Knight v. State
| Decision Date | 31 March 1896 |
| Citation | 54 Ohio St. 365,43 N.E. 995 |
| Parties | KNIGHT et al. v. STATE. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Error to circuit court, Wood county.
Samuel Knight and others were convicted in the common pleas of misconduct in office is county commissioners. The judgment was affirmed on appeal, by the circuit court, as to all defendants except defendant Stahl, and the defendants other than said Stahl bring error. Reversed.
At the February term, 1891, of the common pleas of Wood county, an indictment was presented against the plaintiffs in error Samuel Knight and James Gibson, and one Jacob Stahl containing two counts, the first of which is as follows which said act was passed and took effect on the 2d day of February, A. D. 1893; that thereupon, on said 3d day of May, A. D. 1893, said Jacob Stahl, Samuel Knight, and James Gibson, as such county commissioners of said county, as aforesaid, did unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, and corruptly make and enter into a certain contract with a partnership then and there doing business under the firm name and style of Yost & Packard, whereby they employed the said Yost & Packard to make the plans and specifications for, and supervise the erection of, said new courthouse; that prior to said last-named date, to wit, on the 28th day of February, A. D. 1893, the judges of the circuit court in and for said county of Wood, and state of Ohio, had duly and legally appointed Earl W. Merry, Frank A. Baldwin, Edward B. Beverstock, and John Ault as the building committee, under and in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid act of the general assembly of the state of Ohio, to act and vote with the aforesaid county commissioners in procuring, making, and approving plans, estimates, and specifications for said courthouse, and in determining all questions in connection with the erection of said courthouse, all of which the said Jacob Stahl, Samuel Knight, and James Gibson, as such county commissioners of said county as aforesaid, unlawfully, knowingly, willfully and corruptly failed, neglected, omitted, and refused to act with the aforesaid building committee in the procuring of said plans and specifications for said courthouse, and unlawfully, knowingly, willfully, and corruptly refused to permit the aforesaid building committee to act with or to vote with them, the said Jacob Stahl, Samuel Knight, and James Gibson, as such county commissioners of said county as aforesaid, in procuring the said plans and specifications for said courthouse, and in making the aforesaid contract therefor, and unlawfully, knowingly, willfully, and corruptly prevented the aforesaid building committee from in any manner acting or voting or participating in the procuring of said plans and specifications for said courthouse, and in providing for the supervision of the erection thereof, and they, the said Jacob Stahl, Samuel Knight, and James Gibson, as such county commissioners as aforesaid, in the manner and by the means hereinbefore stated, and without the co-operation therein by the aforesaid building committee, did unlawfully, knowingly, willfully, and corruptly make and enter into the aforesaid contract with said firm of Yost & Packard, and caused the aforesaid plans and specifications for said courthouse to be made by the said firm of Yost & Packard, and did commence and proceed with the erection of said courthouse, and did cause the work of the erection and construction of said courthouse to be done under the supervision of said firm of Yost & Packard. And so the jurors aforesaid, on their oaths aforesaid, do find and say that the said Jacob Stahl, Samuel Knight, and James Gibson, being county commissioners as aforesaid, are guilty of misconduct in office in the manner and form aforesaid. Contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.' A motion to quash, a plea in abatement, and a demurrer to each count having been overruled, a plea of not guilty was entered, a trial had, and a verdict of guilty on the first count returned, consideration of the second count having been withdrawn from the jury. Sentence followed, which, as to the plaintiffs in error, was affirmed by the circuit court, the judgment as to defendant Stahl being reversed. A reversal is asked by plaintiffs in error.
1. Venue is an essential requisite of an indictment. And where, in an indictment, there is a defect, in failing to allege that the offense was committed at the county where the indictment is found, such defect is not cured by section 7215, Rev. St., which provides that ‘ no indictment shall be deemed invalid * * * for want of an allegation of the time or place of any material fact, when the time and place have once been stated in the indictment; * * * nor for want of averment of any matter not necessary to be proved; nor for any other defect which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.’
2. Upon the trial of an indictment charging that defendants, as county commissioners, did on the 3d day of May, 1893, unlawfully, knowingly, and corruptly, make a contract with certain architects for the making by said architects of plans and specifications for the erection of a courthouse, it is not competent for the state to give evidence of an offer made by defendants to another architect, April 8th, preceding, to let to him the architect's work on condition that he should pay them a money consideration therefor.
Cyrus Huling and Parker & Frier, for plaintiffs in error.
Murphy & McClelland, for the State.
SPEAR, J. (after stating the facts).
The indictment is founded on section 6915, Rev. St., which reads as follows: ‘ Whoever, being a county commissioner, is guilty of any misconduct in office, shall be fined not more than four hundred dollars, and forfeit his office.’ Many questions arise upon the record, but we find it necessary to consider only that relating to the sufficiency of the indictment, and two of those relating to the competency of testimony.
1. The indictment: Is venue sufficiently alleged? The indictment shows that it was found by the grand jury of Wood county, and presented to the court of common pleas of that county; that the jury had been impaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire of crimes and offenses committed within that county; and that the defendants, late of that county, were on the 3d day of May, 1893, then and there county commissioners in and for that county, duly elected and qualified, etc. Then follow allegations to the effect that defendants, as such commissioners, on the 3d of May, 1893 declared their purpose to erect a new courthouse in and for the county of Wood, etc., and that ‘ thereupon, on said 3d day of May, A. D. 1893, said Jacob Stahl, Samuel Knight, and James Gibson, as such county commissioners as aforesaid, did unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, and corruptly make and enter into a certain contract with a partnership then and there doing business under the firm name and style of Yost & Packard, whereby they employed the said Yost & Packard to make plans and specifications for, and supervise the erection of, said new courthouse,’ etc. Nowhere in the instrument is there any allegation that the offense was committed in the county of Wood. Indeed, every allegation of the indictment might be fully proven as stated, had the entire transaction occurred outside the limits of the county, and, for that matter, the state. It is elementary, we suppose, that an indictment, in order to be sufficient, must aver with reasonable certainty all the material facts necessary to a conviction. Nothing is to be left to intendment or inference which it is necessary to prove in order to make out the crime. State v. Philbrick, 31 Me. 401; U.S....
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