Knight v. Beckwith Commercial Co.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1896
• Citation: 46 P. 1094,6 Wyo. 500
• Parties: KNIGHT ET AL. v. BECKWITH COMMERCIAL CO
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

46 P. 1094

6 Wyo. 500

KNIGHT ET AL. v. BECKWITH COMMERCIAL CO

Supreme Court of Wyoming

December 12, 1896

Commenced in the District Court May 25, 1895.

ERROR to the District Court of Sweetwater County, HON. JESSE KNIGHT, Judge.

Replevin action brought by Hattie J. Knight against the Beckwith Commercial Company, to recover the possession of certain goods and chattels. The issues presented by the pleadings and the material facts are stated in the opinion. The statute under which defendant claimed a storage lien is as follows:

"Every common carrier of goods or passengers who shall, at the request of the owner of any personal goods, carry, convey, or transport the same from one place to another, and any warehouseman or other person who shall safely keep or store any personal property at the request of the owner or person lawfully in possession thereof, shall, in like manner, have a lien upon all such personal property, for his reasonable charges for the transportation, storage, or keeping thereof and for all reasonable and proper advances made thereon by him in accordance with the usage and custom of common carriers and warehousemen."

Judgment was rendered against the plaintiff and her surety for damages, and costs, and they prosecuted error.

Reversed.

E. E. Enterline, for plaintiffs in error.

Counsel fees may, in replevin, be included in estimating the damages of the plaintiff when the detention is wilful. (Cobbey on Replevin, Secs. 920, 976; Parroski v. Goldberg, 80 Wis. 339; 3 Suth. on Dam., Sec. 1130.) The testimony as to expenses incurred by the plaintiff, including counsel fees, on account of defendant's refusal to return the goods upon demand, was admissible as a basis upon which to estimate punitive or exemplary damages. (5 Ency. L., 21, 22; Cobbey on Replevin, Secs. 924-928; Winstead v. Hulme, 32 Kan. 568; Bruce v. Learned, 4 Mass. 614; 3 Suth. on Dam., Secs. 1131, 1145.)

By pleading that the goods were delivered to it by plaintiff to be stored, the defendant ratified the act of its agent in agreeing to store them without charge. (1 Ency. L., 429, 434; Long v. Osborn, 59 N.W. 14; Russ v. Tilfever, 57 F. 973; 4 Thomp. Corp., 5258, 5289, 5298.) There can not be a partial ratification of the acts of an agent. There must be either an affirmance or disavowal of the entire transaction. (Biedman v. Goodell et al., 56 Iowa 592; Warder v. Pattee, 57 Iowa 515; Strasser v. Conklin, 54 Wis. 102; Joslin v. Miller, 14 Neb. 91; Walker v. Haggerty, 30 id., 120; Wells v. Hikox (Kan.), 40 P. 821; Union Trust Co. v. Philips (S. D.), 63 N.W. 903; Esterly, etc., Co. v. Frolley, 34 Neb. 110; Daniels v. Brodie, 54 Ark. 216; Stanard Milling Co. v. Flower, 46 La. Ann., 315; Mech. on Agency, Secs. 130, 167, and 169; I. A. & E. of Law, pp. 434-436; 4 Thomp. on Corp., Sec. 5303.) The defendant was not engaged in the business of a warehouseman; it would not therefore have a lien upon goods stored by it for another. The general words "or other person" in the statute are restricted and limited by the particular and specific word "warehouseman" which they follow, to those of the same class or kind. (Suth. on Stat. Const., 268-276; People v. Dolan, 5 Wyo., 245.) Not having found whether defendant had the right of property, or right of possession only, the judgment was unauthorized. (R. S., Sec. 3032; Cobbey on R., 1049, 1050; 1056, 1057; Chandler v. Colcord, 1 Okla., 260; Fulkerson v. Dinkins, 28 Mo. Ap., 160; Cob. on Repl., Secs. 1072 and 1073; Guerold v. Holtz, 103 Mich. 118; Holt v. Van Epps, 1 Dak., 206; Phipps v. Taylor, 15 Ore., 484; Yick Kee v. Dunbar, 20 Ore., 416; Smith v. Smith, 17 Ore., 444. There was a failure to find the value of the property. Such a finding is necessary. (Cobbey on Repl., Secs. 1061 and 1062; Foss v. Marr, 40 Neb. 559; Meeker v. Johnson, 3 Wash. St., 247; Lewin v. Stein (Col.), 42 P. 185; Bleiler v. Moore, 88 Wis. 438; Goodwin v. Potter, 40 Neb. 553; Cobbey on Repl., Secs. 970 and 971; Connoly v. Miller, 22 Neb. 82; Philleo v. McDonald, 27 Neb. 142; Just v. Porter, 64 Mich. 565; Hainer v. Lee, 12 Neb. 452; Dodge v. Runnels, 20 id., 33; Boot & Shoe Co. v. Braithwaite, (S. D.) 34 N.W. 68.)

