Knight v. Hilton, 16820

Decision Date12 January 1954
Docket NumberNo. 16820,16820
PartiesKNIGHT et al. v. HILTON et al.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Murchison & West, Camden, for appellants.

Frank M. Turner, Columbia, for respondent.

OXNER, Justice.

This action was brought to partition two parcels of land in Dorchester County. Respondent, Julia Shuler Knight, set up claim of title to one of the parcels containing fifty acres. She alleged that her husband, S. P. Knight, acquired title to this tract by adverse possession, which is now vested in her as his sole heir-at-law. The case was referred to the Master for Dorchester County. He found that respondent had failed to sustain her claim of title and recommended that the premises be partitioned. On appeal to the Circuit Court, the findings of the Master were reversed and that Court held that respondent had established her defense of adverse possession. This appeal followed.

The Peoples Bank of Harleyville, South Carolina, by deed dated April 4, 1923, in consideration of $1,000, conveyed the 50 acre tract in controversy to T. W. Knight and Cecil G. Knight. On April 14, 1923, the grantees in the foregoing deed, who were broughter, along with their mother, Mrs. Ada A. Knight, executed and delivered to S. P. Knight, another brother, a note for $1,000, payable one year after date, which was secured by a mortgage executed by T. W. Knight, Cecil G. Knight and Mrs. Ada A. Knight, covering the 50 acre tract of land described in the foregoing deed, together with an adjacent tract of one acre owned by Mrs. Ada A. Knight, which had been set aside to her as a homestead.

The testimony relating to adverse possession is very meager, which is perhaps due to the fact that the grantees and mortgagee above mentioned are now dead. Cecil G. Knight died in June, 1945; T. W. Knight in September, 1948; and S. P. Knight died in September, 1949.

Apparently the only person in a position to furnish any information as to the use and occupancy of the 50 acre tract was Percy Knight, another son of Mrs. Ada A. Knight. According to his testimony, his mother and some of the children lived in a residence on the homestead and farmed the adjacent 50 acre tract until the death of Mrs. Ada A. Knight about 1928 or 1929. Shortly thereafter T. W. Knight and Cecil G. Knight moved away. The property was then occupied for a number of years by various tenants, but the record does not show the amount of rent nor to whom paid. Percy Knight testified that he moved on the property sometime between 1930 and 1935 (he was unable to definitely fix the year), and continued to reside thereon until shortly prior to the commencement of this action. He said that he paid $60 per year rent for both parcels to his brother S. P. Knight as long as he lived, and after his death to respondent. During this period some timber was sold but Percy Knight was unable to state the amount realized or how the money was disbursed. He was asked whether or not he considered S. P. Knight the owner of the property during the time he rented it and replied, 'I suppose so'. However, he admitted writing a letter to the widow of T. W. Knight, inquiring what she would take for her interest in the place, and stating that he 'knew she had an interest as we all did.'

Respondent, the widow of S. P. Knight, was unable to furnish any material information on the question. She stated that she never heard her husband discuss the ownership of the 50 acre tract. She was under the impression that he had bought and acquired title to this property from the Peoples Bank of Harleyville. She further stated that the rent paid to her husband was $50 per year instead of $60 as testified by Percy Knight.

The mortgage to S. P. Knight which was executed on April 14, 1923, was not recorded until August 14, 1929. At his death he had in his possession both the mortgage and the deed from the Peoples Bank of Herleyville to his brothers T. W. Knight and Cecil G. Knight. A nephew of respondent testified that in looking through the papers of S. P. Knight, he found this deed, called it to the attention of respondent, and had it recorded on October 28, 1949.

The property was returned for taxation in 1928 in the name of T. W. Knight and Cecil G. Knight but thereafter in the name of S. P. Knight, who paid the taxes.

There is no evidence of any payment or demand for payment on the mortgage held by S. P. Knight. Respondent's claim that her husband held the property adversely for more than ten years is based on the fact that after the premises were occupied by Percy Knight, S. P. Knight collected the rents and paid the taxes, but the record is entirely silent as to why he did so.

The Circuit Judge held that respondent had established title by adverse possession. This being a legal issue, it must be conceded that his conclusion is binding upon this Court if there is any evidence reasonably tending to sustain it. Weston v. Morgan, 162 S.C. 177, 160 S.E. 436; Fogle v. Void, 223 S.C. 83, 74 S.E.2d 358. However, the facts before us are undisputed and the question presented is purely a legal one.

It is clear that the legal or record title to the 50 acre tract is vested in the heirs-at-law of T. W. Knight and Cecil G. Knight. Possession is presumed to follow such title and the burden is on the respondent to prove all the facts necessary to establish adverse possession. Love v. Turner, 71 S.C. 322, 51 S.E. 101; Stokes v. Murray, 102 S.C. 395, 87 S.E. 71; Weston v. Morgan, supra. 'The mere possession of land does not in and of itself show hostility to the owner thereof. Indeed, there is every presumption that such an occupancy is in subordination to legal title.' 1 Am.Jur., Adverse Possession, Section 138. Among other elements which it is necessary for respondent to prove is that any possession on the part of her husband was hostile from its inception. Weston v. Morgan, supra, 162 S.C. 177, 160 S.E. 436. In determining what amounts to hostility, the relation which the party claiming adverse possession occupies with reference to the owner is important. 1 Am.Jur., page 873. As a general rule, the law presumes that the exclusive possession of land by one who is a stranger to the holder of the legal title is adverse. Knotts v. Joiner, 217 S.C. 99, 59 S.E.2d 850. But the family or other relation may be such as not to create such presumption. 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, § 216(b). In Whitaker v. Jeffcoat, 128 S.C. 404, 122 S.E. 495, 496, Mr. Justice Cothran stated that where one seeks to acquire title by adverse possession against his brothers and sisters, such a claim should not be sustained 'except upon a clear preponderance of the evidence.'

There is no contention that S. P. Knight was ever in actual possession of the premises in controversy. Assuming that he was constructively in possession through Percy Knight as his tenant, was such possession adverse? We do not think under the circumstances of this case that a hostile holding can be presumed from the fact that S. P. Knight collected the rents and paid the taxes, which are the only acts of hostility claimed. Respondent alleged in her answer that her husband went into possession, claiming ownership and title, in 1928. If so, it is rather strange that during the following year he recorded his...

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