Kniper v. City of Louisville
| Decision Date | 29 April 1870 |
| Citation | 70 Ky. 599 |
| Parties | Kniper v. City of Louisville. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CITY COURT.
WM MIX, F. G. DENNECKER, For Appellant,
Charter of the City of Louisville, secs. 96, 118.
9 B Monroe, 344, Cheaney v. Hoover.
7 B Monroe, 167, Pierce's heirs v. Patton, & c.
15 B Monroe, 497, City of Covington v. Southgate.
Constitution of Kentucky, sec. 14, art. 10.
3 Marshall, 1286, Clay v. Hopkins.
13 B Monroe, 53, Slack v. Maysville & Lex. R. R. Co.
1 Marshall, 543, Bank of United States v. Noril.
T. L BURNETT, For Appellee.
(Brief not in Records.)
OPINIONLINDSAY JUDGE.
On the 23d of July, 1870, the General Council of the city of Louisville adopted an ordinance defining what class of persons and corporations carrying on business within the city limits should be deemed brewers, and requiring all such manufacturers to obtain a license from the city. The amount to be charged each person for said license is " one tenth of one per cent. on the amount of liquor manufactured," provided that each brewer shall be required to pay at least fifteen dollars per annum; and further enacting that any one carrying on such business without first obtaining this license shall be fined not less than twenty nor more than fifty dollars.
The appellant Kniper was proceeded against for a violation of this ordinance, and upon trial in the city court was fined the sum of fifty dollars. To reverse this judgment he has, under a provision of the city charter, prosecuted an appeal directly to this court.
It is claimed that the General Council had power to adopt this ordinance under the provisions of the 96th section of the city charter, which provides that " the General Council shall, by ordinance, provide for the following licenses, to be paid into the sinking fund, with adequate penalties for doing business without the required license; " among others, " for each brewer or distiller, not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars; " and concluding by authorizing said council to grade, class, and fix the rate of license within the minimum and maximum amounts designated.
The right of the legislature to delegate to the city government of Louisville this power we do not regard as an open question. Such right has been frequently discussed and recognized by this court, and while statutes conferring such powers upon cities and towns keep within revenue purposes they are beyond the control of the courts. (Mason v Trustees of Lancaster, 4 Bush, 406.) Nor do we think there is anything in the 118th section of the city charter limiting or abridging the authority delegated to the city government by section 96. By section 118 it is provided that the tools of the manufacturer shall not be taxed, nor shall he be required to take out a license to sell the products manufactured by him. He may be required under one section to procure a license authorizing him to manufacture for the purpose of selling, but the other protects him from being also compelled to pay for the privilege of selling. But there is an objection to the ordinance which to us seems insuperable. The General Council did not follow...
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Pleuler v. State
...two hundred dollars per annum, although they had paid for the same period both a United States and state license tax. Kniper v. Louisville, 70 Ky. 599, 7 Bush 599, also one in which a delegated power was involved. It simply holds that a power delegated to a city by the legislature must be s......