Knaus Truck Lines v. Commercial Freight Lines

• Decision Date: 14 October 1947
• Docket Number: 47077.
• Parties: KNAUS TRUCK LINES, Inc. v. COMMERCIAL FREIGHT LINES et al. MERCHANTS MOTOR FREIGHT, Inc. v. SAME.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

29 N.W.2d 204

238 Iowa 1356

KNAUS TRUCK LINES, Inc. v. COMMERCIAL FREIGHT LINES et al.

MERCHANTS MOTOR FREIGHT, Inc. v. SAME.

No. 47077.

Supreme Court of Iowa

October 14, 1947

Rehearing Denied Dec. 19, 1947.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Loy Ladd, Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Bump & Bump, of Des Moines, for appellants.

Stipp Perry, Bannister, Carpenter & Ahlers, of Des Moines, for appellee Commercial Freight Lines.

Abramson & Myers, of Des Moines, for appellee Aaron Mason.

GARFIELD Justice.

Four trucks were directly involved in the collision from which these actions arose. They belonged to the two plaintiffs, Knaus Truck Lines and Merchants Motor Freight, and the two defendants, Commercial Freight Lines and Aaron Mason. A fifth truck, driven by Jensen, was parked at the scene of the collision but was not directly involved. All but the Mason truck, which was 'straight,' were of the tractor-trailer or semi-trailer type. At the time of the collision all the trucks were stopped except that of plaintiff Merchants Motor Freight.

The collision occurred in January on paved U.S. highway 6 about six miles east of West Liberty near the lower east end of a hill. Some 700 feet to the east the highway forms an elevated crossing over a railroad. As the highway leaves the overpass going west it curves to the left, then to the right up the hill at the bottom of which the collision occurred. Between the west approach to the overpass and the hill to the west the paving is level.

The collision occurred between 7:15 and 7:30 a.m. The road was icy and slippery and there was a heavy fog, mist and freezing rain. Defendant Mason, going west, first arrived at the bottom of the hill. He thought it was too icy to continue and attempted to turn around and go back to the next town east. In the attempt Mason's truck was moved across the paving 'and he could not get away.' The rear of the truck was south of the center line, the front wheels on the north shoulder. It is not shown how long the Mason truck remained in this position across the highway.

Plaintiff Knaus' truck, driven by Wilcoxon, was next to arrive also from the east. He pulled out to his right and stopped east of the Mason truck on the north shoulder except that the left dual wheels occupied the north one foot of the paving. Defendant Commercial Freight Lines' truck, driven by Norgor, also going west, followed the Knaus truck by about a half minute. Norgor stopped the Commercial unit almost directly south of defendant Mason's truck. Half the Commercial truck was on the paving, half on the south shoulder. There was a four to five foot space between the rear of the Mason truck, headed north across the highway, and the Commercial truck headed west south of the Mason truck. About a half minute later Jensen arrived from the west, traveling down the hill. He succeeded in getting his truck onto the north shoulder and stopped, headed east, 15 to 25 feet west of Mason.

Merchants Motor Freight's truck, driven by Merrifield, followed the Jensen truck at another half minute interval. Like Jensen, he was traveling east down the hill. Merrifield was unable to stop the Merchants truck and headed for the four to five foot opening between the trucks of the two defendants. The opening was too narrow and he collided with the Mason truck and grazed the north side of the Commercial truck. The collision knocked the wheels of the Merchants tractor out of line and sent it out of control so that it struck plaintiff Knaus' truck which was 100 to 125 feet east of Mason, mostly on the shoulder.

Both Knaus and Merchants sued Commercial and Mason for the damage to their trucks, alleging defendants were negligent in stopping on the highway and failing to warn on-coming traffic of their presence. The two actions were consolidated. At the close of plaintiffs' evidence the trial court directed verdicts for defendants against each plaintiff on the ground that each, through its driver, 'was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.' From judgment on the verdict plaintiffs have appealed.

Of course it is our duty to view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and give them the benefit of all permissible inferences. When this is done, we think reasonable minds might reach different conclusions upon the issue of plaintiffs' freedom from contributory negligence and therefore it should have been submitted to the jury.

I. Defendants contend Merrifield, plaintiff Merchants' driver, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in violating the prohibition of Code, section 321.285 (all Code references are to the Code of 1946) against driving at a speed greater than will permit stopping within the assured clear distance ahead, 'such driver having the right to assume, however, that all persons using said highway will observe the law.' The quoted words are an amendment which took effect July 4, 1935.

