Knotts v. SC Dept. of Natural Resources

• Decision Date: 07 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 25395.,25395.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: John M. KNOTTS, Jr., House of Representatives, District 88, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Lexington County Legislative Delegation and the Lexington County Legislative Delegation, Respondents, v. S.C. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, and Dr. Paul A. Sandifer, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the S.C. Department of Natural Resources, Appellants.

348 S.C. 1

558 S.E.2d 511

John M. KNOTTS, Jr., House of Representatives, District 88, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Lexington County Legislative Delegation and the Lexington County Legislative Delegation, Respondents, v. S.C. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, and Dr. Paul A. Sandifer, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the S.C. Department of Natural Resources, Appellants.

No. 25395.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard November 14, 2001.

Decided January 7, 2002.

Chief Counsel Buford S. Mabry, Jr., Deputy Chief Counsel Paul S. League and Assistant Chief Counsel James A. Quinn, all of South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, of Columbia, for appellants.

Heath P. Taylor, of Wilson, Moore, Taylor & Thomas, P.A., of West Columbia, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Representative John M. Knotts, Jr., in his official capacity as Chairman of the Lexington County Legislative Delegation, along with the Lexington County Legislative Delegation (collectively "Delegation") sued the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Dr. Paul A. Sandifer in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources (collectively "D.N.R.") over allocating money from the Water Recreational Resources Fund ("W.R.R.F."). The trial court issued a writ of mandamus ordering D.N.R. to process Delegation's funding approval. For reasons set forth below we reverse the trial court's decision and vacate the writ of mandamus.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are undisputed. The statute at the center of this case provides, in part, all W.R.R.F. funds: "must be allocated based upon the number of boats or other watercraft registered in each county pursuant to law and expended, subject to the approval of a majority of the county legislative delegation, including a majority of the resident senators, if any, for purpose of water recreational resources." S.C.Code Ann. § 12-28-2730(a) (2000) (emphasis added). The State funds the W.R.R.F. with a percentage of the gasoline tax revenue which is then disbursed to counties based on the number of watercraft registered in each. S.C.Code Ann. § 12-28-2730 (Supp.2000). The State treasury holds the funds in a "Special Revenue Account" administered by D.N.R.

In July 2001, Delegation forwarded its approval to D.N.R. to disperse W.R.R.F. funds to constituent organizations. D.N.R. acknowledged receipt of the approved request. However, D.N.R. informed Delegation it would not process the request until it ascertained what W.R.R.F. funds the department would use to comply with provisos in the 2001-2002 Appropriations Act. See 2001 Act 66.

Provisos 72.110 and 72.111 direct D.N.R. to transfer money from various special funds, including the W.R.R.F., to the general fund.¹ The Act also authorizes D.N.R. to reduce its own budget reduction by transferring money from the special funds to its departmental budget. See 2001 Act 66 § 72.76.²

ISSUES

Does D.N.R. have discretion to administer the W.R.R.F. under S.C.Code Ann. § 12-28-2730 (Supp.2000)?

Does the 2001-2002 Appropriations Act give D.N.R. discretion to allocate W.R.R.F. funds?

Does S.C.Code Ann. § 12-28-2730 (Supp.2000) violate S.C. Const. art. I, § 8?

If so, are the unconstitutional provisions severable?

DISCUSSION

A writ of mandamus is the highest judicial writ and is coercive in nature. Ex parte Littlefield, 343 S.C. 212, 540 S.E.2d 81 (2000). Delegation may obtain the writ after showing: (1) D.N.R. has a duty to perform the act; (2) the ministerial nature of the act; (3) Delegation has specific legal right for which discharge of the duty is necessary; and (4) a lack of any other legal remedy. Porter v. Jedziniak, 334 S.C. 16, 512 S.E.2d 497 (1999).

Much of Delegation's and D.N.R.'s arguments center on the ministerial nature of disbursing W.R.R.F. funds. Assuming arguendo that disbursement is a ministerial act, a writ of mandamus is improper because D.N.R.'s duty to perform is predicated on an unconstitutional statute. Because we find S.C.Code Ann. § 12-28-2730 is facially unconstitutional we do not address the other issues.

I

D.N.R. asserts S.C.Code Ann. § 12-28-2730 violates S.C. Const. art. I, § 8. This Court is reluctant to find a statute unconstitutional. Every presumption is made in favor of a statute's constitutionality. Gold v. South Carolina Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 271 S.C. 74, 245 S.E.2d 117 (1978). A "legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt." Joytime Distribs. and Amusement Co., Inc. v. State, 338 S.C. 634, 640, 528 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1087, 120 S.Ct. 1719, 146 L.Ed.2d 641 (2000).

