Knox v. Emerson

• Decision Date: 05 November 1910
• Citation: 131 S.W. 972,123 Tenn. 409
• Parties: KNOX, Clerk, v. EMERSON et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

131 S.W. 972

123 Tenn. 409

KNOX, Clerk, v. EMERSON et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

November 5, 1910

Appeal from Circuit Court, McMinn County; George L. Burke, Judge.

Action by W. N. Knox, Clerk of the County Court of McMinn County against Lillie Williams Emerson and another. From a judgment of the circuit court, affirming a judgment of the county court for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Eugene E. Ivins, for appellants.

Attorney General Cates and E. B. Madison, for appellee.

BEARD J.

This suit was instituted in the county court of McMinn county, by the clerk of that court, to recover an inheritance tax alleged to be due upon the estate which the defendant Lillie Williams Emerson takes under the will of her mother, who died a citizen of that county in May, 1909. Two questions are raised to defeat the recovery sought--first, that the county court was without jurisdiction to try the case; and, second that being a child of the testatrix, and taking under her will, Mrs. Emerson was not subject to this tax.

As to the first of these questions, we think there is no difficulty. The tax claimed, if due at all, is provided for in section 20, c. 479, of the Session Acts of 1909 of the General Assembly of the state. In that section it is enacted "that inheritances not taxed under the present law shall pay tax as follows: *** To be collected by the county court clerk of each county."

It will be seen, upon reference to this act, that no specific mode is marked out, and no particular forum is designated, by and in which this tax shall be collected; the Legislature evidently assuming, and we think properly, that these matters had been covered elsewhere. Chapter 174 of the Session Acts of 1893 embraced, as far as it went, within itself a complete system of taxation upon the subject of the imposition and collection of a collateral inheritance tax. Zickler v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 104 Tenn. 277, 289, 57 S.W. 341, 344. By the first section of that act there were excluded from its operation the "father, mother, husband, wife, children, and lineal descendants" entitled to the estate of the party dying, either testate or intestate. By section 15 the duty of collecting a delinquent collateral inheritance tax is imposed upon the county court clerk, and two modes for discharging this duty are prescribed--one, by notice to the parties in interest, requiring them to appear before the county court and show cause why the tax should not be paid; and the other, by filing a bill in that court to enforce its collection, "to be proceeded with after the manner of chancery suits."

Section 20 of chapter 479 of the Acts of 1909 is a repeal, by implication, of so much of the act of 1893 as exempted from the payment of the collateral inheritance tax the parties already named, and placed on them a burden common to all others who took from deceased persons. This section of the act of 1909 comes as a supplement to that of 1893, without so describing itself, and simply widens the collateral inheritance tax system. The two acts, in regard to the tax in question, are in pari materia, and no question is suggested why the remedy and forum for its enforcement, adopted in this case, are not warranted by section 15 of the act of 1893.

If this view, however, were unsound, we think the course here pursued is authorized by section 28 of chapter 602 of the Acts of 1907, where the county courts of the state are given jurisdiction to try and determine, among others, cases involving delinquent privilege taxes, as there can be no doubt that the collateral inheritance tax is a privilege tax, a burden constitutionally imposed upon the right of acquiring property by succession. State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674, 30 S.W. 750, 28 L. R. A. 178.

The main reason, however, urged by Mrs. Emerson for resisting this recovery, is that, as she takes her estate under the will of her mother, she is not within the terms of section 20, c. 479, which imposes a privilege tax upon "inheritances not taxed under previous laws"; her insistence being that the word "inheritances" is to be restricted to cases of devolution of property by operation of law, the owner having died intestate.

It may be observed at this point, if the construction thus insisted upon be necessarily adopted, then there might arise the serious constitutional objection that this was class legislation, arbitrary in its nature, as there could be found no reason why a child, for illustration, taking by inheritance, should be onerated with this tax, while another, taking under a will, would be relieved. It is impossible to believe that the Legislature intended to make such an offensive and unreasonable distinction, and the question is: Have such terms been used in this section as to require the courts to hold with the present contention?

While there is much conflict in the authorities as to whether revenue statutes, either general or special in their nature shall be given a liberal or strict construction, there can be no difference of opinion, at least, that they should receive "a fair construction, to effect the end for which they were intended." Mills v. Thurston Co., 16 Wash. 378, 47 P. 759; Hubbard v. Brainard, 35 Conn. 563; Cornwall v. Todd, 38 Conn. 443; Cooley on Tax. 372. And there is as little doubt that, where a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which...