Knight v. State
| Decision Date | 24 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-1142,95-1142 |
| Citation | 672 So.2d 590 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D988 Algie KNIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Robert B. Carney, Judge.
Patrick C. Rastatter of Glass & Rastatter, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and William A. Spillias and Michelle A. Konig, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant raises two issues in this appeal. She first contends that the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument warrant a new trial. We agree. Because we reverse on this issue, we need not address appellant's remaining point on appeal.
The state charged appellant and codefendants Antoinette Bacon and Calvin Williams with trafficking in heroin. At trial, Dale Allison, a crime scene technician, testified that white powder found on a container was heroin. Ms. Allison also testified that she lifted fingerprints from the container. When the prosecutor asked Ms. Allison whether there was any value from the latent fingerprints, she replied that once she lifts the fingerprints, the latent examiner determines if there is any value to the prints. Codefendant Bacon's counsel objected on hearsay grounds to any testimony by Ms. Allison as to the value of the finger prints. The trial court sustained the objection.
During closing argument, the prosecutor commented on Bacon's counsel's objection to Ms. Allison's testimony:
Now, I don't know why Halpern didn't want ID technician Allison to tell you about the fingerprint results. Maybe he will tell you, I don't know. I don't have a clue.
Maybe he is saving that and has something up his sleeve along with the perjured testimony and planted evidence.
I wanted to find out what the answer was, but you heard him object so he can explain it to you.
The trial court sustained Bacon's counsel's objection to these comments and instructed the jury to not consider why an attorney objects. The prosecutor also made at least five references to one Vetus McCray stating that he was a "criminal" and would have lied to the jury if called to testify. Vetus McCray had been seen with appellant and the codefendants on the day of the incident, but he was not charged or called as a witness in the case.
The prosecutor further argued that a not guilty verdict meant the detectives were criminals and perjurers and effectively sought to poll the jurors on this point when he stated:
Unless you believe [Detective Camilo's] a perjurer, he is a criminal and likes to point the finger at innocent people, if you believe that, let me know. I will sit down now. I wouldn't bother saying anymore because if you believe Detective Camilo is a criminal perjurer and raised his hand and swore to God to tell you the truth here in the courtroom and sits there and looks you directly in the eye and lies to you and decides I want to point the finger at two innocent people because he's got nothing better to do, let me know. Raise your hand now. I will sit down.
Appellant's counsel did not object to the state's improper comments until the end of the prosecutor's closing. He argued in support of a motion for mistrial that the prosecutor had commented on facts not in evidence and had improperly argued that defense counsel accused the police officers of perjury. He also grounded his motion on the previous argument presented by Bacon's counsel that the prosecutor impermissibly attacked the credibility of defense counsel and improperly commented on Bacon's counsel's objection during the testimony of the crime scene technician. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, but agreed that the objected to comments were grossly improper and gave a second curative instruction. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to all three defendants.
The trial court correctly recognized the seriousness of the prosecutor's comments, but erred in denying the motion for mistrial. The prosecutor impermissibly attacked the credibility of defense counsel for objecting to the state's introduction of inadmissible...
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State v. Chitwood, CC 15CR48036 (SC S068655)
...prejudicial and constituted fundamental error requiring reversal; trial court's failure to intervene not discussed); Knight v. State , 672 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 1996) (reversing conviction where "prosecutor's improper comments reach[ed] to the very heart of the case and [rose] to the level ......
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State v. Chitwood
... ... made disparaging comments about defense counsel and referred ... to a prior arrest that was not in evidence was highly ... prejudicial and constituted fundamental error requiring ... reversal; trial court's failure to intervene not ... discussed); Knight v. State, 672 So.2d 590, 591 (Fla ... 1996) (reversing conviction where "prosecutor's ... improper comments reach[ed] to the very heart of the case and ... [rose] to the level of fundamental error obviating the need ... for multiple or contemporaneous objections"; trial ... court's failure to ... ...
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Barnes v. State, 98-0299.
...v. State, 547 So.2d 1201, 1206 (Fla.1989), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 115 S.Ct. 642, 130 L.Ed.2d 547 (1994); Knight v. State, 672 So.2d 590, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Tuff v. State, 509 So.2d 953, 955-56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Peterson v. State, 376 So.2d 1230, 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert......
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Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co., Inc.
...kept them from getting them to you. (c) Repeated references to matters which were not only not in evidence but untrue. Knight v. State, 672 So.2d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So.2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 488 So.2d 832 (Fla.1986). A single portion o......