Koenigs v. MITCHELL COUNTY BD. OF SUP'RS

Decision Date02 April 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-0390.,02-0390.
Citation659 N.W.2d 589
PartiesDeo KOENIGS and Joan Koenigs, Appellees, v. MITCHELL COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Appellant, Marvin FISHER and Doris Fisher, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Carlton G. Salmons of Gaudineer, Comito & George, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for appellant.

Quintin A. Goeke of Hagemann & Goeke, Clarksville, Habbo Fokkena of Fokkena Law Office, Clarksville, and Linda Kobliska, Alta Vista, for appellees-Koenigs.

Robert Mulhenbruch, Ackley, for appellees-Fishers.

STREIT, Justice.

The central issue before us is whether Mitchell County has a duty to clean an obstructed ditch running perpendicular to a county highway. Deo and Joan Koenigs own real property east of Mitchell County's north-south road known as Walnut Avenue. On the west side of Walnut Avenue is Marvin and Doris Fishers' property upon which the ditch is located. Koenigs' property has flooded as the result of natural obstructions in Fishers' ditch. The district court found the County has a duty to clean the ditch. The County appeals contending it has no obligation to maintain the ditch because the ditch does not belong to the County and is on private property. In the alternative, the County asserts any duty it may have had was obviated by its subsequent abandonment of an easement. Because we find the County does not have a duty to maintain the ditch, we reverse.

I. Background and Facts

In the late 1940's the Iowa State Highway Commission began to acquire land from various landowners in Mitchell County. The highway commission planned to build a north-south road to McIntire, Iowa. To further its plans, the highway commission needed to build a concrete culvert to drain water from the east side of the road to the west side of the road. The west side land was then owned by the Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church. The church had a meandering stream running across its estate through marshy land.

In 1950, the highway commission and the church entered into a contract with the commission agreeing to dredge a ditch, filling in the marshy area and natural meandering stream with fill from the dredging. Although not mentioned in the contract, it appears the church agreed to convey sixty feet of right-of-way for the road. According to the contract, the church agreed to supply fill for the road bed. The ditch replaced the meandering stream across the church's property. The contract stated, "the [highway commission] shall have the right to construct and may maintain an open ditch...." Whatever the precise nature of the County's interest in the land, it was restricted in scope and extent. The contract stated the County's possession was limited for the purposes set forth in the contract. The main purpose of the contract was to allow the highway commission to build a ditch. The subservient purpose was to allow the commission to maintain the ditch, as necessary, during the construction of the road. By 1953, the highway commission completed the ditch. The dominant estate (Koenigs' land) drains surface water through a culvert under Walnut Avenue. The drainage then flows to the west of Walnut Avenue, into the ditch. From the church's estate, the drainage flows into the Wapsipinicon River. A supervisor for the county testified the ditch on Fishers' property was not necessary to and does not impact the integrity of the county road.

Two years later in 1955, the church sold its land to Marvin and Doris Fisher. The deed conveyed to the Fishers expressly provided it was "subject to drainage ditch easement." In 1975, Deo and Joan Koenigs acquired the property east of the road. Finally, in 1980, the Iowa Department of Transportation, successor to the Iowa State Highway Commission, conveyed the north-south road to Mitchell County. The current state of ownership of all of the parcels involved in this dispute is as follows: (1) Koenigs own the west property — the dominant estate; (2) Mitchell County owns the north-south road, now called Walnut Avenue; and (3) Fishers own the east property — the servient estate including the ditch constructed by the highway commission in 1953.

As early as 1970, drainage problems developed on Fishers' ground. It was not until 2000 that Koenigs realized there was a problem with the ditch. Since 1953, mature cottonwood and willow trees, brush, vegetation, tree limbs, shrubs, and siltation have impeded the flow of the ditch. There are no obstructions within the area of the County right-of-way or in the box culvert under Walnut Avenue hindering drainage of Koenigs' land. The obstructions to drainage of Koenigs' land begin only where Fishers' property line meets with the County's right-of-way line and continues throughout the ditch on Fishers' land.

