Koehne, In re, Cr. 6737

• Decision Date: 27 October 1960
• Docket Number: Cr. 6737
• Citation: 8 Cal.Rptr. 435,356 P.2d 179,54 Cal.2d 757
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 356 P.2d 179 In re Rudolph J. KOEHNE, on Habeas Corpus.

Page 435

8 Cal.Rptr. 435

54 Cal.2d 757, 356 P.2d 179

In re Rudolph J. KOEHNE, on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 6737.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Oct. 27, 1960.

Richard E. Erwin, Los Angeles (under appointment by the Supreme Court), for petitioner.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Philip E. Grey, Asst. City Atty., and William E. Doran, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, for respondent.

WHITE, Justice.

The petitioner, Rudolph J. Koehne, was convicted by a jury in the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District of three violations of section 41.27(a) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (drunk in and about a public place), occurring on the 16th, 17th and 19th of July, 1960. He was sentenced to 50 days imprisonment in the city jail for each violation, the sentences to run consecutively.

The petitioner alleges that law enforcement officers denied him the right to call and obtain the services of a private physician for the purpose of withdrawing samples of blood and determining the alcoholic content thereof. Based on such allegations, and the contention that the denials of the alleged requests constitute a denial of due process of law (see In re Newbern, 175 Cal.App.2d 862, 1 Cal.Rptr. 80), an order to show cause was issued and the petitioner was ordered released on bail in the sum of $500 pending the final determination of this proceeding. Counsel was appointed to represent the petitioner.

In the Newbern case it was held to be a denial of due process of law to refuse to permit a person charged with being drunk in a public place to call a doctor, at his own expense, to take a sample of his blood for the purpose of determining the percentage of alcohol present therein, as evidence necessary to his defnese. It was held to follow in the Newbern case that, as every person accused of crime, including drunks, has a constitutional right to a fair trial and the right to summon witnesses in his own defense (Const., art. I, § 13), that such right cannot, consistent with due process of law, be denied by the simple expedient of not affording to an accused a reasonable opportunity to attempt to procure a timely sample of his blood. It is significant, however that the law does not impose upon law enforcement agencies the requirement that they take the initiative, or even any affirmative action, in procuring the evidence deemed necessary to the defense of an accused. Rather it is the accused who must act to protect his interests, and it is only when he is denied an opportunity, reasonable under the circumstances, to procure a timely sample of his blood that he can properly claim a denial of due process. In re Newbern, supra, 175 Cal.App.2d 862, 866, 1 Cal.Rptr. 80.

In the present case the return to the order to show cause fails to bear out the allegations of the petitioner. His testimony, and the testimony which he elicited from the arresting officers on cross examination, fail to demonstrate that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to procure a private physician at his own expense. As to the first violation, that occurring on the 16th of July, the petitioner testified in the trial court that when informed by the officer that he was being arrested as a drunk, 'I asked him for the blood test, to be allowed to prove what he's alleging.' The only testimony relating to the officer's response is that of the officer who, when questioned by the petitioner as to whether he would be allowed to...