Kodroff v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 30 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-5684 |
| Parties | JENNIFER KODROFF, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, [1] ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jennifer Kodroff (“Kodroff” or “Plaintiff”) seeks review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the Commissioner of Social Security's (“Commissioner”) decision denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that Kodroff's Request for Review be granted in part and the matter be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
Kodroff was born on January 27, 1990. R. at 1029.[2] She has a limited education and is able to communicate in English. Id. She has past relevant work as a fast-food worker. Id. On July 18, 2012, Kodroff filed applications for DIB and SSI pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Id. at 11. She alleged that she became disabled on March 1, 2011 due to obsessive compulsive disorder, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and depression. Id. at 11, 80. These applications were initially denied on October 1, 2012. Id. at 11. Kodroff then filed a written request for a hearing on October 4, 2012. Id. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on October 22, 2013, at which time only her father appeared. Id. Kodroff then testified via telephone at a hearing on July 16, 2014. Id. On October 22, 2014, the ALJ issued an opinion finding that Kodroff was not disabled. Id. at 33. The Appeals Council denied Kodroff's request for review, thereby affirming the decision of the ALJ as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-4. Kodroff sought review in this Court on May 2, 2016. Docket at 1, Kodroff v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-2090 (E.D. Pa.).
On April 5, 2018, the Honorable Curtis Joyner adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Henry S. Perkin and granted Kodroff relief. Id. at 21, 22. Specifically, the Court determined that the ALJ's decision failed “to demonstrate full consideration of all of [Kodroff's] impairments, including polysubstance abuse, particularly because the ALJ repeatedly suggest[ed] that [Kodroff's] other mental illnesses [were] less severe when she [was] not using drugs.” Report and Recommendation, Kodroff v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-2090, at 6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2018) [hereinafter “2018 Report and Recommendation”]. The Court remanded to the Commissioner “to consider the claimant's impairments related to drug and alcohol abuse and to clearly articulate the weight applied to the evidence and any reasons for rejecting the claimant's claim of disability.” R. at 1015. The order directed the ALJ to discuss the claimant's Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) scores and afford Kodroff the ability to supplement the medical evidence. Def.'s Br. (Doc. No. 26) at 2.
On August 26, 2019, a video hearing was held before an ALJ, during which a medical expert and a vocational expert appeared. R. at 1015. On September 16, 2019, the ALJ issued an decision finding that Kodroff was not disabled. Id. at 1031. Kodroff did not file exceptions to the decision and commenced this action in federal court on February 7, 2020. Pl.'s Br. (Doc. No. 16) at 2. As a remedy, her counsel demanded a court-ordered award of benefits, stating that “[f]urther administrative adjudication of . . . whether she is disabled would only serve to delay the award of benefits to which she is clearly entitled.” Id. at 22-23.
On November 9, 2020, the Commissioner filed a Motion to Remand based on an articulation error identified in Kodroff's brief regarding the ALJ's analysis of her history of drug addiction and alcoholism. Def.'s Br. at 3. Kodroff's counsel filed a Response in opposition to the Motion on November 18, 2020. Id. On November 20, 2020, the Court denied the Commissioner's Motion for lack of a showing of good cause.[3] Order, Kodroff v. Saul, No. 19-CV-5684, at 1-2 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2020). The Commissioner subsequently sought remand in her Response to Kodroff's Request for Review.
In his decision, the ALJ found that Kodroff suffered from the following severe impairments: mood disorders, PTSD, and personality disorders. R. at 1018. The ALJ did not find that any impairment, nor combination of impairments, met or medically equaled a listed impairment. Id. The ALJ determined that Kodroff had the RFC to “perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: she is limited to no detailed instructions and to occasional contact with the public.” Id. at 1019-20.
Based on this RFC assessment and the vocational expert who appeared at the hearing, the ALJ found that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Kodroff could perform, such as paper inserter, table worker, or garment bagger. Id. at 1030. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Kodroff was not disabled. Id.
In her Request for Review, Kodroff contends that the ALJ failed to: (1) follow the relevant governing legal principles with regard to substance abuse and compliance with treatment; (2) reasonably explain his finding that Kodroff did not meet or equal the listing of impairments; (3) reasonably explain his assessment of Kodroff's RFC; and (4) reasonably explain his rejection of lay testimony. Kodroff demands an award of benefits.
The role of the court in reviewing an administrative decision denying benefits in a Social Security matter is to uphold any factual determination made by the ALJ that is supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1986); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985). A reviewing court may not undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision to reweigh the evidence. Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986). The court's scope of review is “limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the record, as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's findings of fact.” Schwartz v. Halter, 134 F.Supp.2d 640, 647 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
Substantial evidence is a deferential standard of review. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence “‘does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988)); Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987). It is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court's review is plenary as to the ALJ's application of legal standards. Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995).
To prove disability, a claimant must demonstrate some medically determinable basis for a physical or mental impairment that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a 12-month period. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1); accord id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). As explained in the applicable agency regulation, each case is evaluated by the Commissioner according to a five-step process:
(i) At the first step, we consider your work activity, if any. If you are doing substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled. (ii) At the second step, we consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). If you do not have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration requirement in § 416.909, or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are not disabled. (iii) At the third step, we also consider the medical severity of your impairment(s). If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404 of this chapter and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you are disabled. (iv) At the fourth step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you can still do your past relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled. (v) At the fifth and last step, we consider our assessment of your residual functional capacity and your age, education, and work experience to see if you can make an adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot make an adjustment to other work, we will find that you are disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (); accord id. § 416.920.
Kodroff argues that the ALJ erred in his articulation of the drug addiction or alcoholism (“DAA”) analysis required by 20 C.F.R. § 416.935 and the compliance considerations required by 20 C.F.R. § 416.930. Pl.'s Br. at 3-12. The Commissioner agrees with Kodroff's contention that the ALJ failed to properly execute the DAA analysis. Def.'s Br. at 4-5.
An applicant for SSI or DIB may not receive benefits if DAA “would be . . . a contributing factor to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). The ALJ must complete the...
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