Knowles v. Leggett
| Decision Date | 09 December 1895 |
| Citation | 7 Colo.App. 265,43 P. 154 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | KNOWLES v. LEGGETT. [1] |
Appeal from district court, Arapahoe county.
Action by Orville J. Leggett against Joseph C. Knowles for breach of contract. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
Wells McNeal & Taylor, for appellant.
Fred L Shaw, for appellee.
Knowles being then the owner of what is called the "Ike Ranch," on the north side of Platte river, in Arapahoe county, on the 2d of November, 1885, leased it to Leggett, the appellee, for a term of years, at an agreed rental, covenanting on his part "to furnish him with sixty inches of water in the irrigating ditch on said premises." Leggett was to keep the ditch in repair, seed the land with clover and timothy, and leave it with a good stand and in good condition at the end of his term. There were sundry other conditions in the lease, which are unimportant. Leggett occupied the premises for some years but did not pay the whole of the agreed yearly rental, basing his refusal on Knowles' failure to furnish water according to the terms of the covenant. He brought this action to recover his damages, set up the contract in so far as it related to the water, averred the injuries, and prayed judgment accordingly. The owner defended, and relied partly on performance, partly on Leggett's failure to perform the contract on his part in the preparation and care of the land, and alleged a release on Leggett's part of the covenant to supply the water. He set up by way of counterclaim the notes for the unpaid rent, and prayed the appropriate judgment. He likewise filed a cross complaint against Leggett and the Platte River Mill & Ditch Company wherein he set up the obligation of the company to furnish him water as a shareholder in the corporation, stating the obligation of the company to furnish the water with which he had agreed to supply Leggett. In this cross complaint he averred Leggett's knowledge of the source of supply when the lease was executed, and Leggett's reliance on his right to procure water from the company. The purpose of this cross complaint was to compel Leggett to litigate with the ditch company, and recover his damages from them. Leggett proved all the general facts set out in his complaint which were not admitted in the answer, and made an attempt to establish his injury. The chief difficulty springs from his neglect or failure to prove what was essential to entitle him to judgment. It is quite apparent that proof of the lease and of the failure to supply water according to the agreement would not suffice. Of necessity he must prove some injury. To meet this burden, he offered evidence which tended to show the amount of crop which could have been grown on the land had the water been furnished, and the value of that crop in the market at the time. He went no further than to show the probable total crop and its market value. The other essential items of the cost of raising and harvesting it, transporting it to market, and all other expenses ordinarily incident to raising and harvesting timothy and clover, were left unproven. Thus the only basis furnished the jury was the tonnage and the market value. The trial resulted in a judgment in his favor for $715.
The appellant presents several questions for our consideration some of which must be disposed of in view of the succeeding trial, though they are not of themselves sufficient to reverse the case. The appellant insists the court erred in striking out his cross complaint. We cannot accede to this position. Whatever may have been Knowles' rights as between him and the ditch company as corporation and shareholder respectively, the record fails to disclose anything which renders it necessary for Leggett to litigate that question, or to take part in that dispute. There was no privity between Leggett and the ditch company, and, whatever may have been his knowledge as to the source of the water supply, he was compelled to look no further than to the contracting party for his damages. Leggett's contract was with Knowles. The breach being established, a cause of action arose; but it did not give Leggett a right to sue the company, nor was he compelled, under the circumstances, to look to the corporation for redress. If he had brought suit against the company, it would have had a perfect defense in the denial of any contract between them. Under these circumstances it is not easy to see how the company can be brought into the present litigation, or Leggett be compelled to have his issue incumbered by the trial of the controversy between the company and one of its shareholders. Whether, under the existing circumstances, Knowles could have given the corporation notice of the suit, and required them to appear and defend, so as to bind the company by the amount of any judgment which Leggett might recover, is a question which need not be considered, anticipated, or determined. Leggett could not be forced to try the question with the ditch company, or have his suit embarrassed by the controversy between it and Knowles. The determination of...
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State Trust & Sav. Bank v. Hermosa Land & Cattle Co.Hermosa Land & Cattle Co. v. State Trust & Sav. Bank
...any damages awarded upon this record would have been speculative and could not be sustained. Sedgwick on Damages, § 170; Knowles v. Leggett, 7 Colo. App. 265, 43 P. 154; Sullivan v. McMillan, 26 Fla. 543, 8 So. 450; Findlay Brick Co. v. Am. Sewer Pipe Co., 18 Ga. App. 446, 89 S. E. 535; Bay......
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Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co.
...of the land to which the easement is appurtenant. Appellant seems to claim that the action could not be for damages. The case of Knowles v. Leggett, supra, was for damages for of contract. No rule is pointed out to us which prevents proper parties from bringing an action for damages for bre......