Koike v. Board of Water Supply, City and County of Honolulu

• Decision Date: 23 February 1960
• Docket Number: No. 4081,4081
• Citation: 44 Haw. 100,352 P.2d 835
• Parties: , 44 Haw. 146 Edna S. KOIKE, Shoji Sekiya, Yachiyo Baba Sekiya, Janyce Chiyo Maekawa and Helen M. Baba, v. BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 835

352 P.2d 835

44 Haw. 100, 44 Haw. 146

Edna S. KOIKE, Shoji Sekiya, Yachiyo Baba Sekiya, Janyce Chiyo Maekawa and Helen M. Baba, v. BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU.

No. 4081.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Feb. 23, 1960.

Rehearing Denied March 23, 1960.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The essence of a moral obligation is that it arises out of a state of facts appealing to a universal sense of justice and fairness, though, upon such facts no legally enforceable claim can be based. It is generally recognized that a moral obligation is more than a mere desire to do charity or to appropriate money in acknowledgment of gratitude. It is an obligation which, though lacking any foundation cognizable in law, springs from a sense of justice and equity, that an honorable person would entertain, but not from a mere sense of doing benevolence or charity.

2. Whether a moral obligation exists in a particular situation is primarily a question of policy and ethics rather than one of law, and the legislature accordingly is vested with a broad discretion in determining what shall constitute a valid moral obligation, subject to judicial control only when its action is a clear and palpable abuse of this discretion. The legislature is the keeper of the state's conscience. It and it alone determines where lies the state's moral duty.

3. The prohibition in Section 55 of the Hawaiian Organic Act against grants of 'special or exclusive privilege' does not apply to legislative acts authorizing payment of a private claim against the Territory, based upon a moral obligation.

4. Within the framework of the fundamental doctrine respecting the separation of powers of government, some flexibility must be infused. Since the legislative branch of the government has exclusive power to consider governmental moral obligations, in order to conscientiously carry out its responsibility, it must be able, without undue encroachment upon the judicial province, to incidentally consider and adjudge, to its own satisfaction, all facts and contentions underlying a claim, although the exercise of such incidental function may, because of its basic nature, be more properly considered as a judicial process.

Stanley Ling, Deputy City & County Atty., Honolulu (Norman K. Chung, City & County Atty., Honolulu, on opening and reply briefs; Albert W. Evensen, Deputy City & County Atty., Honolulu, also on reply brief), for defendant-appellant.

George T. Nakamura, Honolulu, (also on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.

Norman K. Chung, Corp. Counsel, and Ben F. Kaito, Deputy Corp. Counsel, for the petition for rehearing.

Before TSUKIYAMA, C. J., and MARUMOTO, CASSIDY, WIRTZ and LEWIS, JJ.

WIRTZ, Justice.

The question for decision is whether the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii exceeded its authority in enacting Acts 262, 263, 264 and 265 of the 29th Regular Session (1957) ¹ by which specified sums were appropriated out of the revenues of defendant-appellant as maximum compensation to plaintiffs-appellees for property damages sustained as a result of a break in a water main belonging to and under the control of defendant, the actual amount of compensation to be determined 'upon proof of damages established before the Circuit Court of the First (Judicial) Circuit.'

Plaintiffs brought the present proceeding in the Circuit Court, First Circuit, to recover upon their claims as specified and sanctioned by the Acts. The complaint cited the Acts as authority for the actions at law therein contained and prayed for damages in the maximum amounts allowed. The court, finding the Acts valid, denied the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.

The case comes here on interlocutory appeal from the Order Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to dismiss, the ground of such motion being that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and assigns two specifications of error:

(1) The Acts upon which the complaint is based propose to grant special privileges to plaintiffs, in violation of Section 55 of the Organic Act, 48 U.S.C.A. § 562, and

(2) The Acts upon which the complaint is based represent an invasion by the Legislature into the powers of the Judiciary.

In passing, as we must, on the question of the validity of the Acts in question, it is incumbent upon us to be mindful of fundamental and guiding principles to be applied. 'While the judicial department of the government has the power and is under the duty, in proper cases, to declare laws unconstitutional, there can be no doubt at this day that laws duly passed by the legislature are to be deemed constitutional and valid unless the contrary clearly appears. All presumptions are in favor of constitutionality and validity. In cases of doubt, the doubts must be resolved in favor of constitutionality and validity. So, also, if the power exercised in the enactment of a law depends for its validity upon the existence of facts and circumstances, the presumption is that the necessary facts and circumstances did exist, until the contrary is clearly shown. With reference to all of these presumptions, favorable to constitutionality and validity, the burden is upon the person attacking the constitutionality of the law to show that the enactment cannot be supported as the exercise of any of the powers vested in the legislature or by the existing facts and circumstances.' In re Mott-Smith, 29 Haw. 343, 346.

Especially is this true where, as here, we are called upon to determine whether or not there has been an encroachment by the legislative branch of government upon functions normally considered reserved to the judiciary. Too often, courts in their zeal to safeguard their prerogatives overlook the pitfalls of their own trespass on legislative functions. Mr. Justice Stone, in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, at page 78, 56 S.Ct. 312, at page 325, 80 L.Ed. 477, stated succinctly in his timely and thought-provoking AAA dissent, that '[The] the power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject to two guiding principles of decision which ought never to be absent from judicial consciousness. One is that courts are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not with their wisdom. The other is that while unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint. For the removal of unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies, not to the courts, but to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government.' This doctrine of judicial self-restraint became the beacon by which the Supreme Court steered its way through the troubled waters of questioned legislation. 'This restriction upon the judicial function, in passing on the constitutionality of statutes, is not artificial or irrational. A state legislature, in the enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the limits of the Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue of the considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence of such a record courts cannot assume that its action is capricious, or that, with its informed acquaintance with local conditions to which the legislation is to be applied, it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for its action. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to perserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.' Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510, 57 S.Ct. 868, 872, 81 L.Ed. 1245; Cf., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385; Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568.

Since this case involves an appeal from an interlocutory order of the circuit court all of the surrounding facts and circumstances have not been presented. The complaint herein (the facts set forth therein being admitted by the Motion to Dismiss) alleges only that the causes of action are brought under and by virtue of the Acts which are incorporated by reference into and made a part of the complaint.

The Acts before us are special enactments constituting legislative recognition of the claims of plaintiffs for property damages sustained as a result of a break occurring in the water main of defendant fronting their premises. No legal basis for this recognition is apparent. The purpose and effect of the Acts was to create an obligation upon the government to pay plaintiffs' claims where none existed before. The only basis for such legislative action is the recognition of a moral obligation. This is borne out by the contents of Senate Standing Committee Report No. 784. ²

A moral obligation has been defined in this jurisdiction as '* * * one 'which cannot be enforced by action but which is binding on the party who incurs it in conscience and according to natural justice.'' In re Tavares,26 Haw. 101, 104.

The United States Supreme Court pictures it this way. '* * * The nation, speaking broadly, owes a 'debt' to an individual when his claim grows out of general principles of right and justice, when, in other words, it is based upon considerations of a moral or merely honorary nature, such as are binding on the conscience or the honor of an individual, although the debt could obtain no recognition in a court of law. * * *.' United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440, 16 S.Ct. 1120, 1125, 41 L.Ed. 215.

The essence of a moral obligation is that it arises out of a state of facts appealing to a universal sense of justice and fairness, though, upon such facts no legally enforceable claim can be based. The state may be said to owe a...