Koehn v. State Bd. of Equalization

• Decision Date: 04 June 1958
• Citation: 326 P.2d 502,50 Cal.2d 432
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: M. M. KOEHN, Petitioner and Respondent, v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION et al., Defendants and Respondents; E. L. Ledger, Real Party in Interest; Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, Appellant. S. F. 19780.

Page 502

326 P.2d 502

50 Cal.2d 432

M. M. KOEHN, Petitioner and Respondent, v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION et al., Defendants and Respondents;

E. L. Ledger, Real Party in Interest;

Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, Appellant.

S. F. 19780.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

June 4, 1958.

Rehearing Denied July 2, 1958.

Edsel M. Haws, Senior Counsel, Sacramento, for appellant.

Willard S. Johnston, George H. Johnston, Benjamin H. Parkinson, Jr., Johnston & Johnston, San Francisco, Dodge & Evans and Robert P. Brorby, Oakland, amici curiae on behalf of appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., E. G. Funke, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles A. Barrett and Wiley W. Manuel, Deputy Attys. Gen., and Albert G. Evans, San Francisco, for respondents.

Dodge & Evans and Robert P. Brorby, Oakland, for real party in interest.

SHENK, Justice.

The respondents have moved to dismiss the appeal taken by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board on the ground that the appeals board is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of section 938 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is not entitled to appeal. ¹

On August 20, 1953, the State Board of Equalization dismissed an accusation filed by M. M. Koehn against E. L. Ledger, the holder of certain liquor licenses, and directed that the order become effective on September 21. Koehn filed a petition for reconsideration, and thereafter the state board postponed the effective date of its decision to October 13. A reconsideration was granted on October 8, and after further proceedings the state board in December 1954 ordered that Ledger's licenses be suspended indefinitely. Ledger appealed to the appeals board, which set aside the order of suspension on the theory that the state board did not have jurisdiction to grant a reconsideration in October 1953 because of failure to act within the times specified in sections 11519 and 11521 of the Government Code. Thereafter Koehn, acting pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed a petition in the superior court seeking a writ of mandate against the state board, the appeals board and others, to compel the appeals board to vacate its decision setting aside the order of suspension. In the meantime, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control had become the successor of the state board with reference to matters relating to alcoholic beverage control. Const. art. XX, § 22; Bus. & Prof.Code, § 23051.

An alternative writ was issued and directed to the state board, the department, its director, and the appeals board, commanding them to revoke Ledger's license and vacate the order setting aside the order of indefinite suspension, or show cause why they had not done so. The appeals board in its answer alleged facts in justification of its action in setting aside the decision of the state board and raised questions which involved the jurisdiction of the appeals board in matters wherein the action of the department was claimed to have become final. The state board and the department and its director joined forces with the petitioner and prayed that the appeals board be compelled to set aside its decision and order. They charged that the action of the appeals board was 'arbitrary and capricious and constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion in that the State Board of Equalization did have jurisdiction to grant reconsideration on October 8, 1953. * * *' The superior court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and held, among other things, that the action of the appeals board, in deciding that the state board was without jurisdiction to grant reconsideration, was unlawful, imporper and in error as a matter of law, and that the appeals board's order setting aside the suspension of Ledger's licenses was not justified or sustained by the evidence or record before it and was contrary to law. The ensuing judgment ordered the issuance of a writ of mandate commanding the appeals board to set aside its decision and to proceed to determine any issues and questions left undecided on the appeal from the state board's order of suspension.

The appeals board then took this appeal from the judgment of the superior court, and the state board and the department have made this motion to dismiss.

The policy of the law is to recognize a right to review the judgment of a lower court if not prohibited by law. The 'right of appeal is remedial, and in doubtful cases the doubt should be resolved in favor of the right whenever the substantial interests of a party are affected by a judgment.' People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo, 152 Cal. 261, 264, 92 P. 481, 482; see also Santa Barbara County Water Agency v. All Persons, 47 Cal.2d 699, 712, 306 P.2d 875; Manning v. Gavin, 14 Cal.2d 44, 46, 92 P.2d 795.

Under section 938 of the Code of Civil Procedure any party aggrieved may appeal in a proper case. Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is involved, and the granting of a writ directed to the tribunal would have the effect of controlling or limiting that jurisdiction, the tribunal is an aggrieved party and entitled to appeal. Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal.2d 668, 321 P.2d i9; Simpson v. Police Court of City of Riverside, 160 Cal. 530, 532, 117 P. 553, 554. In the Simpson case, after pointing out that the appellant police court had no direct interest in a case before it, the decision says: 'It has, however, a right to appeal from any judgment against it prohibiting it from proceeding in that action, and has a right to be relieved from any writ improperly issued so prohibiting it.' The rule of the Simpson case has been followed and accepted without discussion or criticism in later cases which determined on the merits an appeal taken by a tribunal from a judgment granting a writ which would have the effect of limiting or impairing the jurisdiction of the tribunal or of controlling its functioning. See Hidalgo v. Municipal Court, 129 Cal.App.2d 244, 277 P.2d 36 (mandamus to compel preparation of transcripts at county expense in a misdemeanor case, on appeal by court, judge and reporter, judgment granting writ reversed); Zamloch, For and on Behalf of Cowan v. Municipal Court, 106 Cal.App.2d 260, 235 P.2d 25 (mandamus to compel dismissal of misdemeanor charges for violation of right to speedy trial; on appeal by court and judge, judgment directing dismissal affirmed); Wyman v. Municipal Court, 102 Cal.App.2d 738, 228 P.2d 89, 229 P.2d 491 (prohibition to restrain court from revoking an order...