Knapp v. City of North Bend
Decision Date | 06 October 1987 |
Citation | 304 Or. 34,741 P.2d 505 |
Parties | David L. KNAPP, Respondent on Review, v. CITY OF NORTH BEND, Petitioner on Review. TC 85-919; CA A38486; SC S33737/SC S33823. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Daniel M. Spencer, Coos Bay, argued the cause and filed the petition on behalf of the petitioner on review. With him on the petition were Paul L. Roess and Foss, Whitty & Roess, Coos Bay.
Michael D. Reynolds, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause on behalf of the intervenor/petitioner on review, State of Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries. The petition for review was filed by Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., and David Schuman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem.
Michael R. Stebbins, North Bend, argued the cause on behalf of the respondent on review.
Susan P. Graber, Eileen Drake and Stoel, Rives, Boley, Fraser & Wyse, Portland, filed an amici curiae brief on behalf of A-Dec, Inc., Bohemia, Inc., Good Samaritan Hosp., Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Northwest and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon and Les Schwab Warehouse Center, Inc., Leupold & Stevens, Inc., and Precision Castparts Corp.
Larry K. Amburgey, Craig A. Crispin and Bullard, Korshoj, Smith & Jernstedt, P.C., Portland, filed an amici curiae brief on behalf of City of Portland, Food Employers, Inc., HealthLink; Lamb-Weston, Inc.; Lynden Farms/Belozer's Hatchery, McCracken Motor Freight, Inc., McPike Marketing, Inc., Mid-Columbia Medical Center, Nike, Inc., Northwest Packers Indus. Ass'n, Inc., Oregon Self-Insurers Ass'n, Oregon Trucking Ass'n, Inc., Pacific Northwest Bell, PayLess Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., Portland Chamber of Commerce, The Port of Portland, Rogue Valley Medical Center, Silver Eagle Industries, Stayton Canning Co., Tektronix, Inc., Timber Operators Council, Truitt Brothers, Inc., United Grocers, Inc., and Western Bank.
The issue in this employment discrimination case is whether an employer must reinstate a worker, who has sustained a compensable injury, to his or her former position, upon the worker's demand for reinstatement, when the position the worker formerly occupied still exists but no longer is vacant. ORS 659.415 provides:
"(3) Any violation of this section is an unlawful employment practice."
The Court of Appeals held that a former position is "available" within the meaning of ORS 659.415(1) if it still exists, even if, at the time of the demand for reinstatement, it has been filled by a permanent employe. Knapp v. City of North Bend, 83 Or.App. 350, 732 P.2d 31 (1987). We hold that the legislature intended to require reinstatement to a former position only where that position is existing and vacant. Accordingly, we reverse.
From October 8, 1975, to January 22, 1983, plaintiff worked as a sergeant on the North Bend police force. On January 22, 1983, he sustained a compensable injury and, as a result, was unable to work until November 27, 1984. Upon being released to work on that date, plaintiff demanded reinstatement to his former position pursuant to ORS 659.415(1). Defendant city refused, because another employe had been promoted permanently to fill plaintiff's former position and because there were no other suitable vacant positions at that time. On May 29, 1985, a patrol officer position became vacant, and defendant reinstated plaintiff in that position.
Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that defendant engaged in an unlawful employment practice in refusing to reinstate him to his former position. The case was tried on stipulated facts. The trial court ruled that defendant was required to reinstate plaintiff in his former position. The court ordered that plaintiff be reinstated and awarded him back wages from the time of his request for reinstatement.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It found that the proviso that a former position be "available" was ambiguous and that the legislative history offered little guidance in determining whether "available" meant "existing and vacant" or, merely, "existing." 83 Or.App. at 355, 732 P.2d 31. The court then examined which definition was more consistent with the legislature's policy in enacting ORS 656.415(1). Defendant had argued that the legislature intended to preserve the employment relationship while permitting the employer to maintain an orderly workplace by filling vacancies with permanent employes, rather than temporary replacements for injured workers who may be unable to return to work for long periods of time. 1 Plaintiff had argued that the legislature's primary purpose was to facilitate an injured worker's return to self-sufficient status. The trial court found that, although both arguments had merit plaintiff's interpretation of the term "available" was the more reasonable, because:
The Court of Appeals agreed, noting that "[u]nder the current statute, as under the earlier version construed by the court in Shaw, the interpretation defendant advocates 'would permit an employer unilaterally to vitiate the mandate of ORS 659.415 and to thwart the broader legislative scheme to afford employment opportunity and security to the handicapped.' " 83 Or.App. at 357, 732 P.2d 31 (quoting Shaw v. Doyle Milling Co., 297 Or. 251, 255, 683 P.2d 82 (1984)).
In Shaw, this court held that, under a previous version of ORS 659.415(1), 2 an employer was required to reinstate a worker to the worker's former position even though that position had been filled by another permanent employe. In 1981, three years before Shaw was decided (but after the events with which Shaw dealt), the legislature amended ORS 659.415(1) to add, inter alia, the proviso that the former position be "available." Or.Laws 1981, ch. 874, § 14. Some of the legislative history of the amendment suggests that the legislature intended to clarify, not to change, the law. Plaintiff argues that, therefore, the legislature must have intended the Shaw rule, which was announced three years after the amendment, to apply to the amended version.
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Shaw is not dispositive. That case interpreted the pre-1981 version of ORS 659.415(1) three years after 1981, when the language at issue here was added to the statute. We turn to an examination of the language added in 1981.
We agree with the trial court that the policy arguments submitted on behalf of both employers and injured workers have merit. The statute under consideration here clearly was the result of the legislature's balancing of those competing interests, intending to achieve some sort of compromise by adding the word "available." The Court of Appeals went through the balancing of the competing policy considerations for itself in arriving at what it believed to be the most "reasonable" interpretation of the term "available." We decline to embark upon such an analysis because there are other indications of the legislature's intent sufficient to demonstrate that "available" means "vacant."
The Bureau of Labor and Industries (Bureau) is charged with the administration of the employment discrimination law. ORS 659.040 to 659.103. Effective January 26, 1983, the Bureau promulgated OAR 839-06-140, which defines "available," for the purposes of ORS 659.415(1), as follows:
The Court of Appeals noted...
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