that death penalty statutes must genuinely narrow the...