We have frequently held this statute is not a hard and fast rule applicable in every case where a motorist collides with a stationary object. Many of our cases recognize there may be a legal excuse for violating the statute or that peculiar or diverting circumstances may render the statute inapplicable. Schroeder v. Kindschuh, 229 Iowa 590, 593, 294 N.W. 784, and cases cited; Angell v. Hutchcroft, 231 Iowa 1057, 1061, 3 N.W.2d 147, 149; Central States Electric Co. v. McVay, 232 Iowa 469, 473, 5 N.W.2d 817, 819.

Under section 321.285, Merrifield had a right to assume, until he knew or should have known otherwise, there would be no illegal obstructions upon the highway. The jury could properly find here that both defendants' trucks were illegally parked upon the paving in violation of section 321.354. See Smith v. Pust, 232 Iowa 1194, 1197, 6 N.W.2d 315, 317; Uhlenhopp v. Steege, 233 Iowa 368, 373, 7 N.W.2d 195, 198. Also that Commercial's truck was stopped in violation of section 321.358, pars. 10, 11.

When Merrifield discovered the Jensen truck he was some 400 feet or perhaps more to the west coming over the top of the lower part of the hill with a grade of about 6 per cent. The hill then flattens out to the west or forms 'a little valley' and then there is a second rise to the west on a grade of about 2 per cent. Merrifield was not exceeding 25 to 30 miles per hour when he saw the Jensen truck. He was traveling in the third of five forward speeds. 'It is unable to run over 30 miles an hour, and very seldom over 25 or 26 miles in third gear. The governor cuts off about then.' Although Jensen was completely off the paving, Merrifield 'realized there must have been some trouble, a flat tire or something, and tried to slow down.' As he came closer, descending this ice-covered, 6 per cent grade, Merrifield discovered the Mason truck 'crossways' and then the Commercial truck on his side of the road facing him.

The jury could properly find Merrifield discovered defendants' trucks as soon as they were reasonably discernible in the exercise of ordinary care. We cannot say the speed he was then traveling was, as a matter of law, excessive. Reasonable minds might fairly conclude not only that Merrifield, from the time he discovered defendants' trucks exercised ordinary care in an attempt to avoid the collision, but did everything possible toward that end.

Wilcoxon (Knaus' driver), Jensen and Merrifield (who had not worked for Merchants for several years before the trial), all experienced truck drivers, substantially agree it was impossible to stop a truck on the pavement of this icy hill and the only chance of stopping was to get off on the shoulder where traction was possible. The jury could find Merrifield made every effort to get on to the shoulder but was unable to do so because of the 6-inch curb at the edge of the paving and the fact his truck was practically empty.

Merrifield in descending the hill operated the Merchants' truck in about the same way Jensen operated his truck as he descended the hill and as Wilcoxon and Norgor operated their trucks in descending the icy 6 per cent grade just west of the railroad overpass. It would be proper to find that Jensen was able to get onto the north shoulder (to his left) because his truck was loaded and that the 700-foot level stretch of road enabled Wilcoxon and Norgor to come to a stop near the foot of the hill.

We quote these excerpts from defendants' cross-examination of Jensen, a disinterested witness: 'When I saw this situation my heart came up into my mouth. I didn't know what to do but I tried to stop. I felt my trailer start to slip sideway and I used my brakes to hit the shoulder, either one side or the other, first north and then south. * * * As soon as I saw them I did everything I could to try to stop and because of the slippery pavement I could not get over on the shoulder on the south side of the road. I was trying to get off the pavement either on the north side or the south side and I managed to jump the flange on the north side and got out on the shoulder where I got a little traction and was able to stop. It was a bad situation there due to the weather and the presence of trucks on the highway. * * * I saw the Merchants come over the hill from the west, something like 30 miles per hour, and the Merchants truck began to slide from one side of the road to the other trying to stop. * * * The Merchants truck jackknifed some coming down the hill, just about as I was until I had got mine over the edge of the pavement. I talked with the Merchants driver after the accident. He asked me how I got stopped. I said 'I was lucky.' He said, 'What else could I do?' I said 'You could not do anything.' * * *.'

Merrifield himself testified: 'The first thing I did was to try to stop and I saw I could not stop because...