Knight v. Stickrath, 88-1338
| Decision Date | 14 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-1338,88-1338 |
| Parties | KNIGHT v. STICKRATH, Supt., et al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Where Ohio, pursuant to R.C. 5149.17 (), permits a person on parole to reside in another state and to be supervised by the other state, the other or "receiving" state does not have authority to grant a final discharge to the parolee.
Pursuant to R.C. 5149.17, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers Act, petitioner Marshall K. Knight's parole was transferred to Texas in October 1983. Correspondence from the Ohio Adult Parole Authority to the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles indicated that petitioner would be eligible for final release consideration on February 17, 1984, upon the recommendation of his supervising officer. However, petitioner's parole eligibility date was extended to May 5, 1985 by Ohio authorities as a result of petitioner's conviction on December 14, 1983 of a misdemeanor theft offense in Texas. Knight claims to have received a final release from his Ohio parole from the Texas parole authority on or about September 27, 1984.
On March 3, 1986, Knight was arrested in Summit County, Ohio, for breaking and entering. Ohio parole authorities initially placed a parole holder on him, but subsequently removed it. Knight pled guilty to breaking and entering on June 16, 1986, and was sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment of one and one-half years on August 4, 1986. Knight's Ohio parole was revoked as a result of his 1986 conviction.
The case is before us upon Knight's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
J. Boyd Binning, Columbus, for petitioner.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Alexander G. Thomas and John J. Gideon, Columbus, for respondents.
We must address two issues. First, whether Texas had the authority to grant petitioner a final release from his Ohio parole. Second, whether petitioner's due process rights were violated when his February 17, 1983 parole was revoked as a result of his June 16, 1986 conviction for breaking and entering. We answer both questions in the negative and hold that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
The Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers Act permits a person who is on parole in one state (the sending state) to reside in another state (the receiving state) and to be supervised by the parole authority of the receiving state. R.C. 5149.17(A) and (B).
R.C. 5149.17 was revised on December 23, 1986; however, division (B) thereof remained unchanged. R.C. 5149.17(B) provides:
"Each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation of and supervision over probationers or parolees of any sending state and in the exercise of those duties will be governed by the same standards that prevail for its own probationers and parolees."
Petitioner argues that this language authorized Texas parole authorities to discharge him from his Ohio parole obligations. The argument fails. The receiving state does no more than enforce a sending state's parole. See Dillworth v. Barker (C.A. 5, 1972), 465 F.2d 1338, 1341. The language of the statute authorizes the receiving state to visit and supervise the parolee. The statutory language does not support the conclusion that supervision includes discharge from parole. The only place the word "discharge" is used in the statute is division (G).
Division (G) states the procedure to be followed in the event that one of the participating states elects to renounce the compact. In the event of renunciation, the duties and obligations of the renouncing state continue "as to parolees or probationers residing therein at the time of withdrawal until retaken or finally discharged by the sending state. * * * " (Emphasis added.) R.C. 5149.17(G). Significantly, the discharge is by the sending state and not the receiving state. 1
Accordingly we hold that where Ohio, pursuant to R.C. 5149.17 (), permits a person on parole to reside in another state and to be supervised by the other state, the other or "receiving" state does not have authority to grant a final discharge to the parolee.
Petitioner makes an additional argument that after he allegedly was released from parole by Texas, he Although not clearly articulated, petitioner apparently is contending that he was entitled to a hearing to determine his parole status subsequent to the alleged release by Texas. However, the alleged release by Texas does not constitute a final release by the Ohio Adult Parole Authority within the meaning of R.C. 2967.16. Petitio...
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Palmer v. Ghee
...release is granted by the authority pursuant to section 2967.16 of the Revised Code." R.C. 2967.01(E); see Knight v. Stickrath (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 38, 39-40, 531 N.E.2d 716, 716-718. "While the state's failure to place detainers on a declared parole violator or pursue him so as to return ......
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...a final release is granted by the authority pursuant to section 2967.16 of the Revised Code." R.C. 2967.01(E); See Knight v. Strickland (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 38, 39-40. "While the state's failure to place detainers on declared parole violator or pursue him so as to return him to custody doe......
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