Knapp v. Monroe County Civil Service Com'n

• Decision Date: 10 July 1980
• Citation: 77 A.D.2d 817,437 N.Y.S.2d 136
• Parties: , 36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 392 Charles Nelson KNAPP, Appellant, v. MONROE COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and Office of Personnel and Human Resources and Frederick W. Lapple, as Executive Director, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 136

437 N.Y.S.2d 136

77 A.D.2d 817, 36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 392

Charles Nelson KNAPP, Appellant, v. MONROE COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and Office of Personnel and Human Resources and Frederick W Lapple, as Executive Director, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

July 10, 1980.

Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., by Marcia Boyd, Rochester, for appellant.

William J. Stevens, County Atty., by Joseph Pilato, Rochester, for respondents.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., by John Driscoll, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, for the State.

Before HANCOCK, J. P., and SCHNEPP, CALLAHAN, DOERR and WITMER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

This appeal requires us to determine whether section 58 of the Civil Service Law which prohibits the original appointment of police officers over twenty-nine years of age violates the equal protection requirements of the United States and the New York State Constitutions as well as the New York State Human Rights Law protection against discrimination in employment (Executive Law, §§ 291, 296). We hold that Special Term correctly ruled that section 58 is constitutional. Based on the rationale expressed in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, and Matter of Figueroa v. Bronstein, 38 N.Y.2d 533, 381 N.Y.S.2d 470, 344 N.E.2d 402, we have upheld the constitutionality of this section of the Civil Service Law and its age limits under challenge here in Whitehair v. Civil Serv. Comm. of Monroe County, 56 A.D.2d 711, 392 N.Y.S.2d 583. The issue merits no further discussion.

We also hold that section 58 does not contravene the prohibition against age discrimination afforded by the Human Rights Law in section 296 (subd. 3-a) of the Executive Law and is not, as plaintiff argues, superseded by that section. Section 296 (subd. 3-a) declares that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer because an individual is between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five, to refuse to hire or employ such individual. Subdivision 1 (par. (a)) of section 58 of the Civil Service Law limits eligibility for provisional or permanent appointment as a police officer to persons between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine years of age. Plaintiff, relying on Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 84, 300 N.Y.S.2d 884, 359 N.E.2d 393, contends that a conflict exists between the two statutes and that the Human Rights Law imposes a "greater obligation" and controls in the instant case. In Brooklyn Union, the Court of Appeals, faced with an "evident incongruity" between the minimum demands on employers set forth in the Disability Benefits Law and the Human Rights Law, held that "(w) hichever statute imposes the greater obligation is the one which becomes operative" (Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., supra, 41 N.Y.2d p. 88, 300 N.Y.S.2d 884, 359 N.E.2d 393). We hold that no incongruity exists between the Civil Service Law and the Human Rights Law (Executive Law, § 296, subd. 3-a). The Human Rights Law governs, inter alia, any "employer or licensing agency" or "labor organization" or "employment agency" (Executive Law, § 296). The Civil Service Law covers "the state civil service department, ... the state civil service commission, ... (or) any municipal civil service commission" (Civil Service Law, § 54). Thus, the statutes operate upon two separate and unrelated categories of employers or agencies and cannot conflict.

As further support for our conclusion,...