Knight v. Lee, 19751
| Decision Date | 09 January 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 19751,19751 |
| Citation | 262 S.C. 17,202 S.E.2d 19 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Norman R. KNIGHT, Jr., et al., Respondents, v. Vernon D. LEE, Appellant. |
Brantly Seymour and W. Turner Logan, Charleston, for appellant.
Padgett, Altman & Fuller, North Charleston, for respondents.
This equitable action was instituted by Norman R. Knight, Jr., and others, the respondents herein, against Vernon D. Lee, the appellant herein, seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the appellant to either remove a two story building constructed as a garage apartment from his premises, or in the alternative, to cease using the structure as a garage apartment. The respondents, in their complaint, assert that the structure was erected in violation of the Zoning Ordinance of Charleston County and the restrictive covenants applicable to all lot owners in Whipper Barony Subdivision. It is alleged that all parties to this action are owners of lots located within said subdivision.
The respondents allege in their complaint that the two story building erected by the appellant is one other than his residence and is now being used as living quarters in violation of the restrictive covenant binding upon all lot owners in Whipper Barony Subdivision and prohibiting the erection and construction of a building for such purposes. The restrictive covenant is as follows:
'(G) No trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding erected in the tract shall at any time be used as a residence temporary or permanently, nor shall any structure of a temporary character be used as a residence, nor shall servants quarters above or attached to garage or other outbuilding be occupied by owner or tenant.'
It is also alleged that the Zoning Ordinance of Charleston County prohibited the appellant from constructing a garage apartment on his premises and using it as living quarters, and at the time the appellant commenced the construction of the garage apartment, Norman R. Knight, Jr. one of the respondents, filed a petition with the Zoning Board protesting the violation by the appellant of the Zoning Code; that hearings were had by the Zoning Board resulting in the appellant being advised that the structure being erected could not be used as a garage apartment, because if so used, it would be in violation of the Zoning Ordinance. It is further alleged that in disregard of the decision of the Zoning Board of Charleston County the appellant completed the two story building which is now being used as a garage apartment. The Zoning Ordinance of Charleston County became inapplicable to the property in question on December 12, 1972, because of the annexation of the subdivision to the City of North Charleston.
The appellant demurred on the ground that the complaint of the respondents did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because it affirmatively appears that the building in question had been completed. The appellant also moved to strike from the complaint the allegation that the erection of said building was in violation of the Charleston County Zoning Ordinance, because the Zoning Ordinance is no longer applicable for the reason that the appellant's premises have been annexed to and are now within the corporate limits of the City of North Charleston.
The demurrer and motion to strike came on to be heard before The Honorable Theodore D. Stoney, Judge of the Charleston County Court, and by his order of February 28, 1973, the demurrer was overruled and the motion to strike was denied. This appeal followed.
The exceptions of the appellant are three in number. The appellant in his brief states that the first question involved is whether the respondents are barred by their inaction from seeking relief in equity...
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Beall v. Doe, 0157
...upon him to raise the issue by proper exceptions. Matthews v. Montgomery, 193 S.C. 118, 7 S.E.2d 841, 854 (1940); see Knight v. Lee, 262 S.C. 17, 202 S.E.2d 19 (1974). Conerly also argues that he was denied a fair and impartial trial because the trial judge threatened him with a possible pe......
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Centaur, Inc. v. Richland County
...Court will not consider a question which was neither presented to the trial court nor raised by an exception on appeal. Knight v. Lee, 262 S.C. 17, 202 S.E.2d 19 (1974).5 We note that the term "principal business purpose" has previously survived a vagueness challenge. Dumas v. City of Dalla......
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McGann v. Mungo, 0626
...exceptions and it appears for the first time in their brief. The question, therefore, does not merit our consideration. Knight v. Lee, 262 S.C. 17, 202 S.E.2d 19 (1974); Hall v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 177 S.C. 148, 181 S.E. 33 In any case, the first cause of action, liber......
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Shields v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Public Transp.
...the grounds of objection. The exception neither mentions the word "hearsay" nor the words "remedial measure." See Knight v. Lee, 262 S.C. 17, 202 S.E.2d 19 (1974) (a question not raised by any exception on appeal will not be Even if preserved, the hearsay objection is, at most, argued in a ......