Knight v. State
| Decision Date | 13 June 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-204,78-204 |
| Citation | 373 So.2d 52 |
| Parties | Bobby KNIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Alan H. Schreiber, Public Defender, and Stuart M. Lerner, Asst. Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Benedict P. Kuehne, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant was charged, tried and convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal six points are suggested to demonstrate error; we find two of them require reversal.
Briefly, the appellant's statement of the facts reflects that at 1:30 a. m. on April 27, 1977, Clara Jones was working at a window cash register at Church's Chicken Store. The manager testified that on the morning he heard Clara scream, "We've been robbed." He immediately rushed to the window and saw a dark Charger or Cordoba with a white roof speeding across the parking lot. He could not identify the driver. In response to his inquiry as to what happened, Clara said a man had approached the window, pointed a gun in her face and demanded the money from the register; she complied. Another employee, Beulah Davis, corroborated the manager's testimony, but she, too, saw nothing more of the actual incident except the car speeding away. Appellant objected to all extrajudicial statements made by Clara.
The police testified that they dusted a white Chrysler Cordoba for fingerprints and lifted those of Willie Houston. A photograph of Houston was procured and exhibited in a photo lineup for Clara. She pointed out Houston as resembling the person who robbed her. Houston was not arrested but was questioned. The police further testified that as a result of this interrogation of Houston the appellant was implicated. They obtained a photo of appellant, exhibited it to Clara in a photo lineup and she thereupon identified appellant as the armed robber. The foregoing testimony was admitted over appellant's objection.
As a result of Clara's identification in the photo lineup, appellant was arrested on June 15th at 3:50 a. m. At the police station an officer told him that he had been identified by Houston and another person in a photo lineup and it was suggested that "it would be in his best interests to come clean." The officer then advised appellant of his constitutional rights and took a taped confession. At a pretrial hearing on appellant's motion to suppress the statement, appellant contended he was "stoned" from the use of drugs and that the statement was involuntary. The officer, refuting appellant's story, testified that appellant appeared fine and seemed to know what was going on. The trial court simply denied the motion to suppress the statement without further finding or comment.
Prior to trial and pursuant to discovery motion the State furnished appellant with the home and business addresses of Clara Jones. Appellant attempted to subpoena Clara at these addresses so as to take her deposition but without success. Thus, appellant went to trial without being able to depose Clara Jones.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the police officers' testimony regarding Clara's identification of appellant at a pretrial photo lineup and her failure to identify Houston as the culprit at a pretrial lineup, since neither Clara nor Houston were present at the trial. Error is also suggested in the trial court's failure to find on the record "with unmistakable clarity" that appellant's statement was voluntary. Appellant's final point is that the State is obligated to "keep track" of the robbery victim's whereabouts, since this witness may possess information about the case relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Taking the last point first, we reject appellant's contention that the State is responsible to "keep track" of important witnesses so as to be able to produce them for defendant's discovery or at trial, facing dismissal of the charges for failure to do so. State v. Banks, 349 So.2d 736 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977); State ex rel. Gerstein v. Durant, 348 So.2d 405 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977); State v. Velasquez, 305 So.2d 837 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974), cert. den.315 So.2d 196 (Fla.1975). Appellant acknowledges these cases as constituting the general rule, but suggests this case as an exception. W...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Brown
...and is not available for cross-examination. See People v. Howard, 198 Colo. 317, 320, 599 P.2d 899, 901 (1979); Knight v. State, 373 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979), cert. denied, 385 So.2d 761 (Fla.1980); People v. White, 33 Ill.App.3d 523, 530, 338 N.E.2d 81, 87 (1975); Preston v. Com......
-
Dino v. State
...will was affected by the ingestion of drugs is, of course, a basis for attacking the voluntariness of a confession. Knight v. State, 373 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).2 On the issue of whether Dino was under the influe......
-
State v. Carda, 85-1858
...State v. Mesa, 395 So.2d 242, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); see Merritt; State v. Ashley, 393 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Knight v. State, 373 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So.2d 761 (Fla.1980); State v. Banks, 349 So.2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); State ex rel. Gerstein v. Duran......
-
Peterson v. State
...(Fla.3d DCA 1975); Graham v. State, 292 So.2d 373 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Smith v. State, 288 So.2d 522 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Knight v. State, 373 So.2d 52 (Fla.4th DCA 1979); Bullard v. State, 358 So.2d 48 (Fla.4th DCA 1978); Greene v. State, 351 So.2d 1031 (Fla.4th DCA 1976).3 Sims v. Georgia, 38......