Knight v. Chief Judge of Florida's Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 2D17–965
| Decision Date | 27 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D17–965 |
| Citation | 235 So.3d 996 |
| Parties | Thomas M. KNIGHT, Sheriff of Sarasota County, Petitioner, v. CHIEF JUDGE OF FLORIDA'S TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; and Karen E. Rushing, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sarasota County, Florida, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Patrick J. Duggan, Senior Assistant General Counsel, and Crystal L. Hansen, Assistant General Counsel, Sarasota, for Petitioner.
Matthew J. Conigliaro of Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent Chief Judge of Florida's Twelfth Judicial Circuit.
Bradley J. Ellis of Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., Sarasota, for Respondent Karen E. Rushing, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Sarasota County, Florida.
Jason Vail of Jolly, Peterson & Truckenbroad, P.A., Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae the Florida Sheriffs Association.
Fred W. Baggett and M. Hope Keating of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae the Florida Association of Court Clerks.
The Sheriff of Sarasota County petitions this court for certiorari review of portions of Administrative Order 2017–4.2, issued by the Chief Judge of Florida's Twelfth Judicial Circuit, that direct the Sheriff to secure court facilities. "This court has jurisdiction to review by certiorari a claim that a chief judge has exceeded his or her authority by issuing an administrative order." Holt v. Chief Judge of Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 920 So.2d 814, 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (). Because the Sheriff has not met his burden to show that the Chief Judge exceeded his authority by issuing the order, we deny the petition.
The challenged portions of the administrative order require the Sheriff to provide security for certain court facilities where no sessions of court are held. According to the parties, these facilities largely house offices of the Clerk of the Sarasota Circuit Court, judicial chambers, court staff offices, and court-related administrative offices. With respect to these facilities, the Sheriff challenges the following provisions of the order:
The Sheriff argues that by directing him to provide security beyond the dictates of section 30.15, Florida Statutes (2016), the Chief Judge—an arm of the judicial branch—exceeded his authority and encroached on the Sheriff's constitutional independence in violation of separation of powers principles. According to the Sheriff, the Chief Judge can only compel him to provide security within the literal four corners of a courtroom wherein sessions of court are actually held because section 30.15, which addresses the "[p]owers, duties, and obligations" of the Sheriff, only requires the Sheriff to, in relevant part, "[a]ttend all sessions of the circuit court and county court." § 30.15(1)(c). The Sheriff further argues that the Chief Judge exceeded his authority because the challenged portions improperly specify how, even within the four corners of the courtroom, the Sheriff performs his independent function of providing security.
The Chief Judge responds that the Sheriff has not shown that he exceeded his authority because the order only affects the Sheriff in his capacity as an officer of the court, and the Chief Judge has the power to direct the Sheriff, as an officer of the court, to provide security for court facilities in order to promote the prompt and efficient administration of justice.
We conclude that the Sheriff has failed to show that the Chief Judge exceeded his authority by issuing Administrative Order 2017–4.2. Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution divides our state government into three branches and provides that "[n]o person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein." Regarding the powers of the Chief Judge, the Florida Constitution provides that he "shall be responsible for the administrative supervision of the circuit courts and county courts in his circuit." Art. V, § 2(d), Fla. Const. The Sheriff, on the other hand, is a county officer whose "powers [and] duties ... shall be fixed by law." Art. II, § 5(c), Fla. Const.; Art. VIII, § 1(d), Fla. Const. Thus, in examining the contours of the powers at issue in this case, we must consider the sources of law designed to fix those powers.
We begin our examination with section 43.26(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2016), which empowers the Chief Judge "[t]o do everything necessary to promote the prompt and efficient administration of justice in the courts over which he ... is chief judge." See also Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.215(b)(3) (). "A statutory grant of power or right carries with it by implication everything necessary to carry out the power or right and make it effectual and complete." Brock v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Collier Cty., 21 So.3d 844, 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting Deltona Corp. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 220 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla. 1969) ).
Consistent with this statutory grant of power, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.215(b)(2) requires the Chief Judge to "direct the formation and implementation of policies and priorities for the operation of all courts and officers within the circuit," which he may do through the use of administrative orders. Moreover, he "shall have the authority to require that all judges of the court, other court officers, and court personnel comply with all court and judicial branch policies, administrative orders, procedures and administrative plans." Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.215(b)(2) (emphasis added). Pursuant to section 26.49, Florida Statutes (2016), "[t]he sheriff of the county shall be the executive officer of the circuit court of the county." See also § 34.07, Fla. Stat. (2016) (). From these sources of law, it is clear that the Chief Judge has the power to require the Sheriff, as an officer of the court, to comply with an administrative order that contains policies designed to promote the prompt and efficient administration of justice.
The concern from the Sheriff's point of view now becomes whether the geographic scope of the Chief Judge's power extends beyond the literal four corners of the courtroom. Relating to the Chief Judge's authority to promote the prompt and efficient administration of justice in the courts, section 43.26(6) specifies that "[t]he clerks of court provide court-related functions which are essential to the orderly operation of the judicial branch." And, "[t]he chief judge may authorize the clerks of courts to maintain branch county court facilities." Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.215(b)(9). Importantly, rule 2.215(b)(7) gives the Chief Judge the power to "regulate the use of all court facilities." While rule 2.215 does not explicitly define the phrase "court facilities," section 29.008, Florida Statutes (2016), which addresses the funding of court-related functions, provides guidance on the issue. In enumerating the facilities within the Circuit to be secured pursuant to the instant order, the Chief Judge applied the following definition contained in section 29.008(1)(a) :
"Facility" means reasonable and necessary buildings and office space and appurtenant equipment and furnishings, structures, real estate, easements, and related interests in real estate, including, but not limited to, those for the purpose of...
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