Koehne, In re

Decision Date21 May 1963
Docket NumberCr. 7286
Parties, 381 P.2d 633 In re Rudolph KOEHNE on Habeas Corpus.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court

Rudolph Koehne, in pro. per., and Earl Klein, Beverly Hills, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Roger Arnebergh, City, Atty., Philip E. Grey, Asst, City Atty., Wm. E. Doran, and Charles W. Sullivan, Deputy City Attys., Los Angeles, for respondent.

McCOMB, Justice.

Petitioner (hereinafter referred to as 'defendant') seeks a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he is being illegally restrained of his liberty by the Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles.

Facts: Defendant was convicted of violating section 41.27(a) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, which provides in part: 'No person shall be or appear in a state of drunkenness or intoxication upon any public street, sidewalk, highway or alley or in any public park, or in any railroad depot or bus station, or in any public place, or in any place open to the patronage of the public, or in any place open to public view, or in or upon any building or premises or portion thereof which is owned or occupied by any municipality or by any department office thereof, or by any other government or governmental agency or instrumentality, and devoted to any public or governmental use or to the performance of any official business or function, including any premises occupied by the Federal Government but not under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof.' (Italics added.)

This is the sole question necessary for us to determine: Has the state adopted a general scheme for the regulation of the criminal aspects of being intoxicated in a public place?

Yes. A municipal ordinance is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements in a field that has been preempted by the general law. (In re Moss, 58 Cal.2d 117, 118(2), 23 Cal.Rptr. 361, 373 P.2d 425.)

Whenever the Legislature has seen fit to adopt a general scheme for the regulation of a particular subject, the entire control over whatever phases of the subject are covered by state legislation ceases as far as local legislation is concerned. (In re Moss, supra, at p. 118(3), 23 Cal.Rptr. at p. 361, 373 P.2d at p. 426.)

In determining whether the Legislature intended to occupy a particular field to the exclusion of all local regulation, we may look to the 'whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme' and are not required to find such an intent solely in the language used in the statute. (In re Moss, supra, at p. 118(4), 23 Cal.Rptr. at p. 362, 361 P.2d at p. 426.)

Section 647, subdivision (f), of the Penal Code provides that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he is 'found in any public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or any drug, or the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and any drug, in such a condition that he is unable to exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others, or by reason of his being under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or any drug, or the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and any drug, interferes with or obstructs or prevents the free use of any street, sidewalk or other public way.'

Following the decision in In re Newbern, 53 Cal.2d 786, 3 Cal.Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116, which declared the state 'common-drunk' law unconstitutionally vague, the Legislature undertook to revise former Penal Code section 647, which concerned vagrancy, drunkenness, and similar misdemeanors.

The matter was considered in detail by the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure. The committee recommended that the conduct proscribed by section 647 be labeled 'disorderly conduct' instead of 'vagrancy,' and that the individual misdemeanors be redefined in terms of acts instead of status (e. g., 'engages in any act of prositution' instead of 'common prostitute').

With regard to subdivision (f), the committee quoted Professor Sherry, the draftsman...

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  • Galvan v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • April 23, 1969
    ...the general law. (Cal.Const., art. XI, § 11; In re Hubbard, 62 Cal.2d 119, 125, 41 Cal.Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809; In re Koehne, 59 Cal.2d 646, 649, 30 Cal.Rptr. 809, 381 P.2d 633; In re Loretizo, 59 Cal.2d 445, 446, 30 Cal.Rptr. 16, 380 P.2d 656; In re Lane, 58 Cal.2d 99, 102, 22 Cal.Rptr. 85......
  • Hom v. Clark
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • October 30, 1963
    ...117, 118, 23 Cal.Rptr. 361, 373, p.2d 425; In re Loretizo, 59 A.C. 462, 463, 30 Cal.Rptr. 16, 380 P.2d 656; In re Koehne, 59 A.C. 668, 670, 30 Cal.Rptr. 809, 381 P.2d 633; In re Zorn, 59 A.C. 672, 673, 30 Cal.Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d In the light of the authorities cited it is clear that the gen......
  • Cox, In re
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • October 1, 1970
    ...to regulate disorderly conduct and vagrancy, areas which have expressly been preempted by state law. (See In re Koehne (1963) 59 Cal.2d 646, 30 Cal.Rptr. 809, 381 P.2d 633.) We adopt the position of neither petitioner nor prosecution. In 1959 the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Proce......
  • California Water & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles County
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • July 31, 1967
    ...119, 125, 41 Cal.Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809; In re Loretizo (1963) 59 Cal.2d 445, 30 Cal.Rptr. 16, 380 P.2d 656; In re Koehne (1963) 59 Cal.2d 646, 30 Cal.Rptr. 809, 381 P.2d 633; In re Zorn (1963) 59 Cal.2d 650, 30 Cal.Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d 635; People v. Lopez (1963) 59 Cal.2d 653, 30 Cal.Rptr......
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