Knierim v. James

• Decision Date: 09 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 65989,65989
• Parties: Kenny Dean KNIERIM, Appellant, v. Ray L. JAMES (Now Richard King), Director of Revenue, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 322

677 S.W.2d 322

Kenny Dean KNIERIM, Appellant, v. Ray L. JAMES (Now Richard King), Director of Revenue, Respondent.

No. 65989.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Oct. 9, 1984.

Theodore D. Barnes, Charles D. Wilson, Raytown, for appellant.

Matt Whitworth, Alfred A. Riederer, Robert Frager, Kansas City, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This case was transferred from the Court of Appeals, Western District, by this Court upon application of the Director of Revenue, to resolve the apparent conflict between the parties' interpretations of section 304.009 (Cum.Supp.1983).

The case has now been argued and submitted to this Court, and the Court adopts the opinion of the Honorable Harold L. Lowenstein in the court of appeals which resolves the issue in favor of Mr. Knierim.

Knierim filed a petition for review asking the Circuit Court of Jackson County to set aside four of eight points assessed against him and the resultant 30 day suspension of his drivers license under Section 302.304(2), RSMo (Cum.Supp.1983), by Ray James then the Director of Revenue. Section 302.311, RSMo 1978, ¹ gives a driver who has been suspended by the director the right to appeal to the circuit court in the county of his residence for a de novo hearing where the director's action can be sustained, set aside or modified. The stipulated facts show that twice Knierim was stopped by Kansas City policemen and charged with speeding violations under a municipal ordinance. ² He was driving in the city limits of Kansas City on Interstate 435 (a divided limited access highway) on both occasions--he pleaded guilty in the municipal division to exceeding the speed limit of 55, but not over 70 m.p.h., and paid fines. On appeal Knierim basically alleges the state, i.e. the director of revenue, had no right to assess two points for each conviction under Section 302.302 (Cum.Supp.1983) since Section 304.009 (Cum.Supp.1983) sets the speed limit on I-435 at 55 m.p.h. He says that since the speed limit was set by the state but not specifically set by Kansas City Ordinance, 304.009 controls and he should not have received points for a municipal speeding violation. ³

It is conceded the state set speed limit on this highway is 55 m.p.h., and under Section 304.009 no points could be assessed for these violations which were under 70 m.p.h. There is no contention the city made a request to set a lower limit under Section 304.012. The problem of seeming unfairness arises in that Kansas City has copied or duplicated the state's limit and the director seeks to impose points for the violations under Section 302.302 which allows two points to be assessed for a municipal ordinance violation.

The circuit court denied relief sought by Knierim and upheld the director's action. The standard of review is under Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976), and Rule 73.01. Knierim says the exception of 304.009 applies only when the speed limit on a controlled access interstate highway is set at a speed by the municipality at less than that by the state. He relies on Sections 304.012 and 304.009 being read together to reach this conclusion. His alternative argument that cities cannot regulate the speed on controlled access highways within their boundaries where the limit is already set by state law will not be addressed.

The sole issue in this case is whether the state may assess points for an ordinance speeding violation on a controlled or divided limited access highway, where the city has adopted a general ordinance duplicating the speed set by state statute.

The stipulated facts in this case do not say whether the city or the state posted or set the limits in question, but merely say speed limit on this interstate highway was a "state speed limit, that being 55 m.p.h.--and not a violation of a speed limit specifically set 'by ordinance of any political subdivision of the state.' " The stipulation says that Knierim pleaded guilty to an ordinance of "... exceeding the posted speed limit and that posted speed limit was set by state statute, and specifically Section 304.009."

As was the situation in Rudd v. David, 444 S.W.2d 457, 458-59 (Mo.1969) Knierim does not question the fact the records of his guilty pleas to the moving charges were properly forwarded to the director. There is no statutory authority for the director to seine through municipal speeding violations and, as appellant suggests, to not assess points if the violations occurred on roads also regulated by state speed laws. Instead, the state argues the director must record the points as the convictions come to him, "and once the specified number of points are accumulated the Director has no discretion." Rudd, supra, at 459.

Certain other statutes are relevant to the issue presented. Section 302.225.1 (Cum.Supp.1983) provides for municipal courts to forward to the highway patrol records of convictions of ordinance moving violations. "The record of all convictions involving the assessment of points as provided in Section 302.302 shall be forwarded by the highway patrol ... to the director of revenue." Paragraph 3 of Section 302.225 states no municipal judge or municipal official shall have the power to revoke a drivers license. Section 302.302, supra, sets out the point system the director is to use relating to suspensions and revocations. Three points are assessed for "state law" speeding violations, and two points for violations of "municipal ordinances." This section states that an act that constitutes both state and municipal violations may carry points for either, but not both.

Here the state has set the speed limit on sections of I-435, while the city, by blanket reference to a speed set by the state, has said "me too." It would be anomalous to allow the director to assess points for a municipal violation which merely duplicates by reference the state limit, and then to disregard the other portion of state law that effectively prohibits points on this type of road in unincorporated areas.

The holding of this case is limited to the situation where a city blanketly adopts the state speed limit on a controlled access highway within its boundaries. According to state law no points may be assessed on any such highways between 55 and 70 m.p.h. Because the director has the ultimate power to assess points and to suspend licenses for accumulated points, this decision must also weigh the fact that there is no authority or mechanism provided for the director to peruse the records of convictions sent to him to determine whether he should assess points. Nonetheless under these facts no points can be charged by the state, through the director, for this municipal violation. Section 304.009 does not allow, when read with 304.010, points until the speed exceeds that set by law or ordinance. Section 304.009 sets the speed here at 55. Section 304.012 relating to divided limited access highways through incorporated areas allows a municipality to set a speed lower than the state law or state-set speed only after state approval for safety reasons or for efficient movement of traffic. Construing the statutes in light of...