Knutson v. Christeson
| Citation | 684 S.W.2d 549 |
| Decision Date | 13 December 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 13441,13441 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
| Parties | Mary Louise KNUTSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Leo J. CHRISTESON, Eugenia A. Christeson, Donald E. Hanaford, Phyllis F. Hanaford, and Boonslick Savings & Loan Association, Defendants-Appellants. |
William Icenogle, Icenogle & Icenogle, Camdenton, for plaintiff-respondent.
Gene A. Hilton, Hilton & Bennett, Camdenton, for defendants-appellants.
In this equitable action plaintiff seeks to have set aside as fraudulent or infected by fraud certain conveyances among the various defendants because of an alleged attempt by defendant Leo J. Christeson to thwart satisfaction of a money judgment obtained by plaintiff against him in 1977. The trial court found all issues in favor of plaintiff and against all defendants and decreed that the deeds in question be set aside and avoided as against the interest of plaintiff. From this judgment all defendants have appealed.
On April 19, 1977, in the Circuit Court of Camden County, Missouri, Case No. 5337, plaintiff secured default judgment against defendant Leo J. Christeson in the amount of $4,159.00. Defendant Leo Christeson was at that time the sole owner of Lots A and B in Leo's Tier Subdivision, having previously acquired each of these lots in his individual capacity via separate warranty deeds.
On August 14, 1980, plaintiff filed an application for scire facias to revive her 1977 judgment and concomitant lien, the latter of which had expired, per Rule 74.35 1, on April 19, 1980. A scire facias issued and was served upon defendant Leo Christeson on August 16, 1980. On August 21, 1980, defendant Leo Christeson and his wife, defendant Eugenia A. Christeson, executed a quitclaim deed conveying all of Lots A and B to themselves, as husband and wife. This deed was recorded August 25, 1980, and appears in Book 223 at Page 443, Office of the Recorder of Deeds, Camden County, Missouri. On September 19, 1980, the Circuit Court of Camden County sustained plaintiff's application for scire facias and an order reviving the judgment in Case No. 5337 was filed on October 7, 1980.
On November 5, 1980, defendants Christeson executed a general warranty deed conveying Lots A and B to defendants Donald E. and Phyllis F. Hanaford. This deed is recorded in Book 225 at Page 363 in the Camden County Recorder's Office. On the same day, November 5, 1980, defendants Hanaford executed a deed of trust conveying Lots A and B to defendant Boonslick Savings and Loan Association (Boonslick) to secure payment of a promissory note. This deed of trust is recorded in Book 107, Page 849, Camden County Recorder's Office. Prior to closing of the loan to defendants Hanaford and execution by them of the promissory note and deed of trust, defendant Boonslick received a title opinion in the form of a title commitment issued by Gene A. Hilton, as issuing agent for the Title Insurance Company of Minnesota. Mr. Hilton has been attorney for defendant Leo Christeson at all times relevant herein. Sometime later in November, 1980, defendants Hanaford, by deed of trust recorded in Book 107, Page 982, Camden County Recorder's Office, conveyed Lots A and B to defendants Christeson to secure payment of a promissory note. Thereafter, on January 4, 1982, plaintiff filed the instant action.
Section 428.020 provides:
"Every conveyance or assignment in writing, or otherwise, of any estate or interest in lands, or in goods and chattels, or in things in action, or of any rents and profits issuing therefrom, and every charge upon lands, goods or things in action, or upon the rents and profits thereof, and every bond, suit, judgment, decree or execution, made or contrived with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors of their lawful actions, damages, forfeitures, debts or demands, or to defraud or deceive those who shall purchase the same lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any rent, profit or commodity issuing out of them, shall be from henceforth deemed and taken, as against said creditors and purchasers, prior and subsequent, to be clearly and utterly void."
Section 428.070 provides:
"This chapter shall not extend to any estate or interest in any lands, tenements or hereditaments, goods or chattels, or any rents, profits or commons out of the same, which shall be upon valuable consideration, and bona fide and lawfully conveyed; nor shall it be construed to avoid any deed, as against any subsequent bona fide purchaser from the grantee for valuable consideration, and without any notice of fraud."
The trial court concluded that, as the August 21, 1980 quitclaim deed from defendants Christeson to themselves "was contrived and made with intent to defraud plaintiff as a creditor of defendant Leo J. Christeson," it was void per § 428.020. No issue is raised concerning this conclusion, though defendants Christeson are, at least nominally, among the appellants on this appeal.
Defendants' two points relied on both concern the trial court's determination that defendants Hanaford and Boonslick were not protected parties under § 428.070 and thus could not take Lots A and B free of the fraud perpetrated by their predecessors in title, defendants Christeson. The court concluded that defendants Hanaford and Boonslick had notice of the prior fraud because they had constructive notice of the following matters of public record at the time they acquired their respective interests:
1) The unsatisfied April 19, 1977, judgment for plaintiff and against defendant Leo Christeson in the amount of $4,159.00.
2) Plaintiff's application for scire facias to revive her April 19, 1977, judgment and lien, which application was filed August 16, 1980.
3) The quitclaim conveyance from defendant Leo Christeson and his wife to themselves as husband and wife, executed August 21, 1980, and recorded August 25, 1980.
4) The September 19, 1980, judgment of revival, filed October 7, 1980.
In their first point defendants Hanaford and Boonslick contend the trial court erred in overruling their joint motion for summary judgment because there was no genuine issue as to their being bona fide purchasers for value and without notice of fraud on the part of defendants Christeson. Plaintiff, as...
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Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Lom Prop. Corp. (In re Allen)
...(1931) ). Any instrument which lies outside of the chain of title does not impart notice to a purchaser of realty. Knutson v. Christeson, 684 S.W.2d 549, 551–52 (Mo.App.1984). “Notice may be imparted to a prospective purchaser by actual or constructive notice of facts which would place a re......
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Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Lom Prop. Corp. (In re Allen)
...(1931)). Any instrument which lies outside of the chain of title does not impart notice to a purchaser of realty. Knutson v. Christeson, 684 S.W.2d 549, 551–52 (Mo.App.1984). “Notice may be imparted to a prospective purchaser by actual or constructive notice of facts which would place a rea......
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Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Lom Prop. Corp. (In re Allen)
...(1931)). Any instrument which lies outside of the chain of title does not impart notice to a purchaser of realty. Knutson v. Christeson, 684 S.W.2d 549, 551–52 (Mo.App.1984). “Notice may be imparted to a prospective purchaser by actual or constructive notice of facts which would place a rea......
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Hayward v. Arnold
...but of anything which a reasonable inquiry might reveal. Hamrick v. Herrera, 744 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo.App.1987); Knutson v. Christeson, 684 S.W.2d 549, 551-52 (Mo.App.1984); Walkup v. Evinger, 653 S.W.2d 383, 390 (Mo.App.1983). Hayward says in his amended petition that the "prior agreement" ......