D.N.R. bears the burden of proving the statute unconstitutional. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 312 S.C. 324, 440 S.E.2d 375 (1994). To carry this burden D.N.R. cites the following cases: Tucker v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 309 S.C. 395, 424 S.E.2d 468 (1992) (Tucker I); Gunter v. Blanton, 259 S.C. 436, 192 S.E.2d 473 (1972); Bramlette v. Stringer, 186 S.C. 134, 195 S.E. 257 (1938).

This Court in Bramlette v. Stringer, supra, found unconstitutional a statute authorizing a bond issue to improve a county's roads. The statute impermissibly delegated a variety of powers to the county legislative delegation, including the ability to determine the amount of the bonds issued, the process for issuing the bonds, and which roads to improve. This Court began its analysis by noting an act is presumed complete after leaving the hands of the Legislature. The Bramlette statute failed because it created the framework of a law whose interior would be finished by a legislative delegation assuming executive duties. We grounded the Bramlette holding in the basic concept of separation of powers that a legislative body cannot reserve for itself powers given solely to the executive branch.

Delegation attempts to distinguish Bramlette from the present case by focusing on who ultimately spends the funds. Delegation insists the Bramlette statute wrongfully gave the legislative delegation broad powers to expend the funds while S.C.Code Ann. § 12-28-2730 allows Delegation to merely approve requests leaving to the parties receiving the funds the unfettered discretion in spending the appropriation. We disagree with this interpretation of Bramlette.

Separation of powers is not predicated on differentiating between who actually spends the money, but on whether the legislative branch assumes powers belonging to another branch of government. Once the legislature enacts a law all that remains is the efficient enforcement and execution of that law. Bramlette, 186 S.C. at 134, 195 S.E. at 258. Regardless of who spends the money, § 12-28-2730 is unconstitutional because a legislative delegation may not execute or enforce a law.

This Court in Gunter v. Blanton, supra,

found a statute unconstitutionally allowed a school board to adopt tax increases only with the approval of its county legislative delegation. We held the Legislature could delegate its taxing power to the school board, but it could not tie that power to the legislative delegation's approval. We ruled the statute could not "authorize the members of the delegation to participate in this determination as legislators, for they may exercise legislative power only as members of the General Assembly." Id.,

259 S.C. at 441,

192 S.E.2d at 475. The statute impermissibly empowered a legislative delegation to effectively veto a tax increase with which it disagreed. See also Aiken County Bd. of Educ. v. Knotts, 274 S.C. 144, 262 S.E.2d 14 (1980) (This Court adopted the Gunter analysis to find a similar statute unconstitutional).

Delegation distinguishes Gunter because it did not address a legislative delegation's power to approve expenditures. The Gunter rationale prohibits the Legislature from undertaking "to both pass laws and execute them by setting its own members to the task of discharging such functions by virtue of their office as legislators." Aiken County Bd. of Educ. v. Knotts, 274 S.C. at 149-50, 262 S.E.2d at 17.

Contrary to Delegation's assertions the rationale underlying Gunter and Aiken undermines the constitutionality of S.C.Code Ann. § 12-28-2730. The statute clearly permits the Legislature to execute a law it has passed by empowering its own members to administer the law by virtue of their office as legislators. See Gunter v. Blanton, 259 S.C. at 441, 192 S.E.2d at 475

; see also, Aiken County Bd. of Educ. v. Knotts, 274 S.C. at 149-50, 262 S.E.2d at 17.

Delegation argues its approval under § 12-28-2730 is merely incidental to the Legislature's appropriation authority. See Aiken County Bd. of Educ. v. Knotts, 274 S.C. 144, 262 S.E.2d at 17

(A Legislature may "engage in the discharge of such functions to the extent only that their performance is reasonably incidental to the full and effective exercise of its legislative powers."). We disagree because Delegation's interpretation undermines the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Legislature has the power to delineate how an executive department may fund a request under the W.R.R.F. The Legislature may statutorily outline how D.N.R. must expend money from W.R.R.F. by clarifying the term "water recreational purposes." The Legislature may allow legislative delegations to make suggestions on how to spend W.R.R.F. funds. See Tucker v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 314 S.C. 131, 442 S.E.2d 171 (1994) (Tucker II)

. However, the Legislature does not have the power to create a law then execute it. The power to execute a law is not incidental to the power to appropriate, but is a separate executive power.

In Tucker I, supra, this Court held a legislative delegation could not approve highway fund expenditures or enter into contracts for highway improvements on behalf of the county. We adopted the Gunter and Aiken rationale that...