Knight v. MINN. COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY ASS'N

• Citation: 571 F. Supp. 1
• Decision Date: 13 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 4-74 Civ. 659.,4-74 Civ. 659.
• Parties: Leon W. KNIGHT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MINNESOTA COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

571 F. Supp. 1

Leon W. KNIGHT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MINNESOTA COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 4-74 Civ. 659.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

March 31, 1982.

Opinion on Motion to Amend and Relief from Judgment August 13, 1982.

Edwin Vieira, Jr., Silver Spring, Md., John J. Fogarty, Springfield, Va., for plaintiff National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc.

Darel F. Swenson, Wayzata, Minn., for plaintiffs.

Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard & Donnelly, Eric R. Miller, St. Paul, Minn., for Wise, Barrett, Herndon and Lambert, Klinkerfues, Morgan, Schutt, Harris, Holman, Mondale, Rosasco, Provo, Gallop, Norman, Durhan, Bell, Minke, Chesebrough, NEA, MEA, MCCFA, IMPACE.

Donald J. Mueting, Sheila S. Fishman, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., for Crippen, McVay, Sontorovich, Plunkett, Nycklemoe, Bruce, Helland, Helling, Lord and Denison.

Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, ALSOP, District Judge, and LARSON, Senior District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs are community college faculty members who challenge the constitutionality of the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) as applied in the community colleges. Essentially two issues are raised: whether the Minnesota Community College Faculty Association (MCCFA) may act as an exclusive representative under PELRA, and whether the "meet and confer" provisions of PELRA are valid on their face and as applied. Following extensive proceedings and an independent review of the exhaustive record, we entered findings of fact on November 17, 1981, which are attached hereto. This memorandum opinion incorporates our conclusions of law and order for judgment.

I. MCCFA AS AN EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVE

The structure of collective bargaining under PELRA and MCCFA's role thereunder may be summarized as follows. PELRA provides several mechanisms by which an employee organization may be designated as the exclusive representative of an appropriate bargaining unit. See Minn.Stat. § 179.67. The MCCFA is an association of faculty members of the community colleges in Minnesota. It is not disputed that the MCCFA facially qualifies as an employee organization, that community college faculty are an appropriate unit under PELRA,¹ and that the MCCFA was properly certified as an exclusive representative in 1971.

Public employers have an obligation, under PELRA, to "meet and negotiate"² with respect to compensation and other "terms and conditions of employment." Id., § 179.66, subd. 2. When an exclusive representative has been certified, the employer may negotiate only through that representative. Id., § 179.66, subd. 7. The Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges (MSBCC) has negotiated four collective bargaining agreements with the MCCFA since 1971.

Employees are not required by statute to join the MCCFA. Indeed, PELRA expressly provides that employees have "the right not to form or join" an employee organization. Id., § 179.65, subd. 2. The contract negotiated by the MCCFA applies to all community college faculty members and its economic benefits flow to all faculty regardless of whether they are members of the MCCFA. PELRA provides that a fair share fee may be collected by an employee organization from nonmember employees that it represents, not to exceed 85% of members' regular dues. Id. Such a fee has been collected from plaintiffs by the MCCFA. Determination of the amount of the fee is not in dispute, but we note that PELRA does provide a procedure by which employees may challenge calculation of the fair share fee. Id.

The foregoing describes a system of public sector collective bargaining which is common to many states insofar as it applies to traditional subjects of collective bargaining.³ See generally, Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 Mich.L.Rev. 885 (1973). The essential character of such systems is implicated by two claims which the plaintiffs advance here.

A.

Plaintiffs' first contention is that because the MCCFA is a private organization, it holds an impermissible power under PELRA to make "economic laws" and its function constitutes an impermissible delegation of state sovereignty. Under this theory, only a quasi-state agency — some branch of the public employer — may constitutionally serve as the employee representative. We reject this theory.

The State of Minnesota has not impermissibly delegated its sovereign power. The employer's duty to negotiate under PELRA "does not compel the public employer or its representative to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Minn. Stat. § 179.66, subd. 2. Negotiated agreements with state employees and even arbitration awards must be "submitted to the legislature to be accepted or rejected." Id., § 179.74, subd. 5. Contract terms successfully bargained by the MCCFA have been, in fact, subsequently modified by the state legislature. The state might well find it in its own interest to confer more authority upon its employers or to afford public employees more of the rights held by private employees, but we need not speculate on modifications of PELRA that might occur. It is clear that the present structure under PELRA does not impermissibly abridge the state's sovereign power.

In contending that the legislature's retained authority under PELRA is constitutionally inadequate, plaintiffs rely heavily on Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936), and Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935). Plaintiffs also rely on these cases for the proposition that PELRA confers upon the MCCFA an impermissible power to make "economic laws."⁴ The continuing vitality of Schecter and Carter Coal, however, is doubtful at best.⁵ Moreover, even if Schecter and Carter Coal might have some vitality in another context, plaintiffs' reliance on them here is clearly foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Abood squarely upholds the constitutionality of exclusive representation bargaining in the public sector.

Abood is central to this case and warrants elaboration. Abood involved a public employee bargaining statute similar to Minnesota's PELRA.⁶ The plaintiffs in Abood were teachers who had not joined the private employee organization which served as their exclusive representative. Like the plaintiffs here, the teachers objected to compulsory fair share fees on First Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court had previously rejected such claims in the private sector, holding that agency shop arrangements were supported by compelling state interests. See Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961); Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956). In Abood, the Court reaffirmed that exclusive representation

avoids the confusion that would result from attempting to enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of employment. It prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work force and eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization. It also frees the employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and permits the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements that are not subject to attack from rival labor organizations.

Id. 431 U.S. at 220-221, 97 S.Ct. at 1791-1792 (citations omitted).

Moreover, the Abood Court reiterated that the agency shop arrangement has been found to "distribute fairly the cost of collective bargaining among those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become `free riders' — to refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all employees." Id. at 222, 97 S.Ct. at 1792.

These state policy interests are just as compelling in the public sector. As the Court stated in Abood, supra at 224, 97 S.Ct. at 1794, "the desirability of labor peace is no less important in the public sector, nor is the risk of `free riders' any smaller." Although the agency shop in the public sector necessarily impacts on First Amendment rights, the Abood Court found such concerns outweighed by the compelling state interests in orderly labor relations. Id. at 222-223, 229-231, 97 S.Ct. at 1793, 1796-1797.

The Abood decision is controlling here.⁷ The State of Minnesota has expressly declared that the purpose of PELRA is "to promote orderly and constructive relationships" between public employers and employees and that such a purpose "may best be accomplished" by the bargaining structure provided under PELRA. Minn.Stat. § 179.61. As the Abood Court noted, such a determination by the state is to be afforded great weight in the constitutional balance. Abood, supra at 229, 97 S.Ct. at 1796. Moreover, such a determination rests on a long tradition in Minnesota of recognizing the importance of the agency shop in resolving traditional subjects of collective bargaining. See e.g., Minn.Stat. § 179.16 (providing for exclusive representation in the private sector since the 1940's); see also, Note, Certification of a Bargaining Representative under the Minnesota Labor Relations Act, 38 Minn.L.Rev. 827 (1954); Note, History and Provisions of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act, 24 Minn.L.Rev. 217 (1940). Minnesota may provide for exclusive representation by an employee association in the public sector and may require that nonmembers of the association financially support its collective bargaining efforts through a fair share fee. No constitutional infirmity arises merely because the employee association is a private organization.

B.

Plaintiffs' second contention rests on a factual assertion that the MCCFA, alone and in...