Koester v. Bd. of Review of Cook Cnty.

Decision Date08 February 1933
Docket NumberNo. 21382.,21382.
Citation351 Ill. 301,184 N.E. 325
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. KOESTER v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF COOK COUNTY et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Petition for writ of mandamus by the People, on the relation of George F. Koester, Jr., against the Board of Review of Cook County and others. From an order directing a writ of mandamus to issue, defendants appeal; the Board of Appeals being substituted as party appellant for the Board of Review.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

STONE and JONES, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Charles A. Williams, judge.

Roy Massena, of Chicago (Hayden N. Bell and Weymouth Kirkland, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Watkins, Ten Hoor & Gilbert, of Chicago, for appellee.

HEARD, C. J.

A petition was filed in the superior court of Cook county by the people of the state of Illinois, on relation of George F. Koester, Jr. The petition made as party defendants the board of review and Charles V. Barrett, Edward R. Litsinger, and Edward J. Hughes, as members thereof, and Robert M. Sweitzer, as county clerk of Cook county. The original petition was filed on November 6, 1931, to which the board of review and the members thereof filed a demurrer. Thereafter, by leave of court, an amended petition was filed, and later a second. This latter amendment for convenience is hereinafter referred to and treated as the petition. The second petition was on January 6, 1932, dismissed as to Robert M. Sweitzer, county clerk of Cook county. General and special demurrers were filed to the petition by the board and its members. On January 11, 1932, the death of Charles V. Barrett, one of the members of the board, on December 31, 1931, was suggested. The court overruled the general and special demurrers of the board and its members. The board and its members elected to stand by the generaland special demurrers, and the court ordered a writ of mandamus to issue. From this order directing a writ of mandamus to issue, the board of review and its members have appealed to this court.

By an act of the Legislature at its first 1932 special session, in force February 13, 1932 (Laws 1931-32, 1st, 2d & 3d Sp. Sess. p. 73) the Revenue Act was amended and section 32a was added, whereby, in counties containing 250,000 or more inhabitants, a board of appeals, consisting of two members, was created and established, and it was provided: ‘In counties containing two hundred fifty thousand or more inhabitants a board of appeals consisting of two members is hereby created and established. * * * Such board of appeals shall be the successor of the board of review in such counties containing two hundred fifty thousand or more inhabitants and immediately upon the appointment and qualification of the first members of such board of appeals, as hereinbefore provided the board of review in such counties shall deliver up to the county assessor all the books, papers, maps, plats, lists and other records of their office and thereupon such board of review shall be abolished and cease to exist.’

While this appeal was here pending, on June 22, 1932, a motion of appellants Edward R. Litsinger and Edward J. Hughes to dismiss the appeal was denied, and, it appearing to the court that the board of appeals had succeeded the board of review, the board of appeals was substituted as party appellant.

The petition consisted of twenty-three paragraphs, and, as appellants' special demurrer was directed specifically to particular paragraphs of the bill, it will be necessary in this opinion to set them out somewhat in extenso.

Paragraph 1 recites that the relator is a taxpayer of Cook county and is the owner of various parcels of real estate, upon one of which the assessed value for the year 1929 was $96,995, and the taxes thereon for that year were $5,693.61.

[351 Ill. 304]Paragraph 2, 3, 4, and 5 pertain to the organization of the record, its practices and duties.

Paragraph 6 alleges that there were enormous sums of personal property not exempt from taxation in Cook county for the year 1930 which had either been wholly omitted from taxation or grossly underassessed by the board of review; that on October 5, 1931, the board of review was notified of such omissions and underassessments by a written notice signed by the relator, which notice set forth that the board of assessors of Cook county had publicly announced that there was $172,270,000 of personal property, consisting of boats, aeroplanes, refrigerator cars, Board of Trade and Stock Exchange seats, and fire, marine, and inland transportation insurance, which had not been assessed; that, if these mentioned items were put on the assessment books, the taxes would be increased by $3,824,394; that said items were but a small part of the omitted property subject to assessment; that there were bank deposits and trust estates in banks which had not been assessed, the assessed valuation of which would be $139,420,460; that the assessed value of estates in the probate court amounted to $42,790,500; that under the statutes and in accordance with the oath of the members of the board of review it was their duty to assess all property subject to assessment; that the board of review for the year 1930 had reduced the assessment of banks and trust companies by over $47,000,000; that the demand formally called the attention of the board of review to the facts set forth and advised the members of the board of review as to their oaths of office, their bonds and other obligations; that the excuse for failure to put such omitted property on the tax books was not due to inadvertence or lack of knowledge because attention had been called to the omissions through the public press; that, if the board of review adjourned without placing enormous amounts of personal property upon the assessment books, the validity and collection of the 1930 tax would be endangered;that the failure of the taxing bodies to place available personal property on the assessment rolls of Cook county would vitiate and make illegal the 1930 assessment roll; that the real estate taxpayers of Cook county were asking for a uniform and equitable tax as provided by law; that, if the personal property mentioned in the demand, and other assessable personal property, were not placed upon the 1930 assessment books, there would be no alternative for the taxpayers but to take adequate steps to remedy the wrong and institute proper legal action against those bodies responsible for the situation.

