Knighten v. E. Chi. Hous. Auth.
| Decision Date | 12 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 45A04–1312–CT–632.,45A04–1312–CT–632. |
| Citation | 20 N.E.3d 605 (Table) |
| Parties | Stacy KNIGHTEN, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. EAST CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Individually and d/b/a West Calumet Complex, Davis Security Service, LLC, and Donnell Caldwell, Appellees–Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
R. Brian Woodward, David E. Woodward, Woodward & Blaskovich, LLP, Merrillville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Nicholas A. Snow, Harris Law Firm, P.C., Crown Point, IN, Katherine Y. Gappa, Bruce P. Clark & Associates, St. John, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.
Stacy Knighten appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of East Chicago Housing Authority (“ECHA”) and Davis Security Service, LLC (“Davis”), in her action to recover damages for injuries she suffered after an incident at an ECHA property known as West Calumet Complex (“WCC”). Concluding that there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding the entry of summary judgment in favor of ECHA and Davis, we affirm.
ECHA, a public housing authority in East Chicago, operates WCC. On March 26, 2009, ECHA entered into a contract with Davis for the provision of security services for WCC. Donnell Caldwell, an employee of Davis, was assigned to work in a guard shack located at the front entrance of WCC sometime in June or July 2010. Caldwell's duties were to monitor traffic and operate an entry gate allowing access to WCC. Knighten, who was a tenant of WCC, was involved in a romantic relationship with Caldwell.
On August 7, 2010, Caldwell, who was on duty at the WCC guard shack, allowed Knighten and her friend to use his personal vehicle to drive to a liquor store. Upon Knighten's return from the liquor store, Knighten and Caldwell argued about Knighten having spent all of his money and Caldwell's belief that Knighten was driving his vehicle while intoxicated. The argument escalated to the point that Caldwell ordered Knighten to exit his vehicle and to walk home. Caldwell returned to the guard shack, retrieved his handgun, and set the traffic gate to automatically allow all incoming traffic into WCC property. Next, Caldwell entered his vehicle to drive Knighten's friend, who also lived in WCC, home and drove away from his post.
After Caldwell returned to the area of the guard shack, he discovered that Knighten remained there awaiting his return. Knighten angrily confronted Caldwell, who had not re-entered the guard shack, and the two engaged in a heated argument. Knighten admits that at some point during the course of the entire confrontation she damaged the entrance gate. She turned away from Caldwell and began walking home when Caldwell drew his handgun and fired a shot which struck Knighten's backside. Ultimately, the gunshot injury left Knighten paralyzed from the waist down.
Knighten filed a complaint against ECHA, Davis, and Caldwell alleging that during the course of his employment and while at WCC, Caldwell negligently discharged his firearm causing Knighten to suffer permanent injuries. ECHA and Davis filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted by the trial court after a hearing was held on those motions. Knighten had filed a response to the motions for summary judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment, which was denied in the same order. Knighten now appeals.
Knighten appeals from the trial court's order granting ECHA's and Davis's motion for summary judgment. “When reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court.” Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind.2012). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings and evidence considered by the trial court show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Clark v. Aris, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). “On a motion for summary judgment, all doubts as to the existence of material issues of fact must be resolved against the moving party.” Id. “Additionally, all facts and reasonable inferences from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. (emphasis added). “If there is any doubt as to what conclusion a jury could reach, then summary judgment is improper.” Id. “The fact that the parties make cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review.” Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Grp. v.. Blaskie, 727 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). “Instead, we must consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. Thus, contrary to Knighten's assertion, our standard of review does not require us to consider only the facts most favorable to Knighten, the nonmoving party. We are to consider all facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to Knighten, the nonmoving party.
Knighten's complaint alleged negligence and negligent hiring and supervision. Davis's motion for summary judgment alleged that Davis owed no duty of care to Knighten and that it was not liable for Caldwell's actions because at the time of the argument and Knighten's injury, Caldwell had turned from his employer's business to serve some purpose of his own. Davis's motion further asserted that it was not liable for negligent hiring and retention of Caldwell because Knighten was not a reasonably foreseeable victim injured by a reasonably foreseeable harm. ECHA's motion for summary judgment asserted statutory immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. Knighten responded to ECHA's assertion of immunity by claiming that ECHA had assumed a duty of care to her by contract and that ECHA owed her a non-delegable duty based upon premises liability.
We first observe that Knighten has not presented any argument in support of reversal of the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of ECHA, or presented any issues suggesting that we should review that part of the trial court's order. “The party appealing the grant of summary judgment bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court's ruling was improper.” Morris v. Crain, 969 N .E.2d 119, 123 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). “ Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Additionally, “we will not consider an appellant's assertion on appeal when he has failed to present cogent argument supported by authority and references to the record as required by the rules.” Id.
Here, there are no assertions made suggesting that the trial court committed reversible error by granting summary judgment in favor of ECHA. Indiana Appellate Rule 66(C) authorizes us to affirm the decision of the trial court with respect to some or all of the parties or issues in whole or in part. Accordingly, we need not address the part of the trial court's summary judgment order granting summary judgment in favor of ECHA as Knighten has not raised issues or presented arguments pertaining to ECHA. Summary judgment for ECHA is affirmed.
The allegations of Knighten's complaint against Davis were based on negligence. “To make a successful negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) an injury proximately caused by the breach of that duty.” Clark, 890 N.E.2d at 763 (citing Web v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1991) ). In negligence actions, summary judgment is “rarely appropriate.” Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004). This is so because negligence cases are fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—a standard best applied by the finder of fact after hearing all of the evidence. Id. Even so, a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 385.
We first examine whether Caldwell's acts were within or outside the scope of his employment. “Respondeat superior imposes liability, where none would otherwise exist, on an employer for the wrongful acts of his employee which are committed within the scope of employment.” Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244, 247 (Ind.1989). “An employee is acting within the scope of his employment when he is acting, at least in part, to further the interests of his employer.” Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) ). “Even if an employee is primarily motivated by self-serving purposes, if he was at least partially serving his employer's interests, liability will accrue.” Id. at 456–57. “However, simply because an act could not have occurred without access to the employer's facilities does not bring it within the scope of employment.” Id. at 457.
Further, the type of act committed does not conclusively determine whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment, and an employer can be vicariously liable for the criminal acts of an employee. Id. But an act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as part of or incident to the service for which the servant is employed. Wells v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv....
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Knighten v. E. Chi. Hous. Auth.
...Davis Security.1 In a memorandum decision the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. See Knighten v. E. Chi. Hous. Auth., 20 N.E.3d 605 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (Table). We now grant transfer and reverse the judgment of the trial court.Standard of Review At the outset we observe the......