Knapp v. Knapp
| Citation | 96 S.W. 295,118 Mo.App. 685 |
| Parties | CLARA PYBUS KNAPP, Administratrix of the Estate of RALPH H. PYBUS KNAPP, Deceased, Respondent, v. GEORGIA KNAPP, Appellant |
| Decision Date | 10 April 1906 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Rehearing Denied 118 Mo.App. 685 at 695.
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court.--Hon. Warwick Hough Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED (with directions).
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
John S Leahy and Bond, Marshall & Bond for appellant.
(1) The general rule of law applicable to the last proposition is clearly stated in 14 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (2 Ed.), page 273, et seq. And this has been the rule in Missouri (as announced not only by the Supreme Court, but by both Court of Appeals), almost since Missouri became a State. Brown, Adm., v. Finley, 18 Mo. 378. In this case it was pointed out that this rule obtained everywhere, except in States having peculiar statutes on the subject, and it was expressly held that an administrator could not recover personal property of his intestate which had been disposed of by the intestate in fraud of his creditors, even though the estate be insolvent. The rule laid down has been followed ever since, both with respect to real property and personal property, without any distinction being drawn as to the character of the property. Hamilton v. Scull's Adm., 25 Mo. 166; George v. Williamson, 26 Mo. 190; Jackman v. Robertson, 64 Mo. 292; Hall v. Calahan, 66 Mo. 323; Zoll v. Soper, 75 Mo. 462; Tyler v. Larimore, 19 Mo.App. 445; Rozelle v. Harmon, 29 Mo.App. 569; Hayes v. Fry, 110 Mo.App. 20, 83 S.W. 772. (2) The law is also well settled in this State that an administrator of a fraudulent grantor, who is also a judgment creditor of the fraudulent grantor, cannot maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent transfer by the deceased. Goldstein v. Winkelman, 28 Mo.App. 432. The same rule obtains as to the heir or devisee of the fraudulent grantor. Ober v. Howard, 11 Mo. 425; Thomas v. Thomas, 107 Mo. 459, 18 S.W. 27; Davidson v. Dockery, 179 Mo. 696, 78 S.W. 624.
W. W. Henderson and Cocke & Trigg for respondent.
(1) (a) An agent, having received from his principal goods or money for the avowed purpose of shielding same from the principal's creditors, will not be heard to set up the fraudulent nature of the transaction in order to defeat a recovery of same by the principal. So long as the illegal design has not been accomplished there remains to the principal a locus poenitentiae. Gowan's Admr. v. Gowan, 30 Mo. 472; Block v. Darling, 140 U.S. 234; Taylor v. Bowers, 1 Q. B. D. 291; Adams Express Co. v. Reno, 48 Mo. 264; Bowes v. Foster, 2 H. & N. (Court of Exchequer) 779. (b) Where a party, being in possession of personal property, admits that he is the custodian thereof for another, the relation of bailor and bailee is thereupon created--it not being essential that the formality of a redelivery of the res be gone through with. "In such case mere words are sufficient to pass the title." Allgear v. Walsh, 24 Mo.App. 144; Robinson v. Haas, 40 Cal. 474; Lide v. Lide's Admr., 32 Ala. 449; Beale on Bailments (1900), pp. 284 and 280; Hale on Bailments (1896), pp. 13-14. (2) The declarations of a party, while in possession of either realty or personalty, and made in disparagement of his title, or in explanation of the character of his possession, have always been deemed admissible evidence tending to show in whom the real ownership and title rested. Meier v. Meier, 105 Mo. 411; Anderson v. McPike, 86 Mo. 293; Cavin v. Smith, 24 Mo. 221. It, therefore, follows that the admission of the appellant, made on the 9th day of February, 1903, to the effect that the money then in her possession was the property of plaintiff's intestate, created the relationship of bailor and bailee between the parties. But, independently of the transaction of February 9, 1903, the evidence being that it was never contemplated by the parties that title to the funds should vest in the appellant, it is unimportant to inquire as to whether the identity of the res was preserved, for, both in contemplation of law, and of the parties, plaintiff's intestate was the rightful owner of the funds. Clarke, Harrison & Co. v. Brown, 77 Ga. 606; Repplier v. Jacobs, 149 Pa. St. 167; Love v. Harvey, 114 Mass. 80; Morgan v. Groff, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 524; Humphreys v. Magee, 13 Mo. 435; Block v. Darling, 140 U.S. 234. (3) Under the answer, which is in the form of a general denial, the appellant may not invoke, as a defense, the illegality of the transaction. McDearmott v. Sedgwick, 140 Mo. 181-183, 39 S.W. 776; McClure v. Ullman, 102 Mo.App. 697, 77 S.W. 325; Gibson v. Jenkins, 97 Mo.App. 27, 70 S.W. 1076.
