Knapp v. Simmons, 83-256

• Decision Date: 15 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-256,83-256
• Citation: 345 N.W.2d 118
• Parties: Richard G. KNAPP, Jr., Appellant, v. David P. SIMMONS, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 118

345 N.W.2d 118

Richard G. KNAPP, Jr., Appellant, v. David P. SIMMONS, Appellee.

No. 83-256.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 15, 1984.

George W. Wittgraf of McDonald, Sayre & Wittgraf, Cherokee, for appellant.

J.R. Miller of Miller, Miller, Miller & Green, Cherokee, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and McGIVERIN, LARSON, SCHULTZ and CARTER, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

Plaintiff, Richard G. Knapp, Jr., appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant, David A. Simmons, in a tort action arising from the poisoning of his cattle on land leased from the defendant. Because we determine that trial court erred in granting summary judgment, we reverse.

The facts developed in the district court proceedings are uncomplicated. Sometime in October of 1979, Simmons entered into an oral lease with Knapp allowing plaintiff to graze his cattle on defendant's cornstalks. Under this agreement, Knapp paid $2.50 per acre for an unspecified number of acres that had been planted in corn even though the cows had unfettered run of defendant's entire 320 acres. The parties had entered into similar arrangements for the three preceding years. Prior to turning out the herd on November 1, 1979, Knapp drove around the perimeter of the premises and also walked the fences to make sure they were stock tight. No other inspection apparently was made.

On November 13, 1979, Simmons informed Knapp that his cattle were sick and dying. A veterinarian was called and arrived about an hour later. He concluded that the cows had been poisoned by eating Furadan and had died of Furadan toxicosis. The parties in searching the premises found cattle milling around an open sack of Furadan and noted several hoof prints on the bag. The record does not disclose the location of the Furadan on defendant's premises.

On September 30, 1980, Knapp filed a petition against Simmons setting out the lease arrangement and alleging that "Defendant was negligent in the operation and maintenance of his land by allowing Furadan to be present when the Plaintiff's cattle were grazing there." The action was relatively dormant until Simmons propounded interrogatories to plaintiff sometime in January of 1983. Plaintiff's answers revealed no further facts than those previously set out. On January 7, 1983, two days after receiving the answers, defendant moved for summary judgment.

In support of the motion, defendant argued that except for latent defects existing at the time the lease was consummated, the landlord was not liable for the condition of the premises nor does he undertake that they may be safely used for the purposes for which they were leased. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the landlord was liable for failing to turn over or maintain the premises in a manner suitable for the rental purpose.

The court rejected plaintiff's suitability theory and stated that no assurances were given that the land was either inspected or safe nor was there a claim defendant knew or should have known of any latent defects or dangers on the property. The court went on to note that "Plaintiff has no evidence to show where the Furadan bag came from, who it belonged to or how long it was on the property." It concluded that defendant should not be put to the expense of trial when such vital evidence did not exist and granted summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, he claims: (1) this court should adopt a rule that leases of agricultural land carry an implied warranty of suitability for a particular purpose; (2) even if there is generally no duty running from an agricultural landlord to his tenant, such a duty arises here because Knapp and Simmons had joint control over the premises where the injury occurred; and (3) there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the poisoning of plaintiff's cattle was caused by a latent defect existing at the time the lease was entered into.

Prior to addressing the specific issues raised by appellant, we will further examine the nature of the action and the trial court's grant of relief by way of summary judgment. We shall also review principles of law concerning motions for summary judgment and the court's ruling.

The pleadings revealed an action in tort. In particular, plaintiff pled that an oral lease allowed his cattle to feed on cornstalks and that while they were grazing they came in contact with Furadan. He alleged negligence on the part of the landlord arising from the operation and maintenance of his land. It is well-settled that neglect of duty imposed by a lease is a tort for which an action ex delicto will lie. Duke v. Clarke, 267 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1978). This duty, arising from the contract, may result from an implied warranty. Id. The determination as to whether the contract supports the asserted duty is made by the trial court as a matter of law. Porter v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 217 N.W.2d 221, 228 (Iowa 1974). When such a duty has been established, compliance with the duty is determined by the trier of fact.

In granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court rejected any duty of the lessor based on an implied warranty of suitability of the premises. The trial court did recognize that a landlord has a duty to warn the tenant of known latent defects but did not address his duties in situations of joint control over the leased premises.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c). The burden of showing the nonexistence of a material fact is upon the moving party. Colonial Baking Co. of Des Moines v. Dowie, 330 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Iowa 1983). While an adverse party generally cannot rest upon his pleadings when the moving party has supported his motion, summary judgment is still not proper if reasonable minds could draw different inferences and conclusions from the undisputed facts. Id. In this respect, summary judgment is functionally akin to a directed verdict, Sherwood v. Nissen, 179 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 1970); every legitimate inference that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence should be afforded the nonmoving party, and a fact question is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved. Henkel v. R & S Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185, 187-88 (Iowa 1982).

I. Plaintiff first urges this court to judicially adopt a rule that liability of a lessor may be based upon breach of an implied warranty of suitability of agricultural land for a particular purpose. In the past, we have soundly rejected the theory that the landlord impliedly warrants that leased property will be suitable for the purpose for which it is rented. See Osterling v. Sturgeon, 261 Iowa 836, 842, 156 N.W.2d 344, 348 (1968) (In adjudicating a claim for rent based on the lease of premises for a bowling alley, the court citing C.J.S. stated: "The fact that the lease designates the use to which the premises are put does not imply a warranty that they are or will continue to be fit for that purpose."); Kutchera v. Graft, 191 Iowa 1200, 1209, 184 N.W. 297, 301 (1921) (Similarly, in affirming the denial of liability based on the negligence in the leasing of farmland, the court said: "[T]he lessor, in the absence of fraud or of any agreement to that effect, is not liable to the lessee for the condition of the premises, and that the premises may be safely used for the purposes for which they were intended").

Nevertheless, plaintiff insists such an implied warranty is appropriate. Essentially, he points to the narrowing of the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of goods, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and also the decisions of this court holding there is an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972) and Duke v. Clark, 267 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1978). In Mease, we specifically limited the implied warranty to leases of residential dwellings. Id. at 796. Moreover, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Law, Iowa Code Chapter 562A, which codified and further delineated Mease, expressly excludes agricultural leases from coverage. See § 562A.5(7) (excluding from application of the chapter any "[o]ccupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the occupant primarily for agricultural purposes"). In sum, plaintiff's position is not supported by either our case law or statutory enactments.

Additionally, important policy considerations dictate against judicial adoption of plaintiff's view. If an individual rents cropland, and the land is infested with insects or is subsequently flooded, would he have a cause of action for a breach of an implied warranty for a particualr purpose? Many variables, difficult of proof and beyond a lessor's control, could possibly subject him to liability if leases carried an implicit warranty that they were suited for a particular purpose.

We conclude that the trial court was correct when it rejected, as a matter of law, any duty of a lessor arising from an implied warranty of suitability.

II. Plaintiff also claims that summary judgment was not appropriate to resolve the issue of the landlord's duty to disclose latent defects. Specifically, plaintiff asserts, and we agree, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the poisoning of the cattle was caused by a latent defect existing at the time the lease was consummated.

The question of Simmon's negligence grounded on a violation of his duty to warn Knapp of hidden or latent defects was considered and disposed of by the court. Indeed, the lessor squarely placed this issue before the court in his motion...