Kokesh's Estate, Matter of, 83-14
Decision Date | 07 June 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 83-14,83-14 |
Citation | 664 P.2d 127 |
Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Hugh N. KOKESH, Deceased. Charles R. KOKESH, Kim C. Kokesh, Michael O. Kokesh, and Patricia G. Kokesh, Appellants (Objectors), v. Joseph A. KOKESH, Appellee (Petitioner). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Michael A. Maycock of Daly, Maycock, Anderson & Taylor, Gillette, for appellants.
Richard S. Dumbrill of Jones, Dumbrill & Hansen, Newcastle, for appellee.
Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, JJ.
This case was first before us over twenty years ago, In re Kokesh's Estate, Wyo., 360 P.2d 368 (1961). In 1961 this court issued a mandate to the district court sitting in probate directing it to modify the decree of distribution.
The parties in the case here were parties and heirs of parties involved in In re Kokesh's Estate, supra. In 1982 Joseph Kokesh, legatee under the will, who is the appellee in the present case, petitioned the trial court to carry out our 1961 mandate. Charles R. Kokesh, Kim C. Kokesh, Michael O. Kokesh and Patricia G. Kokesh, heirs of the deceased Charles R. Kokesh, another legatee under the will, objected to appellee's petition. After hearing, the district court sitting in probate granted appellee's petition and entered its "Order Modifying Decree of Settlement of Accounts and Distribution Pursuant to Mandate of the Wyoming Supreme Court," from which appellants appeal.
We affirm.
When this court decided the case In re Kokesh's Estate, supra, the question centered on what interest the legatees were to receive under the terms of Hugh N. Kokesh's will. Charles R. Kokesh appealed the decree of distribution, alleging that Joseph Kokesh was not abiding by the terms of the will. The will left a life estate to the testator's wife, Louise Kokesh, including the power to mortgage or dispose of the real property, except that she could not make a testamentary disposition of the property. The will also provided:
Charles R. Kokesh contended that under the will his interest was a vested remainder interest, and that, until Joseph Kokesh paid him, he and Joseph Kokesh were co-owners instead of merely creditor and debtor. This court agreed. We directed the probate court:
* * * "In re Kokesh's Estate, supra, at 371.
The probate court in 1982 added the following language to the original decree:
We have stated the rule concerning a court's power on remand:
Sanders v. Gregory, Wyo., 652 P.2d 25, 26 (1982).
Here, the court below used our exact words of In re Kokesh's Estate, supra, in its modification. Appellants specifically object to the last sentence that the title to the whole of the land shall become the sole property of Joseph Kokesh. They argue that the probate court quieted title, which it did not have jurisdiction to do.
"Lawyers spend a great deal of their time shoveling smoke," according to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. That appears to be what appellants are doing here. They want us to believe that the wording is incorrect because neither they nor appellee would be able to bring "a quiet title action, partition suit, or other appropriate action * * * in the district court to settle the issue of when the seven years commences." Appellants make two incorrect assumptions. First, the trial court order modifying the decree did not quiet title in Joseph Kokesh. Second, the questions of when the seven-year period starts to run and of whether Joseph Kokesh has complied with the terms of the will are questions of interpretation of the will, to be handled in probate court.
It is unquestioned that in Wyoming a probate court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate title to property.
" * * * In Estate of Blaney, Wyo., 607 P.2d 354 (1980), this court quoted from the controlling rule * * * to the effect that title to property as between the estate, the heirs or devisees and a third person may not be tried in probate proceedings. * * * " Matter of Estate of Harrington, Wyo., 648 P.2d 556, 559 (1982).
However, the decree of modification does not purport to quiet title. It only says that when appellee has complied with the terms of the will, the title to all of the land shall become his. Whatever title Hugh Kokesh had which was not disposed of by Louise Kokesh will pass to appellee upon compliance with the terms of the will. This decree determines the respective rights of appellee and of Charles R. Kokesh's heirs, not the type of title.
As to appellants' second assumption, they imply that they might want to go into district court to decide when the seven years commence. When a court is operating as a probate court, it is true that it may only consider matters relating to distribution and settlement of estates. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Cheyenne v. First National Bank and Trust...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Harrison v. Harrison
... ... As a preliminary matter, we find that the ... mandate is ambiguous. Where a mandate is ambiguous, ... proceedings have been reviewed.' ") (citation omitted); In re Estate of Kokesh, 664 P.2d 127, 129 (Wyo.1983); Sanders v. Gregory, 652 P.2d 25, ... ...
-
Rush v. Golkowski
... ... the entry of default and proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on the matter. She further contends that the court abused its discretion and violated ... ...
-
Rowe v. Walker (In re Rowe)
...492 P.3d 888In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF Deidra Michayle Walker ROWE, deceased:Tony Rowe, Personal ... ...