--Omitting caption, the petition is as follows:
The answer was a general denial.
The cause was submitted to the court, without the intervention of a jury, who, after hearing the evidence, found the issues for plaintiff and rendered judgment in her favor for twenty-one hundred and eighty dollars and interest thereon. After taking the usual preliminary steps, defendant appealed.
The history out of which the litigation grew, briefly stated, is as follows: In 1902, Ralph Knapp, as the elder son of his father, was, under the law of primogeniture, entitled to an estate, or interest in an estate in England of the value of about seven thousand dollars. He employed the law firm of Dodge & Mulvihill, of the city of St. Louis, to establish his right in the estate. His attorneys were successful and as soon as the matter was settled in his favor, he sailed for England and collected about seven thousand dollars of the estate. He purchased a draft in London for $ 5,811.43, payable to his mother, and sent it to her. She received the draft, cashed it and out of the proceeds handed or gave her daughter, the defendant herein, two thousand dollars, which the latter, on January 23, 1903, deposited to her individual credit with the Mississippi Valley Trust Company. Ralph Knapp spent the greater portion of the balance of his inheritance in seeing Europe and then returned to his home in St. Louis. On his return he refused to pay Dodge & Mulvihill their fee of eighteen hundred dollars. They brought suit against him to recover the fee and obtained a judgment for the amount claimed. The judgment was collected of Knapp's mother through garnishment proceedings.
It is practically conceded by defendant that Ralph Knapp placed the $ 5,811.43 in the hands of his mother for the fraudulent purpose of defeating Dodge & Mulvihill in the collection of the debt he owed them.
Defendant testified that she had kept a deposit account with the Mississippi Valley Trust Company for several years prior to 1903. The state of her account on May 16, 1903, was as follows:
Balance
$ 94.77
January 23, 1903
2,000.00
January 26, 1903
30.00
February 4, 1903
67.00
February 5, 1903
$ 7.00
February 9, 1903
2,180.00
May 16, 1903
4.77
$ 2,191.77
Defendant's evidence shows that her income from all sources was, and had been for several years, thirty-five dollars per month. She testified that after her brother returned from England, she gave him several checks on her bank account for the purpose of enabling him to pay his bills and at one time gave him a check for one hundred dollars. On February 19, 1903, defendant, accompanied by Mrs. Mullins, a friend went to the Mississippi Valley Trust Company and withdrew twenty-one hundred and eighty dollars in currency, which she placed in the bosom of her shirtwaist. Defendant and her friend then walked over to the William Barr Dry Goods Company where they met Ralph Knapp and Charles Ramlose, who had been waiting there for them for about half an hour. When the parties met, Ralph Knapp, addressing defendant, his sister said: "Well, did you get my money, Sis?" Defendant answered, "Yes, Ralph, I have it here," pointing to the bosom of her shirtwaist. Defendant testified that after she withdrew the money from the trust company she took it home and kept it there. The evidence tends to show that defendant apprehended she might be garnisheed on process against her brother and withdrew the money from the trust company to defeat the garnishment; it also shows that on several occasions she stated that she was...
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