Kobza v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 11 May 2021
• Docket Number: AC 43396
• Citation: 253 A.3d 515,204 Conn.App. 547
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Andrew T. KOBZA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

204 Conn.App. 547

253 A.3d 515

Andrew T. KOBZA

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 43396

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 9, 2021

Officially released May 11, 2021

Deborah G. Stevenson, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

James W. Donohue, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (respondent).

Bright, C. J., and Moll and Young, Js.

BRIGHT, C. J.

The petitioner, Andrew T. Kobza, appeals following the habeas court's denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the court with respect to his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal and (2) erred by dismissing his habeas petition, sua sponte, pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29.¹ For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal. We further conclude that the habeas court erred in its sua sponte dismissal of the habeas petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand the case for further proceedings according to law.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On October 4, 1990, the petitioner was arrested and charged with numerous crimes, including felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c. In January, 1992, following a guilty plea, the petitioner was sentenced by the court to a total effective term of forty-five years of imprisonment.²

On August 2, 2018, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentence is illegal because the Department of Correction (department) improperly failed to calculate "seven day job credits"³ that were applicable to his sentence. The petitioner claims that he had earned seven day job credits amounting to a reduction of sixty-three days from his sentence prior to his transfer from MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution to a correctional facility in Jarratt, Virginia, on August 30, 2001.

On July 12, 2019, without prior notice or a hearing, the habeas court, Newson, J ., sua sponte, dismissed the petitioner's habeas petition, pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29, on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction. Specifically, the court stated that "[t]he petitioner asserts that [he] was denied and/or that the respondent [the Commissioner of Correction] inaccurately calculated his entitlement to receive ‘[seven] day job credits’ while the petitioner was incarcerated in another state pursuant to an interstate transfer." The court held that there is no cognizable liberty interest in prison jobs or to credits that have not yet been applied to a sentence . Following the habeas court's dismissal of his habeas petition, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the dismissal, which the habeas court denied. On September 16, 2019, the petitioner filed the present appeal.⁴ Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The petitioner claims that the court erred in denying his petition for certification to appeal from the court's dismissal of his habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. We agree.

"Faced with a habeas court's denial of a petition for certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden , 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in Simms v. Warden , 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). First, he must demonstrate that the denial of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion. ... To prove an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim involves issues that] are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. ... Second, if the petitioner can show an abuse of discretion, he must then prove that the decision of the habeas court should be reversed on the merits. ... In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court's ruling ... [and] [r]eversal is required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done. ...

"In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner's underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner's appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review the petitioner's substantive claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more of the three criteria ... adopted by this court for determining the propriety of the habeas court's denial of the petition for certification. Absent such a showing by the petitioner, the judgment of the habeas court must be affirmed." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wright v. Commissioner of Correction , 201 Conn. App. 339, 344–45, 242 A.3d 756 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 905, 242 A.3d 1009 (2021). On the basis of our review of the habeas petition, we agree that the habeas court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner's job credits claim as pleaded and, therefore, we conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal.

II

The petitioner argues that the habeas court misconstrued his seven day job credits claim and based its jurisdictional ruling on its misreading of the habeas petition as having asserted that the seven day job credits had not yet been applied to his sentence. The petitioner argues that his petition, as pleaded, alleges that he had earned the seven day job credits and, after they were applied to his sentence, the respondent wrongfully removed them. The respondent contends, in response, that "[t]he facts of this case clearly indicate that the petitioner did not earn [sixty-three] [seven day] job credits while serving a portion of his sentence in Virginia," and he argues further that the habeas court properly dismissed the habeas petition because the petitioner has no cognizable liberty interest in unearned credits. In making this argument, the respondent relies not on the allegations of the habeas petition but on a document purportedly from the department. The document purports to show that sixty-three days of credit, to which the petitioner claims an entitlement, were credited to the petitioner's account in error and then removed. We disagree with the respondent that the court could rely on such a document in sua sponte dismissing the habeas petition, and we conclude that the habeas court misconstrued the petitioner's claim as it was pleaded in the habeas petition. Consequently, we further conclude that the court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner's claim.

We begin with our standard of review. "Whether a habeas court properly dismissed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus presents a question of law over which our review is plenary." Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction , 334 Conn. 548, 553, 223 A.3d 368 (2020).

Resolving the petitioner's claim requires us to review the allegations contained in his petition, which he filed as a self-represented party. Accordingly, we are mindful of the petitioner's self-represented status at the time he drafted the habeas petition. "This court has always been solicitous of the rights of [self-represented] litigants and, like the trial court, will endeavor to see that such a litigant shall have the opportunity to have his case fully and fairly heard so far as such latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party. ... Although we will not entirely disregard our rules of practice, we do give great latitude to [self-represented] litigants in order that justice may both be done and be seen to be done. ... For justice to be done, however, any latitude given to [self-represented] litigants cannot interfere with the rights of other parties, nor can we disregard completely our rules of practice." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction , 107 Conn. App. 507, 512–13, 946 A.2d 252, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 902, 957 A.2d 870 (2008).

"It is well settled that [t]he petition for a writ of habeas corpus is essentially a pleading and, as such, it should conform generally to a complaint in a civil action. ... It is fundamental in our law that the right of [the petitioner] to recover is limited to the allegations of his complaint. ... While the habeas court has considerable discretion to frame a remedy that is commensurate with the scope of the established constitutional violations ... it does not have the discretion to look beyond the pleadings and trial evidence to decide claims not raised. ... [T]he [petition] must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties. ... Our reading of pleadings in a manner that advances substantial justice means that a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with it the related proposition that it must not be contorted in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Commissioner of Correction , 198 Conn. App. 345, 376–77, 233 A.3d 1106, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 948, 238 A.3d 18 (2020).

In his habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that his sentence is illegal because certain seven day job credits were...