Knott v. State of California

Decision Date15 March 1994
Docket NumberNo. D014677,D014677
Citation28 Cal.Rptr.2d 514,23 Cal.App.4th 210
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesPreviously published at 23 Cal.App.4th 210, 28 Cal.App.4th 1519 23 Cal.App.4th 210, 28 Cal.App.4th 1519 John Samuel KNOTT, as Administrator, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Monaghan & Strauss, Michael H. Crosby and Brian D. Monaghan, San Diego, Forrest A. Hainline, III, Washington, DC, for plaintiff and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Marvin Goldsmith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Luis R. Vargas, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., and Karen M. Walter, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendants and respondents.

NARES, Associate Justice.

On December 27, 1986, defendant Craig Alan Peyer killed 20-year-old Cara Knott (Cara) while Peyer was on duty as a California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer. We affirmed Peyer's conviction for first degree premeditated murder.

John Samuel Knott, Cara's father and the administrator of her estate, subsequently brought a wrongful death action against the State of California (the State) and Peyer. As against the State, Knott alleged negligent supervision and liability based on the respondeat superior doctrine. During trial the court ruled Peyer was not acting within the scope of his employment when he killed Cara and therefore the State could not be held vicariously liable. On a special verdict, the jury found against Knott on the negligent supervision cause of action. The court took judicial notice of Peyer's criminal conviction and instructed the jury Peyer was liable as a matter of law. The jury awarded Knott $7.5 million in compensatory damages as against Peyer.

Knott appeals, contending the jury's finding the State did not negligently supervise Peyer was unsupported by the evidence and the court erred in finding the State was not liable on the basis of the respondeat superior doctrine. For the reasons explained below, we reject Knott's arguments with respect to the negligent supervision cause of action. We find, however, the court erred in ruling as a matter of law the State could not be held vicariously liable for Peyer's acts. We therefore reverse the judgment.

I.

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In reviewing Knott's contention there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding there was no negligence, we examine the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881, 92 Cal.Rptr. 162, 479 P.2d 362.) All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the State and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict. 1 (Ibid.)

1. Facts Relevant To Negligence Cause of Action Circumstances of Cara's Death 2

On December 27, 1986, at about 8:30 p.m. Cara drove her Volkswagen southbound on the Interstate 15 freeway (I-15) from her boyfriend's house in Escondido to her parents' house in El Cajon. Peyer was the CHP officer assigned to patrol the I-15 between Escondido and San Diego. Peyer ordered Cara to exit the freeway at the Mercy Road exit and drive to the bottom of the offramp, which was very dark and isolated. Peyer killed Cara shortly thereafter by strangling her and then throwing her off a nearby bridge. Cara's vehicle was found the next morning at the bottom of the Mercy Road exit offramp.

Peyer's Pattern of Stopping Women at the Mercy Road Offramp

Knott presented evidence at trial showing that during the six months before Cara's murder Peyer stopped over twenty-four women on the freeway at nighttime, required them to drive down the Mercy Road offramp (even if this meant the women had to back up along the freeway against traffic in order to do so), and then engaged them in long conversations (frequently lasting over thirty minutes) about personal matters. By contrast, when Peyer stopped men, the stops took place on the freeway and lasted less than 10 minutes.

CHP's Knowledge of Peyer's Mercy Road Offramp Traffic Stops

In the month before Cara's murder, two people 3 telephoned the CHP to report Peyer's conduct in making nighttime traffic stops at the bottom of the Mercy Road exit offramp.

On November 26, 1986, Perry Kurtz spoke with CHP operations officer Daniel Mark about an incident which occurred two days earlier. Kurtz told Mark that while her 23-year-old daughter was driving southbound on I-15, an officer (later identified as Peyer) turned on his red light and directed her to exit the freeway at the Mercy Road offramp. Kurtz said she objected that the officer took "a young girl" such as her daughter off the freeway into a "dark ... and ... very isolated area." Kurtz said the officer seemed concerned about a problem with her daughter's headlights because it could cause a problem in the summertime when "trucks lose their ... [p] ... treads." Kurtz said, "Now that's strange because here it is November, and he's concerned about summertime." Kurtz further explained that the officer asked her daughter to get out of the car to look at her headlights and then told her to turn off her headlights. Kurtz said, "There again, it made it even darker, having the lights turned out. This doesn't seem like normal procedure to me. And what I'm checking with you ... is to see if this is standard operating procedure." When Mark responded by stating that officers had the discretion to require persons to exit the freeway because of the danger from other vehicles, Kurtz said, "It's one thing to be on the shoulder. It's another thing to go down onto the exit ramp, onto a dark, isolated area." Mark ended the conversation by stating that "we'll find out who the officer was on the beat that night. We'll get back to you."