Neither Fishers nor Koenigs have ever attempted to clean the ditch. Koenigs argue the County has a duty to maintain the ditch. The County claims it has no duty to clean it because the ditch does not pose a problem to the maintenance of Walnut Avenue. The County also asserts Iowa Code section 721.2(5) makes it illegal for it to clean the ditch and that it vacated the easement.

On December 22, 2000, Koenigs filed an application for writ of mandamus and for crop damages against the Mitchell County Board of Supervisors. Koenigs argued the County had a duty to clean the ditch on Fishers' land for Koenigs' benefit. The court transferred the case to an equity docket, dismissed the damages claims, and ordered Fishers be brought into the case as indispensable parties. The parties submitted motions for summary judgment and the district court granted Koenigs' motion, holding the County was obligated to clean the ditch on Fishers' land. The County appeals.

II. Scope of Review

The district court's decision to issue a writ of mandamus involves the exercise of discretion. Bellon v. Monroe County, 577 N.W.2d 877, 878-79 (Iowa Ct. App.1998). Because a writ of mandamus is triable in equity, in general our review is de novo. Id. In this case, however, the appeal is a result of the district court's grant of summary judgment. Although the nature of the action is equitable, we "cannot find facts de novo in an appeal from summary judgment." Keokuk Junction Ry. v. IES Indus., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Moser v. Thorp Sales Corp., 312 N.W.2d 881, 886 (Iowa 1981)). The proper scope of review of a case in equity resulting in summary judgment is for correction of errors of law. Id. We will uphold the grant of summary judgment if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).

III. The Merits

On appeal, we are called upon to determine whether the County has a duty to maintain the obstructed ditch. Because our conclusion as to this issue is determinative of the entire case, we will not address the other issues asserted by the County.

A. Nature of the County's Interest in the Ditch

The parties' disagreement centers on whether the County has an obligation to clean the ditch. Before we can determine whether the County has such a duty, we must first determine the precise nature of the County's interest in the ditch. In doing so, we look to the original document creating the County's interest. The Iowa State Highway Commission first gained an interest in the disputed property by contract with the Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church of America. In 1980, the department of transportation, as successor to the highway commission, conveyed the north-south road to the County. The County acquired any interest in the ditch originally granted to the highway commission in 1950. That is, when the state conveyed the state highway to the County, it also granted to the County "all rights, easements, title and interest in all land used as street and highway right of way, all roadway, and all right of way and roadway appurtenances thereto."

The 1950 contract between the highway commission and the Church provided:

In consideration of $1.00 ... the [Church]] hereby consents to the construction of a channel change.... It is agreed that [the Commission] shall have the right to construct and may maintain an open ditch extending due west ... thru the lowest part of the marshy land, to the east ... line ... to outlet in a natural drainage course. [The Commission] agrees to grade down the banks of the ditch to afford crossing same in [the] location agreed upon between the [Church] and the Engineer in charge of construction. It is further agreed that soil unfit for use in the highway grade will be wasted by spreading same over a low area ... south of said ditch, as designated by the [Church].
It is hereby agreed that possession of the premises is the essence of this contract and that [the Commission] may take immediate possession of the premises upon the signing of this contract, for the purposes set forth....
Should the highway as finally located require none of the real estate described, this contract becomes null and void....

Though the parties have both labeled the County's interest in the property an "easement," the parties are contemplating different types of easements. The conclusion that the County's interest in the ditch is that of an easement is rendered uncertain based purely on the words of the contract.1

The record reveals extensive confusion among the parties regarding whether this was a drainage easement. Koenigs argue the County acquired a drainage easement for the express purpose of satisfying its alleged duty to adequately drain the dominant estate. The deed conveying the parcel of land to Fishers stated the deed was subject to the "drainage ditch easement."2 This language misconstrues the original 1950 contract to mean the highway commission had a permanent drainage easement. However, the 1950 document was not a typical easement in that it...

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