C. C. Hamlin, for defendant in error.

Defendant's disavowal of the agreement of its agent immediately on learning of it was sufficient. Ratification must be with full knowledge of all material facts. (Pars. on Cont., 52; Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen, 493; Bass v. Worth, 40 Barb. 648; Johnson v. Craig. 21 Ark. 539.) Defendant had a lien under the statute. It comes within the term "or other person." No part of the statute should be rejected if an interpretation can be found which will give it effect. (Sedgwick Stat. L., 199; in re N. Y. Bridge, 72 N.Y. 530; Patterson v. Spierman, 37 Iowa 42; Dearborn v. Brookline, 97 Mass. 466.) No room for construction if the language is clear. (Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 97; U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 388; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 60; U. S. v. Hartwell, 6 Wall., 396.) The finding of the court as to the value of defendant's interest was sufficient. (R. S., Sec. 3032.) If the property was of less value than defendant's lien, the plaintiff should have shown that fact in mitigation of defendant's damages. (Stahan v. Smith, 38 Kan. 474; Fowler v. Hoffman, 31 Mich. 220; Chandler v. Concord, 1 Okla., 260.) The right of the defendant to recover in this case is clearly supported in Stewart v. Woodward, 50 Vt. 78; Idiorne v. Maxey, 13 Mass. 177.)

POTTER, JUSTICE. GROESBECK, C. J., and CONAWAY, J., concur.

OPINION

POTTER, JUSTICE.

In this case Hattie J. Knight sought by action of replevin to obtain possession of certain household goods which were held by the defendant. She gave the delivery undertaking provided for by statute and received the goods. Judgment was rendered against her and the surety in the undertaking for the sum of $ 50 and costs. The amount of the damages assessed being the reasonable value, as determined by the court, for the storage of the property by defendant.

The answer of defendant admitted its possession, and set forth as grounds of defense, that on or about July 10, 1894, the plaintiff delivered to and left with the defendant all and singular the goods and chattels with the request that it safely keep and store the same for her, which service, it is alleged, they performed until May 25, 1895, (this being the date when the suit was commenced) and that a reasonable charge for the storing and caring for the property was sixty dollars; further, that on October 31, 1894, the defendant sold to one Merle S. Knight, the husband of plaintiff, a bill of merchandise amounting to $ 43.85, and that the plaintiff at that time upon demand being made of her husband for security for the payment of said bill, deposited with the defendant the said property in pledge; that said sum had not been paid, and that payment thereof was demanded of plaintiff at the time when she requested a redelivery of the property.

The case was tried without the intervention of a jury, and the court found that the plaintiff was the owner of the property at the time of the commencement of the action; that said property was not chargeable with the claim of defendant against Merle S. Knight, but that as agent for his wife, he had placed the property in the possession of defendant; that the latter was entitled to a lien upon such property for the storage thereof under the provisions of Section 1471 of the Revised Statutes, and the court awarded the defendant the sum of fifty dollars to cover such lien, rendering judgment therefor. The testimony on behalf of plaintiff was to the effect that the manager of defendant's store had agreed to keep the goods without compensation, but the trial court held that any such contract had not been brought to the knowledge of defendant, and if it had been, it would have been unconscionable, there being no limit as to time; that, on the contrary, the defendant had notice from its agent that the property was held for collateral and storage, and acted under that information for about six months after such agent had ceased to be connected with the defendant.

That much of the defense which claimed possession of the goods by way of pledge does not require consideration. The trial court determined that question adversely to defendant, and very properly so. The property was clearly that of plaintiff which she owned prior to her marriage with M. S. Knight, and the latter could not, without her consent, and none such was shown, have pledged the same for an indebtedness of his own. Neither was it established that he attempted to pledge them. The undisputed testimony on behalf of plaintiff disclosed that one Minta, at that time the local manager of the business of defendant at Rock Springs, agreed to allow the goods to be placed and kept in their store without compensation; and that on that account only the goods were permitted to be stored there. The single item of evidence respecting this matter offered in support of the defendant's position was an entry on its books in Minta's handwriting, under date of October, 1894, showing a sale upon credit to the husband of plaintiff of a bill of merchandise amounting to $ 43.85, and a memorandum as follows: "Bill of goods security...