Two days later Sergeant John McDonald, one of Peyer's supervisors, called Perry Kurtz. Kurtz made clear that during Peyer's Shortly thereafter, during an officer debriefing, McDonald commended Peyer for his conduct in ordering Kurtz's daughter to exit the freeway at the Mercy Road offramp because of the potential danger of stopping the vehicle on the freeway.

                encounter with her daughter Peyer acted as a "gentleman" and in a professional and courteous manner.  Kurtz told McDonald, however, she was "concerned about" and "didn't like" her daughter being taken down the Mercy Road exit.  Sergeant McDonald responded that Peyer "was right" and did a "good job" and that making [28 Cal.App.4th 1529] traffic stops off the freeway "is standard operating procedure."   McDonald explained "it's in the interest of safety that the procedure is such as it is."   When McDonald asked Kurtz if she wanted to file a complaint, she responded:  "No.  I'm complaining, but I don't think it's necessary."
                

Two weeks later, Peyer stopped Donna Ziegler while she was driving her Volkswagen on I-15 at about 8:45 p.m. Peyer ordered Ziegler to drive down the Mercy Road offramp. Donna's husband, Sigurd Ziegler, was also in the car but was reclined low in the passenger seat. Peyer wrote Donna Ziegler a ticket for speeding. Peyer was very abrupt and quickly departed, even before determining the Zieglers had safely left the area. The next day Sigurd Ziegler spoke with CHP operations officer Robert Smith to complain about the location of Peyer's traffic stop. Ziegler told Smith he was "concern[ed] ... with the procedure by which we were pulled down at Mercy Road, which appeared to ... put whoever he would pull down there ... in great discomfort and ... I was outraged by that." Smith responded that it was within an officer's discretion to require motorists to exit the freeway to give them tickets. Smith "tr[ied] to reassure [Ziegler] that basically ... the officer is in charge, and he wouldn't put himself in a situation where he could get hurt or you, the violator, could possibly get hurt either." Smith interpreted Ziegler's call as an inquiry as to the CHP policy on stopping motorists and "got the impression that [Ziegler] didn't want to follow up further." Smith therefore did not consider the phone call as a complaint or notify anyone about the call.

CHP Policy Concerning Stopping Motorists Off the Freeway

Several witnesses testified a CHP officer in December 1986 had the discretion to make a nighttime traffic stop of a lone woman at the bottom of the Mercy Road offramp, even though it was very dark and isolated. The state's expert witness, Thomas Reddin, a former chief-of-police of the Los Angeles Police Department, explained a stop at such location was an "accepted practice" and did "not violate the [CHP] policy." Reddin said officers were given the discretion to make stops off the freeway for safety reasons. CHP officers had been killed or injured by passing motorists while the officer was making a traffic stop on a freeway shoulder. In addition, when a traffic stop is made on the freeway, an officer's "attention might stray from the violator" because of his concern about the cars on the freeway. Based on his examination of the area on the freeway near the Mercy Road offramp, Reddin testified this was not a safe area to stop a vehicle. Reddin further opined that under the circumstances Sergeant McDonald's response to Kurtz was correct and McDonald's conduct in commending Peyer for his conduct with respect to Kurtz's daughter was appropriate.

Peyer's Training and Reputation Before the Killing

Peyer had worked as a CHP officer for 13 years. Peyer's performance reports were "very good" and reflected "outstanding" activity. Peyer had a reputation as a very productive, efficient, effective, trustworthy, and professional officer. Peyer was known as an officer who always responded quickly to radio calls and was considered "a very aggressive hard-working officer.... He covered his beat very thoroughly, assisted other officers frequently." Peyer's supervisors received positive feedback from the public about Peyer's work and had...

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