Knowles v. Housing Authority of City of Columbus

• Decision Date: 13 November 1956
• Docket Number: No. 19476,19476
• Citation: 212 Ga. 729,61 A.L.R.2d 1241,95 S.E.2d 659
• Parties: , 61 A.L.R.2d 1241 Tommie Lee KNOWLES v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF COLUMBUS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 659

95 S.E.2d 659

212 Ga. 729, 61 A.L.R.2d 1241

Tommie Lee KNOWLES v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF COLUMBUS.

No. 19476.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 13, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1956.

Syllabus by the Court

Under the 'sue and be sued' clause of our housing act of 1937, an action for damages is maintainable against a housing authority for a personal injury it negligently inflicts on one of its tenants.

Mrs. Tommie Lee Knowles sued the Housing Authority of the City of Columbus, Georgia, for a stated amount as damages. Her amended petition alleges in substance that she was a tenant of the defendant when she was severely injured in consequence of its negligence during November, 1954. The defendant demurred generally to her amended petition on the ground that she could not maintain a tort action against it. The demurrer was sustained and she sued out a writ of error to the Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Knowles v. Housing Authority of City of Columbus, 94 Ga.App. 182, 94 S.E.2d 55. On application therefor, this court granted the writ of certiorari to review the ruling by the Court of Appeals.

Charles A. Hughley, Vincent P. McCauley, Columbus, for plaintiff in error.

Swift, Pease, Davidson & Chapman, W. M. Page, Columbus, for defendant in error.

CANDLER, Justice (after stating the foregoing facts).

Beginning with Williamson v. Housing Authority of Augusta, 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43, and in several cases since then, this court has been called on to consider questions concerning our housing authorities law of 1937, Ga.L.1937, p. 210, and the amendments thereto; but until this case reached the court, we have not had for decision the question of whether or not an action can be maintained against a housing authority for a personal injury it negligently inflicted on one of its tenants. That question, and that question only, is presented for decision by the case now in hand. As shown by our statement of the case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals have held that such an action is not maintainable. Their rulings are predicated on the proposition that a housing authority is an instrumentality of the State which performs governmental functions, and is therefore immune from tort actions. In fixing or prescribing the powers of a housing authority, section 8 of our act of 1937 in part provides: 'An authority shall constitute a public body corporate and politic, exercising public and essential governmental functions, and having all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of this Act, including the following powers in addition to others herein granted: (a) To sue and be sued.' This section of the act confers other broad corporate powers on a housing authority, among which are perpetual succession, the right of eminent domain, authority to insure or provide for the insurance of any real or personal property or operations of the authority against any risks or hazards, to option, lease, purchase, exchange, and sell real and personal property or any interest therein, and to erect or construct dwelling accommodations for rent or lease to persons of low income, and from time to time establish and revise the rents or charges therefor. The controlling question in this case is the effect of the 'sue and be sued' clause in our housing act. This court in Culbreth v. Southwest Georgia Regional Housing Authority, 199 Ga. 183, 189, 39 S.E.2d 684, unanimously held that a housing authority created by our act is in effect an instrumentality of the State, and it is argued in the brief for Mrs. Knowles that the 'sue and be sued' clause is a waiver of the State's immunity from suit in all cases of any character against a housing authority. The act under which the Federal Housing Administration was created provides: 'The Administrator shall, in carrying out the provisions of this subchapter and subchapters II, III, and VI, be authorized, in his official capacity, to sue and be sued in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.' 12 U.S.C.A. § 1702.

In Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U.S. 381, 59 S.Ct. 516, 518, 83 L.Ed 784, it was said: 'Because of the advantages enjoyed by the corporate device compared with conventional executive agencies, the exigencies of war and the enlarged scope of government in economic affairs have greatly extended the use of independent corporate facilities for governmental ends. In spawning these corporations during the past two decades, Congress has uniformly included amenability to law. Congress has provided for not less than forty of such corporations discharging governmental functions, and without exception the authority to-sue-and-be-sued was included. Such a firm practice is partly an indication of the present climate of opinion which has brought governmental immunity from suit into disfavor, partly it reveals a definite attitude on the part of Congress which should be given hospitable scope.' And in the same case in 306 U.S., at page 396, 59 S.Ct. at page 521, it was said: 'Congress has embarked upon a generous policy of consent for suits against the government sounding in tort even where there is no element of contract.' The Keifer case was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corporation, 312 U.S. 81, 83, 61 S.Ct. 485, 486, 85 L.Ed. 595, where the court's opinion was prepared by Chief Justice Hughes. In Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 60 S.Ct. 488, 490, 84 L.Ed. 724, the Supreme Court of the United States, where the question presented was whether the Federal Housing Administration was subject to garnishment for money due an employee, and where the court held that it was so subject under the 'sue and be sued' clause contained in the act under which it was created said: 'As indicated in Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., supra, we start from the premise that such waivers by Congress of governmental immunity in case of such federal instrumentalities should be liberally construed. This policy is in line with the current disfavor of the doctrine of governmental...