Kobi Karp Architecture & Interior Design, Inc. v. RG Mich. 2014 LLC
| Decision Date | 14 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 18-21079-Civ-Scola |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | Kobi Karp Architecture & Interior Design, Inc., Plaintiff, v. RG Michigan 2014 LLC and Gianfranco Rondon, Defendants. |
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Kobi Karp Architecture & Interior Design, Inc. (“Kobi Karp”) brought this action against a former client, Defendants RG Michigan 2014 LLC and Gianfranco Rondon (collectively, “Rondon”), [1] alleging that the Defendants, including two defendants who have since settled infringed certain of Kobi Karp's copyrights. (ECF No 15.) Kobi Karp now brings this motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 52.) The Defendants opposed the motion (ECF No. 87) and Kobi Karp filed a reply in support of the motion (ECF No 90). Having considered the parties' briefing, the record, and the relevant legal authorities, Kobi Karp's motion is granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 52.)
A walk down Miami Beach reveals the allure of architectural design. Geometric shapes and streamlined edges mix with pastel colors to create a pastiche of past eras. These architectural forms imbue a place with history, meaning, and creativity. It was this creativity that was granted protection in the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act. See Pub L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990). The House Report went so far as to quote architect Michael Graves and advise that the act was to protect “the three-dimensional expression of the myths and rituals of society.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, at 19 (1990).
Perhaps to evoke his own myths and rituals, Rondon retained Kobi Karp in 2014 for architectural services in connection with a proposed hotel in Miami Beach.[2] (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶ 5; ECF No. 87-1 at ¶ 5.) Kobi Karp, a renowned architectural firm, was to create preliminary concept plans, which were to remain its property and could not be used without its written consent. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶¶ 6-7; ECF No. 87-1 at ¶¶ 6-7; ECF No. 51-2 at 8.) Kobi Karp created architectural plans and drawings, delivered them to Rondon, and ultimately submitted them to Miami Beach, which approved the plans. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶¶ 8, 11-12; ECF No. 87-1 at ¶¶ 8, 11-12; ECF No. 52-4.) After preparing these architectural plans and drawings, Kobi Karp registered copyrights protecting these works (the “Works”). (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶ 9; ECF No. 87-1 at ¶ 9.)
Rondon did not retain Kobi Karp as architect for long. In mid-2016, Rondon hired Castellanos Design Studio, LLC and Wesley Castellanos (collectively “Castellanos”)[3] as the Architect of Record for the project. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶ 13; ECF No. 87-1 at ¶ 13; ECF No. 51-5 at 2.) However, the scope of this new retention was limited-Castellanos was to merely “revis[e]” and “reconfigure the current plans and provide a more efficient interior design.” (ECF No. 52-1 at 260; ECF No. 52-2 at 14-49.) While it took Kobi Karp over one year to submit plans to the city, Castellanos submitted plans approximately three months after being retained. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶¶ 11, 13, 16; ECF No. 81-1 at ¶¶ 11, 13, 16.) The only noticeable difference between Kobi Karp's copyrighted plans and Castellanos's plans was a new signature block. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶ 17; ECF No. 81-1 at ¶ 17.)
Kobi Karp alleges that it was not aware of Castellanos's role in the project until November 2017, when it received a letter from Castellanos notifying Kobi Karp of a “change in architect.” (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶ 23; ECF No. 52-2 at ¶ 23; ECF No. 52-5 at 2.) The letter, which was dated June 2016 and copied Rondon, informed Kobi Karp that Castellanos had been commissioned as the “successor Registered Architect” for the “elaboration of the project.” (ECF No. 53-5 at 2.)
Following Rondon's retention of Castellanos, Kobi Karp argues that it has not been paid in full. In particular, Rondon has not paid Kobi Karp $38, 000 in invoices for work performed. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶ 44; ECF No. 81-1 at ¶ 44.) Moreover, Rondon has not paid Kobi Karp a $40, 000 termination fee that is provided in the Agreement. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶ 45; ECF No. 87-1 at ¶ 45.) These amounts remain outstanding. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶¶ 44-45; ECF No. 87-1 at ¶¶ 44-45.)
Summary judgment is proper if, following discovery, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. “An issue of fact is ‘material' if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2004). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 1260. All the evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004).
Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The nonmovant's evidence must be significantly probative to support the claims. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court will not weigh the evidence or make findings of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 2003). Rather, the Court's role is limited to deciding whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find for the nonmoving party. Id. “If more than one inference could be construed from the facts by a reasonable fact finder, and that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the district court should not grant summary judgment.” Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.2d 989, 996 (11th Cir. 1990).
Kobi Karp filed a first amended complaint on April 27, 2018, alleging seven causes of action: direct copyright infringement, contributory copyright infringement, vicarious copyright infringement, unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract. (ECF No. 15.) Kobi Karp only moves for summary judgment on five of those claims, namely, his claims for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (on direct, contributory, and vicarious infringement theories), civil conspiracy, and breach of contract. The Court will discuss each in turn.
A claim of direct copyright infringement requires that a plaintiff show (1) ownership in a valid copyright and (2) the copying of original elements of the copyrighted work. See Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ'g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002). If a plaintiff does not provide evidence of direct copying, copying may be shown by “demonstrating that the defendants had access to the copyrighted work and that the works are substantially similar.” Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11th Cir. 1999).
It is undisputed that Kobi Karp owns valid copyrights in the Works. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶ 25; ECF No. 52-2 at ¶ 25.) However, Kobi Karp's arguments that Rondon is liable for direct infringement largely mirror its arguments for contributory and vicarious infringement. Kobi Karp argues not that Rondon itself copied the Works, but that Castellanos copied the Works with Rondon's knowledge. (ECF No. 52 at 10; ECF No. 90 at 6-7.) As Kobi Karp has not presented undisputed evidence that Rondon itself copied the Works, the Court must deny summary judgment as to direct copyright infringement against Rondon. See Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1249 ().
It is well settled that an individual may be held liable for another's copyright infringement where the contributory infringer is “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.” Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) ( that a contributory infringer is one who “was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission”) (discussing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911)). The requisite knowledge is objective-the contributory infringer must “know, or have reason to know.” Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987).
As an initial matter, contributory infringement rests on a finding that someone else actually infringed the copyright. See DuBay v. King, 844 Fed.Appx. 257, 266 n.9 (11th Cir. 2021) () (quoting Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v World Inst. of Scientology Enter., 533 F.3d 1287, 1298 n.11 (11th Cir. 2008)). It is undisputed that Kobi Karp owns the copyrights at issue, and Rondon does not contest the validity of those copyrights. (ECF No. 52-1 at ¶ 25; ECF No. 52-2 at ¶ 25.) Moreover, Rondon largely does not contest that Castellanos infringed the Works. (ECF No. 87 at 5-7.) For the avoidance of doubt, the Court holds that Castellanos infringed the Works, as Castellanos had access to the Works and the plans and...
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