Knapp v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 29 November 1993 |
| Citation | 166 F.3d 347 |
| Parties | 98 CJ C.A.R. 5794 NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Before EBEL, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on appellant's petition for rehearing pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 40. A majority of the original panel has voted to deny rehearing. The petition is denied. The second sentence and the last sentence of the order and judgment filed on October 6, 1998 have been amended, however, in response to the unusual procedural history of this case and the procedural implications pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as outlined in the petition for rehearing. The amended order and judgment is attached.
Judge HOLLOWAY would grant the petition for rehearing.
Petitioner-Appellant Robert David Knapp appeals the district court's summary dismissal of his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Person in State Custody, in which he claimed that his present confinement is illegal due to Colorado's loss of jurisdiction. Concluding that Knapp failed to exhaust his state remedies, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand for the district court to hold in abeyance pending appellant's exhaustion of state remedies, as more fully described herein. 1
In 1970, following a Colorado jury trial, Knapp was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. In 1984, the Colorado State Board of Parole paroled Knapp to Michigan. In 1985, Knapp violated his parole by committing a felony, criminal sexual conduct. As a result of the felony, Knapp was sentenced by a Michigan court to a five-year term of imprisonment and began serving his sentence in 1986. Shortly after Knapp's arrest in Michigan, the Colorado State Board of Parole issued an arrest warrant for Knapp as a parole violator based on the Michigan crime. For a period of time, Michigan officials communicated with Colorado officials regarding Knapp's status and his likely date of release.
In 1988, while still in custody, Knapp mailed a letter to the Colorado State Board of Parole, requesting that his Colorado parole be terminated or that he be allowed to complete his parole in Michigan following his release. According to Knapp, he never received a response. Knapp was released from custody in Michigan in 1989. Colorado authorities made no effort at that time to arrange for Knapp's return to Colorado. Instead, following his release, Knapp settled in Michigan, obtained gainful employment, got married, and became a father. In 1993, Knapp was arrested for the Colorado parole violation. His parole was revoked, and he was returned to the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections.
Knapp filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Colorado district court. In his petition, Knapp claimed, among other things, that Colorado lost jurisdiction over him by failing to take any action between his release in 1989 and his arrest in 1993. In denying the petition, the state district court ignored Knapp's loss of jurisdiction claim. Rather than appealing the court's denial of his petition, Knapp next filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus and/or writ of mandamus in the Colorado Supreme Court, raising only the loss of jurisdiction issue. The Colorado Supreme Court denied Knapp's petition without comment. Knapp then filed the instant petition in which he argues that his custody in Colorado violates the United States Constitution because Colorado abandoned jurisdiction over him.
While the proceedings below were convoluted, the federal district court ultimately denied Knapp's petition on the merits without holding a hearing. The district court did not decide whether Knapp had properly exhausted his state remedies, but instead found that Knapp's petition failed to allege facts sufficient to state a due process claim.
A state prisoner bringing a federal habeas petition must show that he has exhausted his state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, federal claims must be "fairly presented to the state courts" in order to give state courts the "opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Connor, 404 U.S. at 275 (internal quotations omitted); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam). It is not sufficient that all the facts necessary to support a federal claim were before the state court or that a similar state-law claim was made. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (per curiam). "If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution." Henry, 513 U.S. at 365-66. This is not to suggest, however, that petitioner need invoke "talismanic language" or cite "book and verse on the federal constitution." Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir.1989) (internal quotations omitted); see also Connor, 404 U.S. at 278. Instead, the crucial inquiry is whether the "substance" of the petitioner's claim has been presented to the state courts in a manner sufficient to put the courts on notice of the federal constitutional claim. 2 See Connor, 404 U.S. at 278; Nichols, 867 F.2d at 1252.
In Knapp's present petition, he alleges that Colorado, as a result of its inaction, abandoned jurisdiction over him and that its later incarceration of Knapp thus violated his due process rights. Cf. Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245, 246 (5th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (). After carefully reviewing Knapp's petition to the Colorado Supreme Court, as well as his petition to the state district court, which Knapp submitted to the Colorado Supreme Court as an exhibit, this court concludes that Knapp failed to appropriately apprise the Colorado Supreme Court that he was asserting a federal due process claim.
In the petition Knapp filed with the Colorado Supreme Court, he framed his claim in terms of abandonment of jurisdiction, not in terms of due process. While the petition Knapp filed in the state district court came closer to presenting a due process claim, stating that the issue it presented involved "jurisdictional loss affecting fundamental rights of the accused," it did not include in the loss of jurisdiction section any analysis of the manner in which Knapp's fundamental rights were violated. Nor do the cases cited by Knapp in his state habeas petitions address Knapp's due process claim. Instead, the cases cited by Knapp address long arm statutes and the requirement that a state have sufficient contacts to exercise jurisdiction. See e.g., Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F.Supp. 242 (D.Colo.1966); Viernes v. District Court, 181 Colo. 284, 509 P.2d 306 (Colo.1973) (en banc). Knapp's petitions do not cite any case, federal or state, addressing the due process concerns implicated by delay in returning an individual to custody. 3 Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Knapp fairly presented and gave notice of his due process claim to the Colorado Supreme Court. 4 Knapp's failure to assert a due process claim is especially pronounced when, as here, he specifically raised other federal constitutional claims. Cf. Henry, 513 U.S. at 366.
Having concluded that Knapp failed to exhaust his federal due process claim before the Colorado courts, this court must next consider whether he is now procedurally barred from bringing his habeas claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (). Absent special circumstances, Colorado courts will not ordinarily entertain successive motions for post-conviction relief. See Turman v. Buckallew, 784 P.2d 774, 780 (Colo.1989) (en banc). This court, however, declines to speculate whether the Colorado courts would find special circumstances in the context of this case. Therefore, rather than deem petitioner's claim procedurally barred, this court will permit Knapp to return to the Colorado courts to exhaust his due process claim. 5
Because this court concludes that Knapp failed to exhaust his claims before the Colorado courts, we VACATE the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissing Knapp's petition with prejudice, and REMAND to the district court with directions to hold the petition in abeyance pending appellant's exhaustion of state remedies. Appellant shall submit a status report to the district court within 180 days of the date of this order, and then successively within 180 days of that status report and each status report thereafter as necessary, outlining the steps he has taken to exhaust state court remedies and the progress of the matter in the state court. At such time as the state court remedies have been exhausted, appellant shall so notify the district court immediately, and the district court shall reactivate...
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