Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 September 1981
• Docket Number: 79-4139.,Civ. A. No. 78-3942
• Citation: 522 F. Supp. 1070
• Parties: Eugene KOHR, et al., v. RAYBESTOS-MANHATTAN, INC. Rose DeCIO, v. JOHNS-MANVILLE CORP., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

522 F. Supp. 1070

Eugene KOHR, et al., v. RAYBESTOS-MANHATTAN, INC.

Rose DeCIO, v. JOHNS-MANVILLE CORP., et al.

Civ. A. Nos. 78-3942, 79-4139.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

September 21, 1981.

Before WEINER, TROUTMAN, NEWCOMER and BECHTLE, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WEINER, District Judge.

Presented to us in these and a number of other cases are claims of products liability personal injury arising out of the alleged exposure of the plaintiffs, or their spouses or decedents, while employed by the defendants, to asbestos or asbestos products produced and/or sold by the defendants.

The defendants assert as a defense to these actions the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act's exclusivity of remedy provision, which they contend provides an employee's sole legal means for recovery from his employer for work related injuries, and which they further contend thus precludes the plaintiffs from bringing these actions. Plaintiffs urge us to adopt the dual capacity theory, under which the defendants, in their capacity as manufacturers of products which allegedly caused injury to the plaintiffs, would be subject to products liability, despite the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Thus we are called upon to consider the issue of the defendants' dual capacity as both employers of those injured and manufacturers of the products allegedly causing injury, and the impact, if any, of that dual capacity on the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act and the doctrine of products liability. Intertwined with this problem is the question of how to balance two of the tensions inherent in our federal constitutional system of government: that resulting from our dual, independent federal and state court systems, and that resulting from the separation of governmental powers into three co-equal branches.

As an exceptionally large number of diversity jurisdiction cases claiming asbestos related injury have been filed in this district, including many in which the dual capacity issue has been raised, and in order to have uniformity, if possible, among the judges of the court with regard to dual capacity, this panel was designated by the Chief Judge to hear argument on the issue.¹

I

Due respect on the part of the federal government, including the judiciary, for the sovereignty of the individual states is the essence of federalism. Thus, as a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction, we are compelled to follow state law. As is a state court, we are guided in our deliberations by legislative enactment and judicial precedents, but unlike a state court, we are not free to overrule existing state precedent or chart the future course of state law in such manner as we may see fit.

Likewise, due to the pervasive scheme of checks and balances found in both the federal and state, including Pennsylvania, constitutions, and designed to prevent accumulation of excessive power in any one branch of government, courts must defer to the will of the legislature in interpreting the reach of statutory provisions and determining the scope of the common law as it may be legislatively modified.

Consequently, though courts may at times desire to forge ahead with the law in an attempt to keep pace with an ever evolving modern society, we may be circumscribed in our ability to do so by the dictates of the Constitution and the mandate of prior judicial rulings. It is precisely such a dilemma with regard to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act with which we are presented by these cases, for guided by these precepts, we must determine the extent of the exclusivity of remedy provision of that Act when asserted as a defense to an action for products liability.

II

A

The right of an employee to compensation for accidentally inflicted work related injury or death is governed by the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 481(a), which provides as follows:

"The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employes, his legal representatives, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death ... or occupational disease...."

Thus, by its terms, the Act provides the sole and exclusive remedy for injuries within its scope. Wagner v. National Indemnity Co., 492 Pa. 154, 422 A.2d 1061 (1980); Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 123 A.2d 837 (1956). See, Bayless v. Phila. National League Club, 472 F.Supp. 625 (E.D.Pa. 1979).

"As a broad, remedial statute, the act was passed to protect employees and their families by insuring a quick and certain payment for work-related injuries without having to resort to the courts,

* * * * * *

Both the employer and the employee relinquished certain rights to obtain other advantages. For the worker, he no longer had to prove negligence, in return, the employee had to accept a limited, though certain recovery. The employer, on the other hand, guaranteed compensation to an injured employee in return for the exclusivity of the workmen's compensation liability to its employees."

Wagner v. National Indemnity Co., 492 Pa. 154, 422 A.2d 1061, 1065 (1980).

While an employer is liable without regard to negligence or fault, it is not a purpose of the Act to insure the life and health of the employee. Monahan v. Seeds and Durham, 336 Pa. 62, 6 A.2d 889 (1939). The Act has the intended effect of having the economic burden resulting from industrial accidents borne by industry, and ultimately, the public, rather than the injured worker. Girardi v. Penna. Power and Light Co., 174 F.Supp. 813, 916 (1959), aff'd, sub nom, Girardi v. Lipsett, Inc., 275 F.2d 492 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 364 U.S. 821, 81 S.Ct. 56, 5 L.Ed.2d 50 (1960). Thus, the Act is a humanitarian, remedial measure, and must be liberally construed. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Overmyer Mold, 473 Pa. 369, 374-75, 374 A.2d 689, 691 (1977).

B

The law of products liability recognizes that "today ... a manufacturer ... is effectively the guarantor of his product's safety.... A manufacturer, by marketing and advertising his product, impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use.... No societal interest is served by permitting the manufacturer to place a defective article in the stream of commerce and then to avoid responsibility for damages caused by the defect." Salvador v. Atlantic Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974).

Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted the modern view that the "risk of loss must be placed upon the supplier of the defective product without regard to fault...." Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). This change in legal philosophy from the principle of caveat emptor which prevailed in the nineteenth, and indeed, well into the twentieth, century marketplace was inspired by the "development of a sophisticated and complex industrial society with its proliferation of new products and vast changes in the private enterprise system...." Id. at 553, 391 A.2d at 1023. In an "era of giant corporate structures" it is now the consumer, not the manufacturer, who must be protected. "The realities of our economic society as it exists today forces the conclusion that the risk of loss for injury resulting from defective products should be borne by the suppliers, principally because they are in a position to absorb the loss by distributing it as a cost of doing business." Id.

C

Under the dual capacity doctrine, "an employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of those imposed on him as employer." 2A Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 72-80, at p. 14-112. The rationale behind the dual capacity theory as presented to us in these cases is that the existence of an employment relationship between the injured party and the manufacturer of the product causing the injury is of reduced importance when viewed in the context of a products liability action. As applied to products liability cases, the theory reasons that since the employer is also the manufacturer of the product which allegedly caused injury and which would thus give rise to products liability were it not for the existence of the employment relationship, liability ought not to be avoided merely because of that employment relationship. Rather, the theory proposes, the societal interests which led to the adoption of products liability are so strong as to transcend those interests which are behind the exclusivity of remedy provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

In other words, dual capacity theory states, with the advent of products liability, an employer, in its capacity as a manufacturer, owes an additional, and independent, legal obligation to its employees, as users of the employer-manufacturer's product, beyond that which it owes to its employees solely as a result of their employment relationship, and that additional obligation may give rise to product liability actions despite the exclusivity provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Moreover, since the manufacturer's legal duty to act as the "guarantor" of a product's safety exists independently of the manufacturer's status as an employer, and extends to all foreseeable users of the product other than the manufacturer's employees, plaintiffs argue that it is inequitable that those employees be limited in their ability to seek compensation for their injuries. It is further asserted that unless the dual capacity theory is adopted, manufacturers will be able to avoid responsibility for the consequences of their placing defective products into the marketplace, at least as regards their employees, and thereby subvert the salutory purposes behind...