Thomeier v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 June 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-274 Erie.
• Citation: 928 F. Supp. 548
• Parties: Lenise THOMEIER, Permanent Plenary Guardian of the Person and the Estate of Stephen Thomeier, a totally incapacitated person, and Lenise Thomeier, Plaintiffs, v. RHÔNE-POULENC, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

928 F. Supp. 548

Lenise THOMEIER, Permanent Plenary Guardian of the Person and the Estate of Stephen Thomeier, a totally incapacitated person, and Lenise Thomeier, Plaintiffs, v. RHÔNE-POULENC, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 95-274 Erie.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

June 5, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Neil R. Rosen, Kapetan, Meyers, Rosen, Louik & Raizman, Pittsburgh, PA, for Lenise Thomeier.

Charles M. Tea, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Pittsburgh, PA, for Rhône-Poulenc, Inc.

MEMORANDUM

McLAUGHLIN, District Judge.

The Defendant, Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. ("RPI"), has moved to dismiss this action under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, this motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Stephen Thomeier was severely injured on October 14, 1993 while working for RPI near Oil City, Pennsylvania. On July 15, 1994, Thomeier instituted an action in this Court against Rhône-Poulenc Specialty Chemicals Company ("Specialty"), Pennzoil Company, and Pennzoil Products Company. See Thomeier v. Rhône-Poulenc Specialty Chemicals Co., Civ.Action No. 94-200 Erie (W.D.Pa.) (the "Specialty action"). As in this action, Thomeier sought to recover damages for his injuries,¹ and Lenise Thomeier sought to recover for her loss of consortium. Specialty was identified as the owner and possessor of the land on which Thomeier worked. RPI was not named as a defendant in the Specialty action, apparently because Thomeier believed that he would have been precluded under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 Pa.Stat. §§ 1 et seq. (the "WCA"), from recovering any damages from RPI. All parties agree that RPI was Thomeier's employer, as that term is defined in 77 Pa.Stat. § 21, at the time of the accident. The Specialty action remains pending before this Court and has been aggressively litigated by all parties.

Effective December 31, 1994, Specialty merged into RPI. Complaint at ¶ 7. In connection with this merger, RPI filed certificates of ownership and merger with the secretaries of state of New York and Delaware. Id. at ¶ 8; Ex. C to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint. In these documents, RPI's board of directors resolved, inter alia, "that this Corporation assume all of the obligations of Rhône-Poulenc Specialty Chemicals Co." Ex. C at C-3.

Thomeier asserts that, because RPI has become the successor to the interests, including the liabilities, of Specialty, RPI "is responsible for paying any judgment which Plaintiff may obtain against Specialty, and as a result, RPI must be named as a Defendant." Complaint at ¶ 9. Plaintiffs seek money damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

RPI's first argument is that this action must be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not appropriate on the ground that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but only if the right claimed is "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy." Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666, 94 S.Ct. 772, 777, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974)). "The threshold to withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is thus lower than that required to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir.1989).

Bonnett Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 889 F.Supp. 208, 209-10 (W.D.Pa.1995). A plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on a motion under Rule 12(b)(1). Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222, 111 S.Ct. 2839, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1991).

RPI also argues that this action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 163-65, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1161, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). The proper inquiry is "whether relief could be granted ... `under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co., 39 F.3d 70, 71 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, ___, 114 S.Ct. 798, 803, 127 L.Ed.2d 99 (1994)). If no cause of action can be identified, dismissal is proper.

III. DISCUSSION

RPI raises a number of arguments in support of its motion. First, it asserts that, as Thomeier's employer at the time of the October 1993 accident, it is immune from suit under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Second, it submits that this action is not ripe. Third, it claims that the Complaint fails to plead the amount in controversy necessary to support the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Finally, it alleges that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Complaint is ripe. It is susceptible of at least two readings:

1) that RPI will be liable to Thomeier for any judgment that he is able to obtain against Specialty; or

2) that RPI is liable to Thomeier for damages caused by Specialty's negligence because, pursuant to the merger, it has assumed Specialty's liabilities.

On the first reading, RPI would be correct that this action does not present a ripe case or controversy for adjudication. Under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the federal judicial power is limited to actual cases or controversies that arise within certain categories. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir.1995); Presbytery of New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir.1994). "The courts will not decide a case where the claim involves `contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.'" Binker v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738, 753 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting 13A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3532, at 112 (1984)). An effort to obtain money damages on the basis of a judgment that does not now — and may never — exist would clearly not present a real case or controversy.

No similar problem exists with the second possible reading of the Complaint. Thomeier alleges that RPI is directly liable to him as a result of the negligence of Specialty. He further alleges that this liability arises because RPI is the successor-in-interest to Specialty. If these allegations are proven and no adequate defense is demonstrated, they could give Thomeier an immediate right to recover against RPI. Thus, the Complaint presents a ripe controversy.

RPI also alleges that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Thomeier's claim because he has failed to plead the necessary amount in controversy. To establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 on the basis of diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must plead that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. In his original Complaint, Thomeier alleged only that his damages exceeded $20,000. However, in the Amended Complaint, which was filed of right, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a) ("A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served...."); Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1431 n. 9 (3d Cir.1989) (motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading), Thomeier has corrected this problem. Thus, the amount-in-controversy requirement has been met and is no bar to this Court's exercise of jurisdiction.

RPI also submits that this action should be dismissed because, even if this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, Thomeier cannot recover any damages. RPI notes that the WCA provides that worker's compensation benefits are ordinarily the exclusive remedy available to an employee — or his or her spouse — against his or her statutory employer for injuries sustained in the course of employment. 77 Pa.Stat. § 481(a). The company argues that, because it was Thomeier's statutory employer at the time of the accident, recovery is limited to the worker's compensation benefits that have already been received and that will be received in the future.

This is not a case in which RPI, as Thomeier's employer, has agreed in the certificate of merger to indemnify Specialty for any recovery against Specialty by RPI employees injured at work. All parties point to the provision of the WCA that allows an injured worker to sue a third party other than his employer:

In the event injury or death to an employe is caused by a third party, then such employe, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages by reason thereof, may bring their action at law against such third party, but the employer, his insurance carrier, their servants and agents, employes, representatives acting on their behalf or at their request shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contribution, or indemnity in any action at law, or otherwise, unless liability for such damages, contributions or indemnity shall be expressly provided for in a written contract entered into by the party alleged to be liable prior to the date of the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action.

77 Pa.Stat. § 481(b) (emphasis added). The language of the certificate of merger lacks the clarity necessary to waive an employer's immunity from suit. To constitute an effective waiver, a contractual provision "must specifically provide that a named employer agrees to indemnify a named third party from liability for the acts of that party's negligence which cause harm to the named employer's employees." Snare v. Ebensburg Power Co., 431 Pa.Super. 515, ...