Kocher v. Bickley

• Citation: 722 A.2d 756
• Parties: Stephanie R. KOCHER and Patrick G. Kocher, Petitioners, v. Rebecca L. BICKLEY, Director, Bureau of Driver Licensing of the Department of Transportation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 05 January 1999
• Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

722 A.2d 756

Stephanie R. KOCHER and Patrick G. Kocher, Petitioners, v. Rebecca L. BICKLEY, Director, Bureau of Driver Licensing of the Department of Transportation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs October 30, 1998.

Decided January 5, 1999.

Stephanie and Patrick Kocher, petitioners, pro se.

Matthew X. Haeckler and Timothy P. Wile, Asst. Counsel In-Charge, Harrisburg, for respondent.

Before McGINLEY, J., PELLEGRINI, J., and LORD, Senior Judge.

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

Before this Court are preliminary objections filed by the Bureau of Driver Licensing of the Department of Transportation (Department) to a petition for review in the nature of mandamus filed by Stephanie R. Kocher and Patrick G. Kocher (collectively, Applicants) seeking to have the Department issue "learner's" permits to them without having to supply a social security number.¹

Applicants applied to the Department for learner's permits, seeking to eventually be issued a Pennsylvania driver's license.² To obtain a learner's permit, Section 1510 of the Vehicle Code requires, inter alia, that each applicant for a driver's license provide his or her social security number, or, in the alternative, obtain a waiver from the federal government permitting him or her not to have a social security number. 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1510(a) and (f).³ It also provides that the Department may require other identifiers including but not limited to a taxpayer identification number before issuing the license. 75 Pa.C.S. §1510(f). Because Applicants did not provide a social security number, a waiver from the federal government, or a taxpayer identification number, the Department refused to issue them learner's permits.

In response to the Department's denial, Applicants have filed a petition for review in the nature of mandamus⁴ in this Court's original jurisdiction seeking an order to compel the Department to issue them learner's permits without requiring them to provide waivers or submit social security numbers. They contend that social security for them violates a biblical principle that parents of the family were to provide for the children, not the children for the parents.⁵ Because of their religious objections to participation in the social security system, Applicants allege that they cannot be compelled to either obtain from the federal government a waiver not to participate in the system or to obtain a social security number.⁶ They also allege that that they cannot obtain taxpayer identification numbers because such numbers are only issued to resident aliens. As to their clear right to relief requiring the Department to issue them learner's permits, Applicants allege that "mobility is an essential part of independence, liberty and pursuit of happiness and necessary for the acquisition of property" as guaranteed by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the denial by the Department of the issuance of learner's permits was a violation of this right. Because the requirement to obtain a social security number violates their religious rights and their "right" to mobility, Applicants contend that the Department has a non-discretionary duty to issue learner's permits without them obtaining social security numbers or waiver from participation required by Section 1510 of the Vehicle Code.

The Department has filed preliminary objections to Applicants' petition for review contending that the petition should be dismissed because Applicants have no clear legal right to the relief requested because they can obtain a taxpayer identification number, and even if they cannot, requiring Applicants to submit waivers from the federal government in lieu of obtaining social security numbers is not tantamount to compelling participation in the social security system. Additionally, it argues that there are state interests that justify any impingement of religious rights created by the requirement to obtain a waiver or social security number. Because there was no unconstitutional impingement on any of Applicants' religious rights, the Department contends it was correct in denying issuance of learner's permits because Applicants have failed to provide social security numbers, waivers or taxpayer identification numbers as required under Section 1510 of the Vehicle Code.⁷

Initially, the Department contends that because the Vehicle Code allows the Applicants to provide federal taxpayer identification numbers as an alternative to providing a social security number, their action should be dismissed because even Applicants do not maintain that such identifiers would violate any of their free exercise rights. What this argument ignores, as Applicants have pointed out, is that the federal regulations provide that taxpayer identification numbers are only issued to non-citizens of the United States⁸ who are ineligible to participate in the social security system.⁹ Because Applicants are not non-resident aliens and are eligible for social security and, as such, cannot obtain taxpayer identification numbers, providing those numbers cannot serve as an alternative to providing a social security number.

Even if they cannot obtain a taxpayer identification number, the Department contends Applicants do not have a clear right to relief because compelling them to seek a waiver or, for that matter to obtain a social security number, does not violate their free exercise of religion rights. To determine whether religious rights are unconstitutionally impinged, there are no bright line tests, but instead an analysis is made of the statute at issue and a balancing of the interests involved. In that regard, the United States Supreme Court has stated that although religious freedom has an important place in our scheme of ordered liberty,¹⁰ it also steadfastly maintains that claims of religious convictions do not automatically entitle a person to fix unilaterally the conditions and terms of dealings with the government. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986). The right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a neutral, generally applicable law on the grounds that the law affects religious practices, even if it is not supported by a compelling state interest. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997)

. Absent a showing that the legislation facially discriminates against a particular religious belief or against religion in general, the government meets its burden when it demonstrates that the challenged requirement for governmental benefits is neutral and uniform, unless it is not rationally related to any legitimate public interest, the burden of which is to challenge and establish that the requirement of the regulation is valid. See Smith; see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (a regulatory statute without unconstitutional classifications is accorded a strong presumption of validity and is valid if there is a rational basis for the law, i.e., it is reasonably related to accomplishing a legitimate state interest).

With regard to whether the requirement that individuals participate in the social security system violates the free exercise clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127, (1982) held that requiring participation was not unconstitutional. In Lee, the Court upheld the imposition of social security taxes on an Amish employer who failed to pay taxes on his own behalf or to withhold taxes from the wages of his Amish employees because of his religious beliefs that the Amish community and not the government should provide for the kind of assistance contemplated by the social security system. Recognizing that the religious beliefs of the Amish employer were in conflict with the social security system, the Supreme Court held that "[r]eligious beliefs can be accommodated, but there is a point at which accommodation would `radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.'" Id. at 259, 102 S.Ct. 1051 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961)

). The Court concluded that although participation in the social security system interfered with Lee's free exercise rights, the government had a compelling interest in enforcing mandatory participation in the social security system in order to insure the "fiscal viability" of a system designed to serve the social welfare and in preventing individuals from seeking waivers without a valid basis or an established system on which to depend. Requiring mandatory participation was found to be the least restrictive means of achieving those interests because, "widespread individual voluntary coverage under social security ... would undermine the soundness of the social security program" and would be impossible to administer. Id. at 258, 102 S.Ct. 1051.

While the Constitution did not mandate such exceptions for all individuals professing contrary religious beliefs, the Supreme Court held that nothing foreclosed Congress from granting an exemption from participation in the social security system to accommodate religious beliefs. Taking the Supreme Court's suggestion, Congress has allowed qualifying individuals to receive a waiver from participation in the social security system for religious reasons.¹¹

Ignoring for the moment whether Lee's holding that requiring participation in the social security system does not violate the free exercise clause extends to the requirement that one has to submit a social security number to receive a learner's permit, Lee's suggestion that Congress can grant waivers means a fortiori that applying for an exemption or waiver is...