Knudsen v. Hill
| Decision Date | 05 June 1964 |
| Citation | 227 Cal.App.2d 639,38 Cal.Rptr. 859 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Clifford H. KNUDSEN, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Appellant, v. C. McCoy HILL and Laura Hill, Defendant, Cross Complainants and Respondents. Civ. 10835. |
Wilkins, Little & Mix, Sacramento, for plaintiff-appellant.
Edward J. Anzore, Sacramento, for defendants-respondents.
In this action by plaintiff Knudsen for the conversion by defendants Hill of a pledged promissory note belonging to plaintiff then having a face value of $24,674.20, judgment was for plaintiff, but the court fixed the value of the converted note at $16,052.26. 1
Knudsen appeals, his sole contention being that the court should have allowed the full face value of the converted note. We sustain this contention, holding that damages for the conversion of a secured promissory note where there is no personal liability for deficiency judgment on the part of the maker are properly measured by the value of the security, this for reasons hereinafter to be explained. There is no controversy on appeal as to the following facts:
The Hills had loaned $18,000 to Knudsen to be used to build a motel. It was constructed and sold by Knudsen to Mr. and Mrs. Cracraft and Mr. and Mrs. Bringle who, as a part of the purchase price, gave Knudsen their promissory note for $26,500.00 (the 'Cracraft note') secured by a third deed of trust on the motel. The Cracraft note was later pledged by Knudsen to the Hills to secure the indebtedness owed by Knudsen to them.
On January 9, 1961, the Hills wrongfully converted the Cracraft note by selling it for the sum of $16,052.26 to a daughter of the Cracrafts, who apparently bought as agent of the latter. The trial court, in its memorandum opinion, states: 'As to this phase of the case, the Hills acted in a most secretive and unfair manner by indicating that nothing had transpired with respect to the Cracraft note and deed of trust and that they still wanted to discuss the settlement of the debt owing them as late as May 18, 1961.'
Three weeks before the sale of the Cracraft note (December 23, 1960) Knudsen had tendered payment in full of the balance ($11,800.00) of his indebtedness to the Hills. 2
On appeal it is not disputed that Knudsen under these facts was entitled to recover the statutory damages for wrongful conversion of the Cracraft note. The sole question is whether the trial court awarded damages by proper measurement thereof.
The basic statutory measure of damages in California for noncontractual wrongs is that stated in Civil Code, section 3333, to-wit: 'the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby.' By Civil Code, section 3336; 'The detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be: First--The value of the property at the time of the conversion, with the interest from that time, or, an amount sufficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss which is the natural, reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act complained of and which a proper degree of prudence on his part would not have averted; 3 and Second--A fair compensation for the time and money properly expended in pursuit of the property.'
Civil Code, section 3356 provides: 'For the purpose of estimating damages, the value of an instrument in writing is presumed to be equal to that of the property to which it entitles its owner.'
A note in 85 A.L.R.2d 1349, entitled 'Measure of damages for conversion or loss of commercial paper' collects cases throughout the United States on this subject. These show that such damage is to be measured by value at time of conversion and, although the rule is variously expressed, face value of the bill or note is, prima facie, its true value. Evidence is admissible to establish that actual value is a lesser sum than face value but the burden is upon defendant so to prove. This is the rule in California. (Revert v. Hesse, 184 Cal. 295, 193 P. 943; Meyer v. Thomas, 18 Cal.App.2d 299, 63 P.2d 1176).
A qualification is expressed in the note in 85 A.L.R.2d, supra, at page 1352 that damage is measured in terms of the value of the bill or note itself only when the instrument 'imposes personal liability upon the maker or drawer.' 'Where a promissory note imposes no personal liability on the maker, but is collectible only from property mortgaged to secure its payment, the measure of damages is the value of the security as of the date of the conversion.' (Emphasis supplied.) (Op. cit. 85 A.L.R.2d p. 1352.) One case is cited as authority for the rule, Wylde v. Schoening, 96 Wash. 86, 164 P. 752. The rule is apposite here because the Cracraft note is a 'purchase price obligation,' and in the event of foreclosure no deficiency judgment could have been recovered by the holder against the makers after the security had been exhausted. (Code Civ.Proc., sec. 580b.)
Although no California case has been cited or found where the court was called upon to consider the rule just expressed the language of Civil Code, section 3356 quoted above is broad enough to permit its application. That section in terms provides that the value of the 'instrument in writing' is a sum equal to the 'property to which it entitles its owner,' which, in the case of a mortgage note is a lien on the mortgage real property to the extent of the debt secured.
Since the ultimate test of a proper award is 'the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby' the wrong, what fairer yardstick could there be to measure loss when the wrong committed is the wiping out of plaintiff's security, his sole source of redress, than the sum equal to its value? 4
We hold that this properly measures plaintiff's loss and that the rule should have been applied here as the measure of plaintiff's damage.
The converted note bore interest at the rate of 8% per annum. It was payable in installments of $200 per month or more (including interest) for the first 9 months, after which installments increased to $300 monthly. Unless payments were accelerated the note would have been paid off in 1970. The note included a provision for accelerated maturity in the event of default at the holder's option. At the time of the conversion the unpaid balance was, as stated above, $24,674.20.
As to the value of the motel securing the note, Mrs. Cracraft testified it was worth between $250,000 and $275,000 and that she had refused an offer of $285,000. Plaintiff, an experienced real estate broker--but not disinterested--valued it at $300,000. No evidence in the record of any lesser value has been pointed out to us. The two prior encumbrances aggregated $99,000. Thus the value of the security at the most conservative appraisal was $151,000, six times the face amount of the indebtedness secured, $24,674.20. The latter sum then, together with interest from the date of conversion, should have been allowed as plaintiff's damages.
But even were we to assume that plaintiff's damage was to be measured by the value of the note itself, the same result would be...
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...the FPI stock), as well as evidence that the benefits were worth more or less than what defendants paid for them. (See Knudsen v. Hill (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 639, 640, 642 [in a damages case involving conversion of a "pledged promissory note," measure of damage is "value at time of conversio......
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