Paragraph 7 alleged that all of the assessment books for taxes for the year 1930 have been delivered by the board of assessors to the board of review; that the board of review has held hearings thereon and turned over all of the books to Robert M. Sweitzer, county clerk of Cook county, for the purpose of making the rate and extending the tax; that the assessment books contained fraudulent and illegal assessments of property in Cook county for the year 1930; and that vast amounts of taxable personal property as set forth in the petition have been deliberately and intentionally omitted or underassessed for the year 1930.

Paragraph 8 alleged that on April 1, 1930, there were in trust in seventy state banks authorized to conduct a trust business in Chicago, estates of residents of Cook county consisting of taxable personal property, the value of which for the year 1930, after deducting therefrom all real estate and property exempt from taxation, was over $4,000,000,000; that, in addition thereto, there were sixteen national banks in Cook county authorized to transact a trust business on April 1, 1930; that in the national banks there were estates of taxable personal property of residents of Cook county in trust subject to assessment in Cook county for said year, after deducting all property exempt from taxation, in the amount of over $251,000,000. The petition then gave a list of banks and trust companies in Cook county which had in their possession, in trust or in a fiduciary capacity, personal property of residents of Cook county after deducting all property exempt from taxation for the year 1930, and in connection with the list stated amounts held by the individual banks and trust companies; and that the board of review and its members assessed the personal property held by the banks and trust companies at less than 2 per cent. of its fair cash value.

Paragraph 9 alleged that on April 1, 1930, there was on deposit by residents of Cook county in one hundred and sixty-seven state banks in said county, subject to assessment for taxes for the year 1930, the sum of $2,713,000,000, and in addition thereto collateral securities in the form of stocks, bonds, and other evidences of indebtedness which, after deducting therefrom all tax-exempt property, amounted to more than $2,500,000,000; that in the national banks in Cook county there was on April 1, 1930, subject to assessment for that year, the sum of over $2,000,000,000; and that the board of review had failed and refused to levy any assessment upon said bank deposits or collateral securities.

Paragraph 10 alleged that on April 1, 1930, there were listed in the probate court of Cook county estates of decedents and other estates of residents of Cook county subject to tax; that the values of said estates and their descriptions and the names of the owners were set out in full detail in the inventories and appraisements therein, which were available to the board of review in the county treasurer's office and in the inheritance tax department of the Attorney General's office; that said records show that the value of the estates as of April 1, 1930, was $1,927,500,000, after deducting therefrom real estate and property exempt from taxation; that all of the estates were subject to assessment for taxes for the year 1930, and for at least two years prior thereto, at the rate of 37 per cent. of their fair cash value as of April 1 for the respective ...

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14 cases
  • People ex rel. Carson v. Mateyka, 76-204
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    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • January 31, 1978
    ...shown. While mandamus is an extraordinary remedy requiring proof of a clear right to the relief sought (People ex rel. Koester v. Board of Review, 351 Ill. 301, 314, 184 N.E. 325 (1933), and mandamus is not proper where the duty of the officer must first be established (Liquor Dealers Ass'n......
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    ...highest judicial writ known to the law. People ex rel. Dolan v. Dusher, 411 Ill. 535, 104 N.E.2d 775; People ex rel. Koester v. Board of Review, 351 Ill. 301, 184 N.E. 325, 85 A.L.R. 1303. In order to prevail, the petitioners must establish by the pleadings before us that the city court of ......
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